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ABSTRACT
This dissertation synthesizes theory and research in 
economics, social psychology, sociology and management to 
present and test a model of employee propensity to withhold 
effort (PWE) in work groups in 10 organizations. The 
dissertation extends to work organizations Knoke's (1990) 
synthesized motivation model, which suggests that rational, 
normative conformity and affective bonding incentives act 
together to predict whether people will contribute to 
collective activities. A study of 570 private-sector 
employees found that when employees perceived high degrees 
of task visibility, group effort norms, equity and altruism, 
they would be less likely to withhold effort in job-related 
tasks. As predicted, payment of a wage premium, controlling 
for alternative unemployment opportunities, was negatively 
related to PWE in two of four variants of the dependent 
variable. Work group size was positively related to PWE in 
two of four variants of the dependent variable. Whereas 
the complete model was not supported in multivariate 
analyses, results indicated that contextual variables are 
important predictors of PWE and merit further study.
xi
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This dissertation brings together theory and research 
in economics, social psychology, sociology, and management 
to present a model that depicts conditions under which 
employees are likely to withhold effort in completing 
assigned tasks. An important element of the dissertation is 
the extension of Knoke's synthesized motivation model 
(Knoke, 1990; Knoke & Wright-Isak, 1982) to work 
organizations. The model blends rational, normative 
conformity and affective bonding incentives to predict 
whether people will contribute to collective activities.
Concern about employee propensity to withhold effort 
(PWE) goes back to management pioneers such as Frederick 
Taylor (1911), whose scientific management was designed, in 
part, to prevent workers from limiting the amount of work 
they would do in a day. In the Hawthorne studies, observers 
discovered how informal norms could hold production at 
levels that group members felt were appropriate 
(Roethlisberger & Dickson, 1939). Since then, various 
studies have focused on withholding effort, at work and 
elsewhere (e.g., Cappelli & Chauvin, 1991a; Latane, Williams 
& Harkins, 1979; Marwell & Ames, 1979, 1980; Roy, 1952).
This study considers relations among variables such as 
group size, task interdependence, task visibility, 
opportunities for establishing and repeating cooperation,
1
group demography, perceptions of group compliance effort 
norms and of altruism, and employee PWE.
Need for the Study
The proposed study is needed because (a) an integrated 
model of PWE determinants has not been proposed and tested, 
(b) previous research into PWE has overemphasized self- 
interest motives, (c) previous research into PWE has not 
considered on-going work groups across organizations, and 
(d) gaining knowledge of such group processes may enhance 
organizational effectiveness by improving performance by 
work teams.
Although there have been several PWE studies, there has 
not been an attempt to test a model integrating determinants 
that are theoretically important in predicting when 
employees are likely to withhold effort. Theorists have 
proposed models with which to study PWE (e.g., Jones, 1984; 
Spicer, 1985), but their models have not been empirically 
tested in on-going work groups. Previous research has 
concentrated on a few of the determinants that may 
contribute to employee PWE. For example, George (1992) 
studied perceived task visibility and intrinsic motivation 
as predictors of PWE. Contextual characteristics that may 
explain employee PWE, such as group size, task 
interdependence, and perceived group norms were not 
addressed in her study.
In addition, previous models have stressed rational 
cost-benefit analysis in attempting to explain PWE (Jones, 
1984) . In doing so, they neglect on-going social influence 
processes. Economic theories —  and their management 
applications —  generally fail to consider the impact of 
social structure, such as group norms, on predispositions, 
or they treat social structure as something that sets action 
in motion and then does not intervene (Granovetter, 1985).
Many work-group phenomena in business organizations 
(e.g., concern for other team members, prosocial behavior 
and organizational citizenship), may contain elements that 
cannot be explained by pure calculation, but involve moral 
incentives (Shamir, 1990). No existing model brings 
together rational cost-benefit considerations as well as 
conformity to norms and employee desires to establish 
emotional attachments with co-workers to suggest how these 
variables might predict PWE. Following Knoke's (1990; Knoke 
& Wright-Isak, 1982) work in collective-action 
organizations, this study will attempt this synthesis.
A major unanswered question concerning PWE is the 
extent to which job context and group composition help shape 
levels of individual effort in work groups. It is important 
to address this question because managers as well as 
academics continue to emphasize that group performance can 
enhance or inhibit organizational effectiveness 
(Bettenhausen, 1991). Thus far, most studies of withholding
effort have used small-group laboratory simulations or work 
groups in a single organization. Studying more than one 
organization provides greater contextual information, and 
may confirm in existing groups the findings from research of 
temporary groups that were formed to be studied and then 
disbanded. It is important to study PWE in existing work 
groups because much of the research into related topics has 
taken place in newly formed groups of strangers where 
interpersonal relationships have yet to crystalize (Levine & 
Moreland, 1990; Shepperd, 1993). Studying individual 
behavior in work-group contexts may yield results not seen 
in other studies because employee perceptions and 
predispositions may be shaped by informal relationships and 
norms that do not fully develop in temporary groups.
Finally, if important antecedents to withholding effort 
can be identified in existing work groups, managers could 
use this information to improve organizational 
effectiveness. Organizations beset with productivity 
problems are likely to be ineffective in coping with a tough 
competitive environment, and their survival could be 
threatened. Identifying variables that contribute to 
employee PWE may aid organizations in making necessary 
changes to obtain optimal group performance.
Shirking. Social Loafing and Free Riding
The terms shirking (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972), social 
loafing (Latane, Williams & Harkins, 1979) and free riding
(Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985a) have been employed in studies 
of withholding effort. Whereas shirking, social loafing and 
free riding have been used to describe similar phenomena by 
researchers in different disciplines, they often have been 
treated as conceptually distinct. Articles on these three 
topics sometimes use the terms synonymously and sometimes 
define them differently. Some authors mention two of the 
terms and not the third; some only employ one of the terms.
Exhibit 1.1 lists definitions of the three terms used 
in previous PWE theory and research. In brief, the 
literature summarized in this chapter suggests that 
shirking, social loafing and free riding all involve 
individuals withholding effort while performing a task, that 
social loafing and shirking are related to imperfect 
monitoring of effort, and that free riding may be a tendency 
that occurs because of the nature of a group's task.1
Shirking, social loafing, and free riding are defined 
as follows. Shirking is the tendency for employees not to 
give full effort in performing a work-related task. 
Propensity to shirk is a likelihood that an employee will 
not provide full effort. The focus is on effort, rather 
than performance, because the former is most directly under 
employees' control, where the latter depends on various 
factors that may be outside employees' control. In 
addition, employees with less ability may give 100 percent
6Exhibit 1.1
Definitions of shirking, social loafing and free riding
SHIRKING
AUTHOR DISCIPLINE DEFINITION
Alchian & 
Demsetz, 
1972
Economics With several members on the 
team, each has an incentive 
to cheat the others by 
engaging in more than an 
average amount of leisure 
if the employer cannot tell 
at zero cost which employee 
is taking more than 
average. As a result, the 
total productivity of the 
team is lowered.
Leibowitz &
Tollison,
1980
Economics Shirking is an increase in 
an individual's tendency to 
supply less effort.
Jones, 1984 Management Shirking occurs when a 
person has a positive 
incentive to supply less 
effort.
Cappelli &
Chauvin,
1991a
Economics Shirking was equated with 
unproductive behavior in 
this study.
SOCIAL
LOAFING
Latane, Social In clapping and shouting
Williams, & Psychology tasks, subjects exhibited a
Harkins, sizable decrease in
1979 individual effort when 
performing in groups 
compared to when they 
performed alone. The 
decrease, termed social 
loafing, is in addition to 
losses from faulty 
coordination of group 
efforts.
(exhibit con'd)
7Kerr & 
Bruun, 1983
Social
Psychology
Social loafing is a 
motivation loss in groups 
caused by reduced 
identifiability or 
evaluation.
Williams & 
Karau, 1991
Social
Psychology
Social loafing is a 
tendency to reduce one's 
effort when working 
collectively compared with 
individually on the same 
task.
FREE RIDING
Stigler, 
1974
Economics Free riding is a tendency 
for individuals to fail to 
participate in collectively 
profitable activities in 
the absence of coercion or 
individual incentives.
Leibowitz &
Tollison,
1980
Economics Free riding is a dilution 
in the concern to control 
costs.
Jones, 1984 Management Free riding occurs when a 
person has a negative 
incentive to control or 
minimize costs.
Albanese & 
Van Fleet, 
1985a
Management Free riding is a passive 
reaction to task 
conditions. Free rider is 
a group member who obtains 
benefits from the group but 
does not bear a 
proportional share of the 
costs.
(exhibit con'd)
8Albanese & 
Van Fleet, 
1985b
Management Free riding behavior is 
manifested in a variety of 
ways, including social 
loafing, shirking, 
excessive argumentation, 
'dropping out', and 
attempts at individual 
domination.
effort and not perform as well as those who give less than 
100 percent effort. Thus, employees giving less than 100 
percent are shirking even though their output may be higher 
than those giving more effort.
Social loafing is a special case of shirking that 
occurs in groups. Social loafing is a tendency to reduce 
one's effort when working collectively compared with 
individually on the same task (Williams & Karau, 1991). 
Social loafing involves a loss in contribution from declines 
in motivation rather than coordination (Steiner, 1972).
Free riding is also a special case of shirking that 
happens in a group context, but it occurs by passive 
reaction to conditions rather than an active attempt to 
withhold effort. Free riding is a tendency for individuals 
to fail to participate in collectively profitable activities 
in the absence of coercion or individual inducements 
(Stigler, 1974). As Jones (1984) states, free riding might 
occur when there are negative incentives for each employee 
to control or minimize production costs. A defining feature 
of free riding is the instance in which it occurs: 
production of public goods.
A public good has two characteristics (Albanese & Van 
Fleet, 1985a; Olson, 1965): (a) Impossibility of exclusion. 
No one can be prevented from using the good. (b) Jointness 
of supply. If a good has jointness of supply, its 
consumption by one person does not reduce the amount 
available to others. Public goods, such as low production 
costs, committee reports, a drug-free workplace, safer 
working conditions, or increased departmental reputation, 
must be provided to all group members if they are provided 
to any group member. None of these goods can be consumed 
individually, and in many cases benefits cannot be 
restricted to the group that helped produce them (Shamir, 
1990).
The common denominator of shirking, social loafing, and 
free riding is an individual who provides less than 100 
percent participation or effort, and the difference among 
the three concepts may be the reason why, or context in 
which, a lack of participation or a drop in effort occurs.
In shirking, withholding effort can result from various 
motivations and circumstances, such as monitoring 
difficulties, self-interested behavior, and opportunism. In 
social loafing, withholding effort results as one moves from 
an individual performing alone to the same individual 
performing in a group, perhaps because a collective task is 
involved and individuals can hide in a crowd. In free 
riding, withholding effort occurs because public goods are
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involved, and it is rational not to contribute because free 
riders believe they can receive the goods by letting others 
produce them.
Economists have attempted to predict when shirking 
(i.e., withholding effort) will occur based on whether above 
market wages are paid in times when employees lack 
alternative employment opportunities (Cappelli & Chauvin, 
1991a; Yellen, 1984). Psychological research has 
concentrated on social loafing and attempts to predict when 
withholding effort in group activities will occur based on 
group size and whether tasks are identifiable and visible 
(Harkins & Petty, 1982; Williams, Harkins & Latane, 1981), 
and whether there is equity within the group (Jackson & 
Harkins, 1985). Sociological research has looked at free 
riding and collective action in providing public goods 
(e.g., Marwell & Ames, 1979, 1980, 1981; Oliver, Marwell & 
Teixeira, 1985) and tried to predict when withholding effort 
will occur based on normative influences on group members 
and the presence of a critical mass of support. Management 
theorists and researchers have pursued all three avenues: 
social loafing (e.g., Earley, 1989, 1993; Schnake, 1991a), 
shirking (e.g., Judge & Chandler, 1990), and free riding 
(e.g., Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985a).
The following example involving provision of a public 
good may help clarify (a) how shirking, social loafing and 
free riding are similar, (b) how all three concepts can be
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present simultaneously and studied in a work group and (c) 
how all three concepts are due to withholding effort by 
individuals.
An employee belongs to a five-member work group at the 
XYZ corporation, which pays all members based on group 
productivity. While working with the group one day, the 
employee does not provide full effort on a job-related task. 
Observers might label the employee's behavior shirking, 
social loafing, or free riding, perhaps depending upon their 
research orientation. Economists may consider the behavior 
shirking because it was unproductive leisure that lowered 
total output of the work group. Social psychologists may 
label the behavior social loafing because lack of effort 
resulted from reduced identifiability because the employee 
worked in a group, rather than alone. Sociologists might 
consider the lack of effort to be free riding because a 
public good (group output) was involved, and the employee 
permitted co-workers to make greater contributions. Yet, 
the employee shares the group reward despite giving less 
effort than others. In summary, shirking, social loafing, 
and free riding may confound an employee's behavior with the 
reasons for and the context in which it occurred.
Reasons to Study Withholding Effort in Groups
Propensity to withhold effort (PWE) is a common 
characteristic of shirking, social loafing, and free riding. 
It is used as the dependent variable in this study because
12
it encompasses varied tasks, different settings, and 
individual predispositions whereas shirking, social loafing 
and free riding are more specific applications. Studying 
PWE in general terms may provide clues about how and when 
processes such as shirking, social loafing and free riding 
occur.
This study addresses an overriding research question: 
How do contextual organizational elements relate to the 
propensity of employees to withhold effort in work groups? 
But this implies another question: Why are group contexts
important to the study of an individual's PWE? The first 
reason is that whereas withholding effort is a behavior 
engaged in by individuals, it occurs and is usually studied 
in the context of group and organizational activities, and 
can be a function of group characteristics (e.g. Jones,
1984; Latane, Williams & Harkins, 1979; Spicer, 1985).
Withholding effort becomes more prevalent when group 
members have less incentive to contribute effort because 
their individual contributions cannot be measured (i.e., 
task visibility is low; Jones, 1984; Spicer, 1985). Several 
incentives could influence PWE, including (a) the inability 
of the supervisor to monitor what employees are doing 
(Yellen, 1984), (b) the employee's perception that strong
compliance norms (Heckathorn, 199 0) in the group require 
certain effort levels, (c) the perceived presence of 
altruism among co-workers (Spicer, 1985), and (d) the lack
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of opportunity for repeated interaction among co-workers 
(Spicer, 1985). These incentives all emanate from 
interaction in the work group. Hypotheses regarding the 
relationship of these contextual variables to PWE will be 
discussed in Chapter 2.
This study considers relationships between two 
interdependent components: individuals and work groups. A 
social system is formed from the mutual activities, 
interactions and sentiments of active work-group members 
(Homans, 1950). As is true in relations between individuals 
and collective action organizations (Knoke, 1990), links 
between a work group and its members produce many important 
research questions. These include how variables such as 
size, incentives, a group's formal and informal means of 
governance, demography, and norms constrain predispositions 
and actions of group members.
In relating an individual to a collective action 
organization, Knoke (1990) suggests that the most proper 
theoretical stance is methodological individualism, which 
views social phenomena as reciprocal relations between 
individuals and groups in the social system. Knoke (1990) 
suggests that the first step in studying collective action 
organizations is considering the process by which people get 
involved in these organizations: how they decide to join, 
how much they participate, the extent of their psychological 
commitment. He brings together three theoretical
14
perspectives in addressing how individuals are motivated to 
join and make contributions: rational choice, normative 
conformity and affective bonding.
In this attempt to extend his model to work groups, it 
is first recognized that individual motivation to join work 
organizations is mainly economic, and economic exchange 
girds relationships (Jones, 1984; Brief & Aldag, 1989) 
between employee and employer. However, it is true that not 
all behavior in organizations can be explained by economic 
motivation (Shamir, 1990). This recognition led to the 
study of organizational behavior performed to help other 
people (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Organ, 1988) ; it also 
argues for considering the role non-calculative incentives 
such as normative conformity and affective bonding play in 
an employee's tendency to act in a certain way.
Figure 1.1 shows a general model of work-group 
interaction that presents withholding effort (shirking, 
social loafing and free riding) as an intervening process 
that leads to important outcomes such as performance. Group 
and task variables such as size, interdependence, visibility 
and demography are contexts that affect group processes as 
well as outcomes. This figure shows relationships 
considered in previous conceptual work or tested in previous 
research, as well as relationships proposed as part of a 
model to be tested in this study. The figure will structure 
the review that comprises the rest of this chapter.
15
CONTEXTS
Group Structure > -
Size
Turnover rates
—  Group demography
Group Interaction
Norms
—  Equity perceptions
- Altruistic behavior
Task Characteristics
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Figure 1.1
A preliminary model of work-group interaction
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Review of Relevant Theory and Research 
The following sections summarize research into 
withholding effort in economics, social psychology and 
sociology, citing advances and limitations in each area. 
Major theoretical and empirical studies are listed in 
Appendix A.
Economics: Shirking, efficiency wage and gift exchange
Shirking is central to major economic areas of theory 
and research such as theory of the firm (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972), agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and 
transactions costs perspectives (Williamson, 1975, Jones,
1984) . Economists view shirking as a moral hazard that 
occurs due to monitoring difficulties, pursuit of self- 
interest and opportunistic behavior (Alchian & Demsetz,
1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).
A prominent strategy in economics has been to deal with 
shirking by enhancing the visibility of an individual's 
contribution to an organization's tasks (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972), and by internalizing externalities (Demsetz, 1988) 
(i.e., creating a firm). This property rights perspective 
in industrial-organization economics (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972; Demsetz, 1988) stresses the importance of transforming 
what Olson (1965) called public goods [or public property] 
into private goods [private property] to pinpoint individual 
accountability.
The theory of the firm (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972) 
examined individual incentives to engage in shirking. It 
suggested that each employee will have more incentive to 
shirk when working as part of a team than in situations when 
individual performance could be monitored easily, or when 
not working as part of a team. One method of reducing 
shirking in team production (e.g., lifting heavy cargo into 
trucks) is for a monitor to check the input performance 
(effort) of team members. Concentration on inputs is 
necessary because in team production individual outputs may 
be hard to isolate. Establishing a monitor, and a monitor 
of the monitor, gave rise to the firm.
Opportunistic shirking is an element of agency theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency theory attempts to 
resolve two problems in relations between principals and 
agents. These problems are: (a) agency, which arises when
there is goal conflict between principal and agent, and when 
it is difficult for the principal to monitor the agent's 
behavior; and (b) risk sharing, when principal and agent 
have different attitudes toward risk. Agency theory has 
been applied to both macro and micro organizational 
phenomena, such as compensation, diversification strategies, 
vertical integration, and relationships between boards of 
directors and top management (see Eisenhardt, 1989, for a 
review).
A model linking structure, technology and individual 
shirking behavior was proposed by Jones (1984) who used a 
transaction costs approach. His model is reproduced in 
Figure 1.2. Jones (19 84) suggested that transaction costs 
approaches differ from job modification approaches (e.g., 
Brass, 1981) to structure-behavior relationships in two 
ways. Transaction-costs approaches provide an extrinsic 
rationale for behavior, and they take a rational, self- 
interested view of behavior. Job modification approaches 
put greater emphasis on intrinsic motivation and self- 
actualization.
Transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1975) argues 
that employees have strong incentives to withhold effort and 
no incentive to improve performance unless they can 
demonstrate discrete performance contributions and obtain 
rewards that come with higher performance. The Jones (1984) 
model stresses the importance of shirking and free riding as 
a mediator between structure and technology, and individual 
performance. Once again, visibility of individual 
contributions is considered a predeterminant of a person's 
shirking behavior. The model focused on designing work 
procedures or controls to allow monitoring and evaluation of 
an employee's discrete performance. The model's predictions 
have not been explicitly tested, other than a study by 
George (1992).
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Relationships among structure, technology and performance
Efficiency wage models identify four benefits to 
companies that pay wages higher than the market rate: (a)
reduced employee shirking due to higher cost of job loss,
(b) lower turnover, (c) improved applicant quality, and (d) 
better morale (Yellen, 1984). The most popular arguments of 
the efficiency wage hypothesis are "those suggesting that 
wage premiums and the threat of losing them create 
incentives for employees to reduce unproductive behavior or 
'shirking' " (Cappelli & Chauvin, 1991a, p. 769).
The relation of shirking to above-market wages stems 
from a monitoring problem that results because of discretion 
that most employees have in their jobs. An employer can 
rarely specify all aspects of an employee's performance, 
particularly amount of effort expended. Piece rates and 
constant supervision are often hard to implement because of 
cost or inaccuracy. In these circumstances, the employer 
may pay a wage higher than market to give employees an 
incentive not to shirk. Employees who shirk may be caught 
and fired. Employees —  assumed by this theory to be 
rational, utility maximizers —  would see that if they were 
fired in times of less than full employment, they would lose 
a wage premium. If there is no unemployment and all firms 
paid the same, there would be no shirking costs, and it is 
assumed that all employees would shirk.
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Recent tests of the efficiency wage hypothesis by 
economists found support for the relationship between above­
market wages and a decline in shirking. Cappelli and 
Chauvin (1991a) examined employee discipline rates and 
relative wage premiums across plants in the same company. 
They found that greater wage premiums are associated with 
lower levels of shirking, as measured by disciplinary 
dismissals, when labor market conditions, such as 
unemployment, limit alternative employment opportunities.
Krueger (1991) contrasted company-owned fast-food 
restaurants with those owned by franchisers, predicting that 
these types of ownership arrangements give managers of 
company outlets less incentive to monitor and supervise 
employees than franchisers. He found compensation higher at 
company-owned outlets than at franchise outlets, and a 
stronger relationship between tenure and wages at company 
outlets. These results suggested that monitoring problems 
influence timing and amount of compensation, lending support 
to the efficiency wage model.
Akerlof (1982, 1984), in his variant of efficiency wage 
models (labor contracts as partial gift exchange) proposed 
that employees' efforts depended on norms determining a fair 
day's work. The partial gift exchange model suggested that 
companies pay more than a market-clearing wage to affect 
those norms. Akerlof began with Homans's (1953, 1954) 
studies of utility company workers, which found that a small
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group of workers significantly exceeded minimum company work 
standards even though the workers did not expect or desire a 
promotion in return for their efforts.
The partial gift exchange model suggested that in 
working together, employees acquired sentiment for each 
other and for the company, and because of sentiment for the 
firm, the employees gain utility for an exchange of 'gifts' 
with the firm —  the amount of utility depending upon the 
norms of gift exchange.
Akerlof suggested that behavior norms —  implicit 
contracts —  are a major determinant of output. Akerlof 
(1984) said that payment of efficiency wages in the context 
of partial gift exchange is applicable to four labor market 
paradigms. These paradigms include dual-labor markets 
(Doeringer & Piore, 1971), Weber's theory of organization, 
informal work-group dynamics (Roethlisberger & Dickson,
1939), and equity theory (Adams, 1963). Two common themes 
that run through these paradigms and affect the amount of 
effort employees will provide are loyalty to the company and 
perceptions of fairness between employer and employee. 
Akerlof (1984) suggested that paying above-market wages 
improves loyalty, affects fairness perceptions (equity 
overpayment), and increases effort.
Other economic approaches to shirking suggest that 
compensation policies decrease employee motivation to shirk. 
These include the delayed-payment model in which companies
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pay wages that, are first below and later surpass current 
marginal product (Lazear, 1979), and use of tournament games 
in which employees compete for top-paying jobs (Lazear & 
Rosen, 1981). The shirking model is considered in this 
study because it has a greater concern with normative 
influences on PWE in work groups. The other approaches —  
while involving compensation policies —  are not as centered 
on how group interaction may influence PWE.
Summary of the economic approach. Withholding effort 
(i.e., shirking) provides a foundation for economic theories 
such as agency, transaction costs, efficiency wage and other 
compensation approaches and theory of the firm. Economists 
who study shirking generally assume that employees want to 
maximize self-interest. Even when fairness and exchange 
norms are noted (e.g. Akerlof, 1982), the focus is on the 
material gain acquired by employees who are affected by 
sentiments for each other and a firm.
The most complete model of shirking determinants at 
different levels of an organization (Jones, 1984) rests on 
economic assumptions of self-interest, and has yet to be 
tested. The model is important because it ties together 
different levels of analysis that may have an impact on an 
individual's PWE, but it does not consider motivations that 
are non-economic.
Other difficulties in economic approaches to shirking 
involve measurement and assumptions of the efficiency wage
hypothesis regarding shirking. The shirking model suggests 
that employees who are caught shirking are fired, and that 
they know they will be fired if they are caught. However, 
workplace discipline typically involves a progression of 
sanctions from oral reprimands, to written reprimands, and 
finally to termination (Arvey & Jones, 1985). These 
disciplinary actions provide an opportunity for employees to 
correct inappropriate behavior and, as a role model, to 
deter other employees from engaging in deviant behavior. 
Further, there is a problem in using disciplinary dismissals 
as a sole proxy for shirking (e.g. Cappelli & Chauvin,
1991a). Many shirkers may be reprimanded instead, and this 
use of discipline may have an impact on the PWE of others. 
Disciplinary dismissals may be most appropriate to use in 
combination with other measures to indicate shirking at 
work.
Shirking has been defined and operationalized in 
economic studies as productivity or performance rather than 
effort (e.g., Cappelli & Chauvin, 1991a). The problem with 
using performance to measure shirking is that work effort is 
much more in an employee's control than performance (Schwab, 
Olian-Gottlieb & Heneman, 1979), and may be less affected by 
the many factors that influence performance. It may be true 
that withholding effort is not merely the reverse of 
performing well. As noted, Jones (1984) considered shirking 
to mediate actual performance, not to be the opposite of
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performance. For example, a high performer can produce more 
with less effort, and may produce what is required at a 
particular job but not give full effort. At times, the high 
performer may hold back effort, and this may not be 
reflected in productivity measures.
One important contribution of economics to the study of 
shirking is the idea that compensation is a major 
determinant of whether employees withhold effort. In this 
study, compensation practices are used to test a model that 
offers a multi-faceted view of motivation that goes beyond 
rational choice assumptions to consider several determinants 
of employee PWE. Measurement may be enhanced because PWE is 
more related to the shirking process than performance 
measures frequently used in economics.
Social psychology; Social loafing and social dilemmas
Social loafing refers to a tendency for people to put 
forth less individual effort while working in groups than 
they would working alone (e.g., Earley, 1989; Latane, 
Williams, & Harkins, 1979). A recent meta-analysis of 78 
studies found the social loafing effect to generalize across 
tasks and populations, and be moderated strongly by 
performance identifiability, expectations of co-worker 
performance, task meaningfulness, and culture (Karau & 
Williams, 1992a).
Research interest in comparing individual productivity 
with overall group productivity dates to the 19th century
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when Ringelmann conducted studies into group effort at 
pulling on a rope (Kravitz & Martin, 1986). Ringelmann 
observed that when groups of people pulled on a rope, their 
collective performance was inferior to what should have been 
expected from previous individual performances. Ringelmann 
asked subjects to pull as hard as they could on a rope 
either alone or with one, two or seven others.
Using a strain gauge to measure how hard they pulled —  
assuming that one person alone pulled at 100 percent of 
effort —  Ringelmann found that when pulling with one other, 
each member pulled at 93 percent of potential average 
ability. Members of triads pulled at 85 percent of ability, 
and members of groups of eight pulled at 49 percent of 
ability. Ringelmann illustrated that lack of individual 
effort became greater as groups grew in size and 
contributions of individual members became less visible. 
Later researchers viewed the problem as one of coordination 
(Steiner, 1972) and motivation (Latane, Williams, & Harkins, 
1979).
Laboratory studies (Harkins & Petty, 1982; Williams, 
Harkins & Latane, 1981) indicate that individual efforts in 
such exercises as handclapping and shouting decreased as 
group size increased. In addition to group size, task 
variables were manipulated in loafing studies. These 
included identifiability, uniqueness and type. Studies 
reporting social loafing effects used non-identifiable tasks
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(Harkins, Latane, & Williams, 1980). Studies that 
manipulated identifiability of individual members' 
contributions (Harkins & Petty, 1982; Williams, Harkins, & 
Latane, 1981) suggested that social loafing effects can be 
eliminated by making tasks identifiable with particular 
individuals, eliminating ability to hide in the crowd.
But Harkins and Petty (1982) found that even when tasks 
are unidentifiable, social loafing may not occur if subjects 
believed tasks to be difficult or unique. Loafing can be 
reduced by making a task more challenging or by giving each 
subject a different task to perform. Zaccaro (1984) found 
less social loafing in work groups of two to four when task 
attractiveness was high rather than low. As group size 
increased, social loafing increased when task attractiveness 
was low, but social loafing decreased as size increased when 
task attractiveness was high. A recent study supported the 
notion that people work harder collectively when they expect 
co-workers to do poorly on a meaningful task (Williams & 
Karau, 1991).
Other research has attempted to increase understanding 
of loafing by considering what mechanisms may lead to it. 
Jackson and Harkins (1985) investigated if individual group 
members would reduce effort because they expect co­
performers to loaf, and thus reduced their own efforts to 
establish equity. Subjects were believed to reduce effort
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"rather than be a sucker and carry a free rider" (Kerr,
1983, p. 823).
The manipulation used to test for this effect is 
similar to an underpayment condition in equity theory 
research: Two people arrive at a lab to take part in a
purported study together for similar compensation [extra 
credit or class requirements]. A subject is led to believe 
that a co-worker [a confederate] will put in less effort on 
the task, and researchers test whether the subject 
subsequently reduces effort. Equity theory would predict 
this result as the subject tried to reduce tension caused by 
perceived inequity. Attempts by the confederate to reduce 
effort may violate norms of equity and social 
responsibility, that everyone should do a fair share 
(Schnake, 1991a).
Research has also demonstrated that the social loafing 
phenomenon occurred in tasks believed to have social value 
to participants and required cognitive information 
processing, rather than physical effort (Weldon & Gargano, 
1985; Weldon & Mustari, 1988). Subjects led to believe they 
shared responsibility with another person tended to use less 
information in evaluating a decision than those who believed 
they were solely responsible. These studies led to a 
conclusion that feelings of dispensability can sometimes 
cause social loafing and that feeling necessary can motivate 
effort despite anonymity (Weldon & Mustari, 1988).
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In a study of salespeople in an on-going organization, 
it was found that task visibility and intrinsic task 
involvement were both negatively related to social loafing 
(George, 1992). That study found that intrinsic involvement 
moderated the relationship between task visibility and 
social loafing. The relation between task visibility and 
social loafing was strongest when intrinsic involvement was 
low.
Social dilemmas (Dawes, 1980; Orbell & Dawes, 1981) 
occur when individual group members engage in behavior that 
would have negative consequences if all members engaged in 
it, as seen in the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968). 
Each group member receives a higher monetary payoff for not 
cooperating with other members of the group in some activity 
regardless of what other members do; this lack of 
cooperation is often manifested in diminished effort. There 
are two varieties of dilemmas: collective traps (in which 
behaviors that reward individuals yield negative outcomes 
when exhibited by enough people; Platt, 1973), and 
collective fences (in which behaviors that cost individuals 
yield negative outcomes when avoided by enough people;
Levine & Moreland, 1990).
Two solutions to social dilemmas have been advanced:
(a) Individual solutions, in which behavior of individual 
group members is modified, and (b) structural solutions, in 
which a dilemma is removed through group action (Levine &
30
Moreland, 1990). Liebrand's (1986) study indicates that in 
reaching individual solutions to social dilemmas the motives 
and social values of group members influence their conduct. 
Research on provision of step-level public goods, goods that 
result from a multi-step process, indicates that altruism 
and other social values may be meaningful in determining 
behavior (Rapoport, 1987).
Studies focusing on social dilemmas involving shared 
group resources found that three factors impacted group 
members' individual solutions: (a) self-interest; (b) a
desire to use the resource responsibly, and (c) conformity 
to inherent group norms (Samuelson & Messick, 1986). In 
addition, communication among group members may aid in 
cooperation by promoting group identity or providing a 
chance for members to make promises of cooperation (Dawes, 
Orbell, Simmons, & van de Kragt, 1986).
Researchers have considered several variables in 
examining structural solutions to social dilemmas. These 
studies examined variables such as a payoff system (Dawes, 
et al., 1986), the framing of cooperative and competitive 
decisions (Rutte, Wilke, & Messick, 1987), group size (Kerr, 
1989a), and social norms (Kerr, 1989b, cited in Levine & 
Moreland, 1990). Structural solutions such as electing a 
strong leader or developing a punishment system may be 
appropriate when a group is not efficient in dealing with 
common resources, and when free access to resources leads to
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large inequities among members (Samuelson & Messick, 1986; 
Samuelson, Messick, Wilke, & Rutte, 1986). Yamagishi's 
(1986) structural goal/expectations theory assumes that 
structural solutions are adopted when group members develop 
cooperative goals, and understand that structural solutions 
are effective.
Summary of the social psychology approach. Research 
into social loafing and social dilemmas has helped increase 
our understanding of how group processes serve as 
intervening variables in relationships between group 
structure and group performance. Whereas rationality 
assumptions undergird much of the research, these studies 
have introduced variables and findings that point out the 
importance of the social influence process, particularly 
conformity to group pressure, on individual PWE. These 
variables include nature of the task, norms of equity 
involved in relative individual contributions, and 
altruistic values.
Group characteristics —  particularly size and 
visibility of member contributions —  that were seen to be 
important in the study of social loafing seem to echo the 
work of economists regarding propensity to shirk among 
employees. It is rational for members not to withhold 
effort in return for reward if efforts can be seen by 
monitors and fellow group members. Considerations, such as 
equity norms and altruism, which are not necessarily based
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on rational self-interest, also enter the equation, and 
these affect PWE.
Social dilemma and social loafing studies usually 
involve newly formed groups of strangers where relationships 
are not allowed to develop (Levine & Moreland, 1990). The 
group is expected to exist for a short period, and members 
have equal power. By focusing on existing work groups in 
organizations as in this study, contextual information about 
group, status and power relationships is provided that was 
lacking in previous research.
Sociology: Public goods and free riders
Sociologists emphasize public goods, free riders and 
group formation to take collective action. The perspective 
reflects a traditional sociological emphasis on group 
solidarity. When groups possess solidarity, their members 
behave in ways that are consistent with the group's 
collective standards of conduct, or norms, because they feel 
obligated to do so (Durkheim, 1893/1933).
In sociology, withholding effort is approached from a 
standpoint of collective action toward a common goal. The 
goal has the characteristics of a public good. Those who do 
not contribute cannot be excluded from consumption.
Examples of public goods include low production costs of a 
work group, group grade for a class project, a committee 
report, and a drug free workplace.
The inability to exclude non-contributors makes free 
riding attractive, allowing individuals to profit from 
activities of others without making a contribution (Stroebe 
& Frey, 1982). Such activities can occur in work groups as 
some free riders withhold effort toward the common good, 
e.g., workplace safety, increased group reputation, low 
production costs, drug-free workplace. Withholding effort 
toward these public goods should be stronger, the larger the 
group, as costs are spread among many, and a non-contributor 
becomes less visible (Olson, 1965) .
Some sociologists restate this collective action 
problem as one of getting a small subset of a group that is 
interested in providing a public good to contribute time, 
money, or other resources toward the good's production.
This subset, the critical mass (Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira,
1985) is needed for group action. A small number of people 
who contribute to increased work-group reputation, for 
example, can provide benefits of improved reputation to a 
much larger number of non-supporters when the gain shared by 
all does not cut the benefits enjoyed by those contributing.
The application of critical mass to work-group activity 
can be made by considering an academic department. In some 
departments, a core faculty of two or three may strive for 
excellence in teaching, research and service while other 
colleagues do mediocre work. The strivers will continue to 
do so despite colleagues who do not. The reason is when
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departmental reputation is enhanced, the benefit to the core 
faculty is not reduced even though they share this benefit 
with those who give less, or very little, effort.
The Oliver-Marwell analysis of critical mass (Oliver, 
Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985; Oliver & Marwell, 1988; Marwell, 
Oliver, & Prahl, 1988) is important to the current study of 
PWE because it clashes with Olson's idea that material 
incentives must be present to stimulate collective action. 
Their analysis suggested that collective action does not 
have to be a spinoff from pursuit of private goods but can 
occur by a direct appeal to common goals. Thus, conformity 
of members to group norms and repeated interactions of group 
members may have effects on PWE beyond a basic economic 
exchange between employer and employee.
A critical mass emphasis challenges the idea that free 
riders should always be viewed negatively. A few dedicated 
people and a large number of free riders is sometimes the 
most efficient way to provide a public good. For example, 
if every member of a professional association wanted to make 
equal contributions to the group's work by coming to 
business meetings and serving on committees, it would be 
difficult for the group to get anything done.
Oliver and Marwell's work modified a belief that free 
riding makes it irrational for others to contribute when 
members of large groups. The assumptions involved in the 
Oliver-Marwell analysis started with the idea of
interdependent decisions. Most of the previous work on 
collective action assumed that each person makes an 
independent decision about contributing, not considering 
other people's behavior. While this may be true in some 
cases —  for example, responses to mass-mailed fund-raising 
letters (Oliver, Marwell, & Teixeira, 1985) —  it does not 
apply to most organizational phenomena. People in 
organizations may make decisions on contributing effort 
based on what they believe others have contributed and based 
on their on-going relationship at work. When people know 
they will meet again or all parties have experienced a 
similar situation before, then cooperation becomes less 
difficult (Axelrod, 1984).
Macy (1990) provided further undergirding for the 
importance of normative, interdependent decisions in work­
group functioning by relaxing four constraints in the 
Oliver-Marwell original model: (a) that people are
completely rational; (b) that each decision is isolated from 
previous decisions and their results; (c) that outcomes are 
deterministic, and (d) that public goods have pure jointness 
of supply and collective profit. His model extended the 
theory of critical mass by greatly reducing an individual's 
cognitive demands and by applying it to behavior based on 
normative as well as instrumental concerns.
The theory of critical mass used a rational choice 
assumption that people with limited resources seek to spend
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cost-effectively. This limited chances to apply the model 
to cooperation in every-day organizational life, as Macy 
(1990) and Oliver and Marwell (1988) noted. Whereas 
strategic planners and entrepreneurs may calculate costs and 
benefits, the average work-group member probably does not 
have the time, information or analytic abilities to do cost- 
benefit analyses of cooperation toward providing public 
goods (Macy, 1990).
Macy (1990) applied social learning theory to show how 
costs and benefits affect successful collective action, even 
when there are unintended consequences. His proposed 
behavioral model retains a rational choice assumption that 
costs and benefits condition behavior, but rejects the 
assumption that this occurs because each person estimates a 
rate of return on public goods investments.
In the Macy model, positive and negative cues from 
social interaction guide individuals through a search 
process, based on reinforcement and changing tendencies to 
cooperate. To relate this to organizations, as the level of 
individual and work-group involvement changes, so do cues 
received by group members, and these cues modify a person's 
tendency to make contributions to collective activities.
By incorporating learning theory into Macy's model, the 
scope of critical mass is extended to those who believe 
cooperative efforts are worthwhile based on normative tests. 
Learning theory is typically applied to behavior that is
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unthinking or habitual, such as internalization of norms 
(Scott, 1971). Contributions of effort based on norms 
serves as an end in itself regardless of whether it is also 
a means to achieve other ends.
Scott's (1971) theory of moral commitment argues that 
attachment to prosocial norms increased when those who 
comply with prevailing norms are repeatedly rewarded and 
when those who disregard norms and collective welfare are 
penalized. In contrast, attachment declines when compliance 
is penalized, and deviance is rewarded. Scott's theory 
builds on Homans's (1961) model of social exchange in which 
one person's behavior serves to stimulate another person and 
the other person's behavior then stimulates the first 
person. When more than two people are involved, as in a 
work group, this mutual conditioning can generate patterns 
with different degrees of regularity. Over time, a 
consistent pattern of positive and negative cues makes for 
habit-forming responses.
These repeated sanctions result in the emergence of and 
compliance to norms. A compliance norm —  a form of group- 
mediated control that requires certain procedures to be 
followed by all group members (Heckathorn, 1990) —  can be 
powerful in regulating group behavior (Axelrod, 1986; 
Heckathorn, 1990). If work-group culture stresses 
collective effort in providing public, as well as private 
goods, group members may receive reinforcement leading to
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more cooperation and collective action. There may be less 
cooperation in situations where cooperative behavior is not 
rewarded, or deviance from it is not punished.
The presence of behavioral norms such as equity and 
reciprocity (Schnake, 1991a) and altruism (Rushton & 
Sorrentino, 1981) may reduce PWE. The fact that people's 
motivation to behave in a certain way generally involves
mixed altruistic and self-interested motives seems to
2
indicate why a strong free-rider hypothesis usually finds 
no empirical support (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985a). On the 
other hand, support for a weak free rider hypothesis is 
usually found because people generally make decisions based 
on selfish interests reduced somewhat by altruism or 
fairness expectations (Marwell & Ames, 1979; 1980; 1981).
Empirical evidence suggests that self-interest is 
moderated by a "norm of fair dealing" that people comply 
with even though they are not threatened by punishment 
(Stroebe & Frey, 1982, p. 127). The fairness norm 
explanation for high levels of contributions by group 
members departs from a rational behavior (economic exchange) 
assumption (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985a). One implication 
when social-learning theory is applied to the study of 
collective action is that leaders may be able to provide 
cues and informal sanctions that teach participants to care 
about each other, a strategy that has been previously 
suggested in promoting cooperation (Axelrod, 1984).
Marwell and Ames (1981) looked at fairness as a 
behavioral norm and its influence on public goods 
contributions. In their study, which simulated market 
transactions, they found that subjects who considered 
fairness when deciding how to behave and defined higher 
levels of contribution [in providing a public good] as fair 
were those who contributed most. Compared to other 
participants, graduate-level economics majors placed less 
importance on fairness norms in making contribution 
decisions, and contributed less to a public good than other 
participants. Marwell and Ames (1981) pointed out that 
economists are trained to value self-interested behavior, 
which may explain their lower level of contributions.
The importance of norms in guiding human action is 
basic to sociology (Durkheim, 1893/1933; Parsons, 1937). 
Group norms are powerful controls of human behavior and 
periodically receive calls for more empirical attention 
(Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991). More than 50 years ago, 
norms were extended to functioning of work groups through 
equal treatment expectations and how they influenced 
employee behavior. If management is expected to treat all 
employees the same, a concession to management by one worker 
can pressure others to acquiesce to authority. This forms a 
basis for output restriction norms (Roethlisberger &
Dickson, 1939), which prohibit overcompliance to management.
Much of the social control resulting from sanctions 
imposed by supervisors may actually result from compliance 
norms (Heckathorn, 1990). Presence of strong compliance 
norms in a work group can set behavioral standards resulting 
in high effort as well as low effort (Ouchi, 1981). A 
rational perspective suggests that when costs of monitoring 
by conventional means become too high, an organization may 
adopt an organic structure, which relies on strong group 
norms to pressure members to provide high effort. This clan 
control (Ouchi, 1980; 1981) is based on common goals and 
strong group identity.
Granovetter (1985) argued that Williamson's (1975) 
markets and hierarchies approach underestimated the 
importance of informal, interpersonal controls and on-going 
social influence in building trust and discouraging 
opportunism. Granovetter suggested that Ouchi's clan 
concept is a more highly developed instance of the type of 
informal control process that occurs in all organizations.
Summary of the sociology approach. By considering 
variables that stress more than material incentives and self 
interest, the sociological approach enhances the focus taken 
by economists. Variables such as altruism, and norms of 
compliance and fairness focus on the role of informal 
control through social pressure in shaping decisions of 
individuals to contribute effort. One way these norms are 
formed is through repeated interactions among the group
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members. These interactions indicate that when members know 
each other and have continued dealings they may have 
different attitudes toward contributing effort than if just 
starting an activity together as a group.
Although sociologists relax rationality assumptions 
somewhat, there remains a tendency to argue that individuals 
undertake cost-benefit analyses before they make decisions 
about contributing effort and resources. Macy's (1990) 
approach stressed the importance of social relations and 
development of norms in determining individual contribution, 
even though this experience is later entered into a cost- 
benefit calculation of social exchange relationships.
Perhaps Macy's theory attempts to find a middle ground 
between an undersocialized, rational approach of economists 
and an oversocialized norms approach of sociologists and 
some economists to the study of behavior. If this is true, 
Macy follows the thinking of Granovetter (1985), who 
suggested that most behavior is embedded within 
interpersonal networks, and one should avoid extreme under­
and over-socialized views of human action.
Knoke's Synthesized Motivation Model
A theme that pervades this review has been a repeated 
emphasis on assumed rational exchange. A work organization 
provides material incentives in exchange for effort from its 
members. A collective action organization employs voluntary 
actions and democratic procedures to seek nonmarket
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solutions to individual and group problems (Knoke, 1990, p. 
7). In examining research regarding collective action,
Knoke (1990) argued that a strict focus on economic 
incentives as motivation to contribute to collective action 
organizations does not fully explain propensity of 
individuals to behave in a certain way.
For example, in Marwell and Ames's research, normative 
factors strongly influence economic decisions. The 
importance of norms has been offered to explain rejection of 
a strong free rider hypothesis in repeated studies (Albanese 
& Van Fleet, 1985a). One empirical example showing the 
importance of material incentives combined with normative 
factors was Condie, Warner, and Gillman (1976) who found 
that in a mass blood drive, donors were more responsive to 
incentives such as a free health check-up than non-donors, 
and perceived lower costs of donating and greater social 
pressure to donate than non-donors.
Whereas theorists (e.g., Olson, 1965) tended to 
discount the possibility that some group members may value a 
group's well-being and thus "irrationally" contribute to 
provision of public goods when the group is large, other 
researchers (e.g., Gooding & Wagner, 1985) have concluded 
that "irrational" contributions to public goods can occur to 
some extent in larger groups.
The discrepancy illustrates a problem with focusing 
solely on material incentives to motivation in work
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organizations. Individuals have large differences in 
preferences for and responses to organizational incentives, 
thus theorists have suggested other motivational bases 
(e.g., Clark & Wilson, 1961; Etzioni, 1975; Knoke & Wright- 
Isak, 1982). Reducing complex motives for behavior to a 
cost-benefit calculation ignores the way organizations match 
incentives to fit diverse member interests (Knoke, 1990).
In addition to rational choice, which involves an 
individual calculating costs and benefits of material 
incentives in an effort to maximize individual utility,
Knoke (1990) examined two other explanations for propensity 
of members to provide effort to collective action 
organizations: normative conformity and affective bonding.
In a normative conformity model, an individual is 
motivated to follow standards of conduct that are grounded 
in socially instilled values about principled behavior. 
Individual action occurs in a framework of regulation by 
norms, which are prescribed guides for conduct or action 
that are generally complied with by members of a group 
(Ullman-Margalit, 1977). Action is an effort to conform 
with norms. Taken alone, the normative conformity model 
appears to suffer because it relies too much on 
socialization to explain human action.
In an affective bonding model, an individual is 
motivated to provide effort based on emotional attachments 
to other people and groups. This occurs as part of an
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identification process in which the member's role is 
internalized along with specific affective bonds to other 
members and to the group (Knoke, 1990). Studies of 
religious groups and communes have revealed the importance 
of solidarity for commitment to an organization (Kanter, 
1972; Zablocki, 1980). "The resulting sense of 'oneness' 
between person and group strengthens the member's motives 
for contributing personal resources to the organization" 
(Knoke, 1990, p. 42).
Knoke argued that no one motivation can explain a 
person's decision to contribute time, money and effort to 
collective action organizations. He combined all three 
approaches and suggested they jointly affected decisions 
about individual involvement in collective action: whether 
to join, whether to stay, how much to participate, and what 
amount of personal resources to contribute.
Collective action organizations, as defined by Knoke, 
are distinct from business organizations in several ways:
(a) they seek non-market solutions to specific individual 
and group problems, (b) they maintain formal criteria for 
voluntary membership, (c) they may provide democratic 
procedures to allow members to participate in making policy 
decisions (Knoke, 1990, p. 7).
Application of Knoke to work organizations
Whereas Knoke focused on organizations such as lobbying 
groups and associations, this dissertation uses his
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framework to study withholding effort in private firms. An 
issue to be resolved in this study is whether a motivation 
model bringing together material, normative and affective 
bonding incentives is appropriate to study PWE in economic 
organizations.
Organizations that use incentives such as wages, fringe 
benefits and other rewards with monetary value are termed 
utilitarian organizations. Clark and Wilson (1961) 
predicted that these organizations seek material rewards for 
their members, and their leaders focus their efforts on 
obtaining resources needed to provide incentives. Business 
firms are an example.
Organizations that focus on intangible rewards such as 
sociability, identification and status are called solidary 
organizations, e.g. social clubs. Organizations that rely 
on intangible rewards related to the achievement of 
organizational goals are termed purposive organizations 
(e.g. protest groups, Clark & Wilson, 1961).
Whereas businesses provide money in exchange for 
employee contributions, creators of incentive typologies 
suggested that all organizations use all three types of 
incentives (Clark & Wilson, 1961; Etzioni, 1975). Although 
Clark and Wilson (1961) asserted that few organizations can 
easily combine utilitarian, solidary and purposive incentive 
systems, Knoke (1990) pointed out that there is a lack of 
empirical evidence showing that only pure types of incentive
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systems exist. In viewing the typology in the context of 
Knoke's model, it appears that all three types of incentives 
can exist at varying levels for employees of a business. 
Whether businesses actively use all three types to minimize 
employee PWE is an empirical question.
Economic exchange between an employee and an employer 
is fundamental to work motivation (Brief & Aldag, 1989; 
Jones, 1984). Although a business focuses on economic 
incentives as a major tool in producing employee effort, 
normative and affective bonding incentives can also be 
present on a job, even if not an element of the official 
incentive package. Barnard (1938) described varied 
incentives, including objective and subjective inducements 
specifically tied to individual employees (material rewards 
and non-material benefits, such as prestige), and general 
interpersonal incentives. He recognized that different 
people are motivated by different types of incentives and 
that their interests vary over time. He argued that 
organizations never offer all incentives that lead people to 
provide effort and must try to change people's desires 
through persuasion, including coercion and socialization, so 
that available incentives can win enough employee 
contributions for organizations to reach their goals.
Organizational leaders create normative incentives for 
employees by establishing a strong culture that is taught to 
new employees as the right way to perceive, think and feel
in relation to problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration (Schein, 1984). A more natural source of 
normative job incentives is informal structure. It has long 
been recognized that work-group members can establish norms 
of conduct that are not sanctioned by an organization and 
may even be opposed by the organization (Roethlisberger & 
Dickson, 1939). Employees have a strong sense of what 
behaviors are expected from each other and may tailor their 
job efforts to comply with group norms in an effort to avoid 
ostracism meted out to deviants.
Affective bonding incentives can arise as employees 
work together and develop relationships transcending a 
formal job description. Employees who need camaraderie, 
friendship and acceptance may be motivated to provide effort 
that enhances their abilities to receive those sentiments, 
or gifts (Akerlof, 1982), from their co-workers and 
employer.
Investigations into shirking, social loafing and free 
riding have used variables that assume all three motivations 
in decisions to withhold effort (See Exhibit 1.2). Some of 
the variables emphasize motivations to withhold effort that 
stem from material rational-choice considerations, while 
others result from normative conformity and affective- 
bonding incentives. Employees are assumed to rationally 
weigh benefits to withhold effort and the costs associated 
with being caught shirking in efficiency wage models.
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Efficiency wage is one illustration of the importance of 
reward system as a variable relating to shirking propensity. 
Other variables that emphasize individual cost-benefit 
analysis include group size, task interdependence, and task 
visibility.
Exhibit 1.2
Predictors of withholding effort within Knoke's framework
Rational Choice/ Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Efficiency wage (wage premium)
Group size
Task interdependence 
Perceived task visibility
Normative Conformity
Perceived effort compliance norms 
Equity perceptions
Affective Bonding
Perceived altruism 
Turnover rates
Group length-of-service heterogeneity
Individuals are assumed to consider normative 
conformity incentives when variables such as effort norms 
and fairness are studied in relation to withholding effort. 
Affective bonding incentives include variables such as 
altruism and repeated plays. The potential association of 
altruism and care for fellow human beings with individual 
decisions about whether to contribute effort has been 
discussed. If individuals have developed a relationship 
over time and will meet again, that relationship may help
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determine whether they cooperate with others (Axelrod,
1984) . Contextual variables that involve the repeated plays 
aspect of affective bonding incentives can include turnover 
rates (Spicer, 1985).
In addition to turnover rates, a variable that may 
figure in the opportunity to engage in repeated plays and 
affective bonding is a demography variable: heterogeneity of 
a work group's length-of-service distribution. Length-of- 
service distribution is an aspect of organizational 
demography (Pfeffer, 1983) that has not been considered in 
research into withholding effort.
The demography approach builds on the idea that one of 
the most important determinants of interpersonal attraction 
is similarity (Lott & Lott, 1965). Demography refers to 
composition of a social entity in terms of basic attributes 
such as age, gender, educational level, length of service or 
residence, race, socioeconomic status and other variables 
(Pfeffer, 1983). Organizations and groups are generally 
characterized as demographically homogeneous or 
heterogeneous, using either a single variable or a set of 
demographic variables to make the determination (Zenger & 
Lawrence, 1989). Blau (1977) has argued that inequality and 
heterogeneity are important organizational properties that 
may affect several of their critical processes.
A work group with a heterogeneous length-of-service 
distribution is a unit composed primarily of people who have
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dissimilar tenures in the unit. Under certain conditions,
individuals are likely to identify with their groups and
this identification encourages them to comply with group
obligations (Fireman & Gamson, 1979). The potential
importance of a homogeneous length-of-service distribution
(all members having the same or similar tenure) is alluded
to in Schein's discussion of the organizational
socialization process:
The formation of a peer group of novices is 
often a solution to the problem of defense 
against the powerful organization, and at the 
same time can strongly enhance the socialization 
process if peer group norms support 
organizational norms (Schein, 1988: 56).
Length-of-service similarity may bond individuals
together: each person generally entered the group at the
same time and may have had similar experiences. Demographic
similarity of a work group, particularly regarding length of
service distribution and potentially in connection with
other facets of demography such as race and gender, may be
important in an employee's decision whether to provide full
effort as part of an obligation to other group members. On
the other hand, demographic heterogeneity may make it less
likely that affective bonding among group members will
occur.
Research Questions 
There are several potential avenues for research into 
the topic of withholding effort in work groups and 
organizations. The major purpose of this dissertation is to
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test a model that brings together variables that have been 
used across disciplines in the study of individuals 
withholding effort in group and organizational contexts.
Will a test of this model —  which combines various employee 
incentives to withhold effort, such as rational choice, 
normative conformity and affective bonding —  reveal 
relationships between various formal and informal contextual 
elements and an employee's propensity to withhold effort?
Variables such as group size, wage premium, task 
visibility and interdependence have been previously 
associated with the decision of individual employees to 
withhold effort. These variables are concerned with an 
individual making a rational cost-benefit analysis before 
deciding whether to withhold effort. Combining these 
variables with variables such as perceived peer compliance 
effort norms, and perceptions of equity and altruism, which 
tap normative conformity and affective bonding motivations, 
may provide a more complete explanation of PWE when working 
with others.
The hypotheses advanced and tested in this study 
address two general questions:
(a) Is Knoke's model an appropriate theoretical 
framework in which to study the determinants of an 
employee's PWE in work organizations?
(b) How do variables, based on rational choice, 
normative conformity or affective bonding incentives, 
explain an individual employee's PWE?
CHAPTER 2 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
This chapter develops hypotheses tested in the reported 
study. Variables used in the study of withholding effort 
are described, and proposed relations among these variables 
and employee propensity to withhold effort (PWE) are 
advanced. Five different types of variables are used to tap 
the three sets of variables in Knoke's model. These 
variables reflect environmental characteristics, 
organizational characteristics, objective group 
characteristics, perceived task characteristics and 
perceived group characteristics.
Variables and Hypotheses 
Knoke's motivation model has been advanced as a means 
to consider PWE. His model suggests that an employee's 
predisposition to act to attain valued goals is based on 
motivations that include rational choice, normative 
conformity and affective bonding.
As a starting point, Figure 2.1 presents a PWE model 
based on Chapter l's discussion of previous theory and 
research. Proposed relationships and hypotheses are marked. 
The organization level variable shown in the figure —  
payment of a wage premium —  is proposed to affect an 
employee's PWE in times of higher unemployment, controlling 
for the individual's lack of alternative employment 
opportunities.
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RATIONAL CHOICE VARIABLES
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(HI)
Work-Group Size
+ (H2)
(H4)
(H3)
(H5) (H6)
NORMATIVE CONFORMITY VARIABLES
(H7)
(H8)
AFFECTIVE BONDING VARIABLES
(H9)
+ (H10)
Equity Perceptions
Wage Premium
Group-Turnover Rate
Perceived Altruism
Perceived 
Effort Norms
Perceived
Task
Visibility
Task
Interdependence
Length-of-Service
Heterogeneity
Employee 
Propensity 
To Withhold 
Effort
Figure 2.1
Model of employee propensity to withhold effort
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Three variables designed to measure objective work­
group characteristics are shown in Figure 2.1. These are 
work-group size, group-turnover rate and length-of-service 
heterogeneity.
Two variables related to task perceptions are shown in 
the figure: task interdependence and task visibility. 
Finally, perceived effort norms, perceived altruism, and 
equity perceptions represent three variables that tap 
individual perceptions of work-group properties. The 
dependent variable in the model is propensity of employees 
to withhold effort.
Wage premium
Economic theories suggest that compensation policies 
can be used to decrease the likelihood that an employee 
withholds effort. The efficiency wage hypothesis proposes 
that employers pay above-market wages in the hope that 
employees will reduce shirking for fear they will be fired 
and lose their wage premiums when it would be difficult for 
them to find a comparable job (Akerlof, 1984). The relation 
of above-market wages to lower levels of shirking is based 
on the employees' fear of losing above-market wages if they 
are caught withholding effort in times of high unemployment. 
Recent tests of the efficiency wage hypothesis by economists 
supported a negative relationship between payment of above­
market wages and shirking when there is less than full 
employment (Cappelli and Chauvin, 1991a).
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The economic model assumes a rational self-interested 
person who weighs costs and benefits associated with 
withholding effort. PWE should be lower when expected costs 
associated with being fired are greatest: when employees 
fear that wages in the labor market are lower than an 
employee's current pay, and there is more difficulty in 
finding a new job because there is higher local unemployment 
(Cappelli & Chauvin, 1991a).
Higher local unemployment is one factor that could lead 
to a lack of alternative employment opportunities. Others 
include whether employment at an employee's company is 
growing or declining, and percentage of the company's 
workforce on layoff. In addition, it is logical that the 
predisposition of an employee is related to his or her 
perception of lack of alternative employment opportunities 
(Gerhart, 1990). Few layoffs, high growth rates, and 
perceived ease of movement to another job would tend to 
lessen the impact of a wage premium on PWE. This discussion 
and previous research suggests the following hypothesis:
Hi: Payment of a wage premium will be negatively 
related to propensity to withhold effort, controlling for 
labor market area unemployment rate and other factors that 
indicate a lack of alternative employment opportunities.
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Group Size
Individual anonymity that occurs in larger groups makes 
monitoring harder and reduces visibility of an individual's 
effort (Albanese & Van Fleet, 1985a; Jones, 1984). Latane, 
Williams, and Harkins (1979) manipulated group size (up to 
six people) in physical tasks. They found that as group 
size increased, a person's average output fell and total 
group output increased at a diminishing rate as new members 
were added.
Leibowitz and Tollison (1980) suggested that optimal 
law-firm size for controlling shirking in the partnerships 
was about five. Examining effects of group size on 
performance, Littlepage (1991) found that on tasks with high 
coordination demands and with more than an optimal number of 
participants, decreased participation by some members may 
result in higher performance. However, he concluded that it 
is difficult to determine the most efficient group size; 
optimal group size depended on task characteristics and 
participation levels likely within the group.
Small groups may be more successful in producing higher 
average individual effort because in a small group it may be 
easier to encourage effort and cooperation and police 
individual behavior (Hechter, 1987). In a small group, 
contributions from each member may be more crucial to 
success than in a large group. This provides incentive for 
members to give effort lest co-workers, or a supervisor,
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punish them. Therefore, increased group size will make it 
more likely for a rational, self-interested employee to 
withhold effort. This discussion implies the following 
hypotheses:
H2: Work-group size will be positively related to 
propensity to withhold effort.
H3: Work-group size will be negatively related to 
perceived task visibility.
Task interdependence
Using transaction costs theory, Jones (1984) suggested 
that task visibility is a major determinant of shirking and 
free riding. Jones applied Thompson's (1967) technology 
typology to shirking and suggested that as one moves from 
mediating technology (pooled interdependence) to long-linked 
technology (seguential interdependence) to intensive 
technology (reciprocal interdependence), it is harder to 
monitor individual performance. Further, Jones argued that 
the more unstructured or ambiguous a task, the greater the 
difficulty in observing and measuring performance. More 
monitoring problems lead to the suggestion that withholding 
effort will be greater when there is greater task 
interdependence. When interdependence is low, supervisor 
monitoring is easier, and there is less shirking. Applying 
this argument to PWE yields the following hypothesis:
H4: Greater task interdependence will be positively 
related to propensity to withhold effort.
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Perceived task visibility
As indicated, Jones (1984) suggested that task 
visibility was a function of more complex tasks. He 
suggested a congruence between interdependence and task 
visibility. In a field study such as this, it would be 
difficult to treat task visibility as an absolute. As 
George (1992) stated, task visibility can be absolute in a 
lab study because subjects are told if their individual 
efforts are visible. At work, perceptions of task 
visibility would vary among individual employees.
Therefore, for theoretical and practical reasons, perceived 
task visibility will be measured in this study.
Perceived task visibility is an employee's belief that 
a supervisor is aware of that employee's individual effort 
on the job. The level of visibility of an individual 
employee's task depends in large part on whether individual 
performance can be monitored and evaluated (Jones, 1984) .
When employees are paid by piecework and work alone, 
they would be likely to perceive task visibility as high. 
When employees work in groups and the task is obscure, such 
as in research teams, the employees would be likely to 
perceive task visibility as low. In situations of perceived 
low task visibility, employees would be more likely to 
withhold effort because they believe their effort is not 
seen. A laboratory study found that subjects, working in a 
group, were less likely to withhold effort when they
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believed their individual contributions could be identified 
by others (Williams, Harkins & Latane, 1981).
Jones (1984) proposed that nonroutine tasks and complex 
technologies decreased task visibility and thus increased 
the need to monitor individual effort. This study measures 
perceived task visibility of individual employees in 
addition to group technology characteristics. The interest 
here is in the impact of task characteristics relative to 
the impact of employees' perceptions of those 
characteristics, which will be discussed in subsequent 
sections of this chapter. Previous research suggests the 
following hypothesis:
H5: Greater task interdependence will be negatively 
related to perceived task visibility.
In addition, employee perceptions that a supervisor has 
a problem monitoring their tasks results in greater PWE 
because workers perceive their efforts to be less visible 
(George, 1992). In this study, the following hypothesis 
will be tested to replicate that finding in work groups 
across organizations:
H6: Perceived task visibility will be negatively 
related to propensity to withhold effort.
Effort norms
The previous variables considered rational cost-benefit 
analysis as an incentive influencing PWE. The next set of 
variables considers normative conformity incentives. The
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normative conformity model assumes that individual action is 
motivated by a desire to follow standards grounded in 
socially instilled values about principled behavior. Action 
occurs via normative regulation. Norms are prescribed 
guides for conduct or action that are generally complied 
with by group members (Ullman-Margalit, 1977).
Internal group dynamics, particularly perception of 
strong group norms by individual members, can strongly 
influence the decision of members to behave, or not behave, 
in a certain way (Asch, 1951; Janis, 1972; Milgram, 1974). 
Hackman's (1983) review of several group studies suggested 
that norms may influence an individual's performance more 
than the individual's knowledge, skills, and abilities.
In a discussion of organizational dissent, Graham 
(1986) suggested that perceived group unanimity helps 
maintain a social reality that encourages members to remain 
loyal. Conversely, lack of perceived agreement on correct 
conduct allowed members to redefine their situation, 
increasing the likelihood of dissent. Along these lines of 
thinking, an employee's perception that strong compliance 
norms to provide effort exist in a work group should lessen 
the propensity of the employee to defy the norm and withhold 
effort.
This would only be true, of course, if the peer 
compliance norm was for each work-group member to provide 
strong effort in completing the work group's tasks. If the
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strong group norm was to withhold as much effort as 
possible, then such a norm should have a positive effect on 
an employee's PWE. This study tests a proposition that 
perceptions of informal controls, such as compliance effort 
norms, can discourage the likelihood that an employee will 
opportunistically even when such behavior would be 
considered a rational pursuit of self-interest.
H7: Employees' perceptions of norms to provide effort
will be negatively related to propensity to withhold effort. 
Equity perceptions
Marwell and Ames (1981) indicated that normative 
expectations of fairness, rather than narrow economic 
interests, accounted to a large extent for their subjects' 
decisions to contribute to a public good. They found that 
subjects who considered fairness when deciding how to behave 
and defined higher contribution levels to be more fair were 
those who contributed the most.
One explanation of the social-loafing phenomenon is 
Worker A's fear that others in a group will withhold effort 
and thus benefit from Worker A's contributions (Jackson & 
Harkins, 1985). Many people are averse to this "sucker 
effect" (Orbell & Dawes, 1981), and may decide to withhold 
effort themselves when believing that others also plan to 
withhold effort. Many people don't want to be a sucker 
because it violates norms of equity, reciprocity and social 
responsibility, i.e., everyone should give their fair share
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(Kerr, 1983). Equity theory suggests that individuals are 
sensitive to others receiving similar rewards for less 
effort, and they may adjust effort to reflect individual 
perceptions of fairness (Adams, 1963).
Research into the sucker effect and contributions to 
public goods indicated that individuals may adjust effort 
based on fairness judgments about the situation. Those who 
perceive fairness tend to withhold less effort and make 
greater contributions. This leads to the following 
prediction:
H8: Employees' perceptions of equity will be negatively 
related to propensity to withhold effort.
Perceived altruism
The next set of variables involve affective bonding 
incentives. Affective bonding refers to emotional 
attachments to other persons and groups (Knoke, 1990). 
Sociability from personal ties is a very important need that 
group membership may fulfill (Hechter, 1987). This set of 
incentives involves the idea that people who act together 
become emotionally bound together. This notion has been 
stressed in a study of political cohesion in groups 
(Lasswell, 1977), and in the study of social movements 
(Fireman & Gamson, 1979). The variables that may be 
important influences on PWE in work groups include the 
perceived presence of altruism in the group, and objective
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group characteristics that indicate group members have been 
together over time.
Altruism is defined as a pro-social act toward other 
organizational members, such as helping with heavy work 
loads, orienting new people, and helping those who have been 
absent (Smith, Organ & Near, 1983). Altruism is a dimension 
of organizational citizenship behaviors, which are acts not 
formally required of employees but are desired by an 
organization (Organ, 1988, 1990). Organizational 
citizenship is a form of prosocial organizational behaviors, 
which are defined as acts performed within or outside the 
employee's role to aid individuals, groups or organizations 
within or outside an organization (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). 
Prosocial organizational behaviors may or may not benefit 
the focal organization.
In discussing organizational citizenship behaviors, 
Schnake (1991b) suggested that on-the-job altruism may 
result from simple friendships or reciprocal relations 
between co-workers. In general, altruistic behaviors are 
assumed to be motivated by internalized moral principles or 
by empathy and sympathy toward others (Eisenberg, 1991).
Studies of collective action and the production of 
public goods indicate that people often fail to behave in a 
completely self-interested fashion and instead engage in 
helping behavior toward others (e.g., Marwell & Ames, 1980). 
Research on solutions to social dilemmas suggested group
members' social values may influence their behavior 
(Liebrand, 1986). Work on the provision of step-level public 
goods, goods that result from a multi-step process, treated 
altruism and other social values as potentially important 
determinants of behavior (Rapoport, 1987). Altruistic 
behavior has also been seen in bystander-intervention 
studies of impersonal urban environments. For example, 
subway riders sometimes extended aid to a person who 
suffered a staged injury (Latane & Darley, 1970) and to an 
apparent drunk (Piliavin, Rodin and Piliavin, 1969). These 
studies question assumptions that individuals will withhold 
effort if it is in their self-interest.
There have been few, if any, organizational studies in 
which altruism was explicitly considered as an antecedent to 
employee effort. However, research has considered the 
relationship between prosocial behaviors and performance.
In a study of sales people, prosocial behavior of employees 
was positively related, although modestly, to sales 
performance (Puffer, 1987). In a group-level analysis of 
sales people, prosocial behavior, operationalized as 
customer service, was positively related to sales 
performance (George & Bettenhausen, 1990). Neither of these 
studies considered the impact of perceived altruism, or 
prosocial behaviors, among co-workers. In one instance, 
managers provided ratings of prosocial behaviors of
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employees; in the other study sales people rated their 
store's customer service.
Research that reveals relationships between altruism 
and helping behavior and solutions to social dilemmas, 
provision of public goods, performance and collective action 
indicated that perceived altruism may be an important 
consideration in how work-group factors could affect the 
emotional bonding incentives of work-group members to behave 
in a certain way. Williams and Karau (1991) suggested that 
in some situations people are willing to shoulder the burden 
for others. If an employee perceives a high degree of 
altruism in the work group, the employee may be less likely 
to withhold effort so as not to threaten a spirit of 
camaraderie and emotional bonds with co-workers. This leads 
to the following hypothesis:
H9: Employees' perception of altruistic behavior by 
others in a work group will be negatively related to their 
propensity to withhold effort.
Repeated plays: Turnover
Time may be a factor in how successful work groups are 
in developing cooperation among their members (Spicer,
1985). When opportunities to cooperate are repeated, the 
group members have an incentive to cooperate because 
violations of cooperation could lead to a deterioration in 
relations among the members. When individuals know they
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will meet again, future cooperation becomes less difficult 
(Axelrod, 1984).
Implicit in the idea of mutual cooperation among work­
group members is a tendency to give effort acceptable to co­
workers. It would be easier for an employee to refuse to 
cooperate and reduce effort if that employee were only a 
temporary work-group member, or if an employee had little 
previous relations with other members. Thus, chances for 
more cooperation depend partly on a group's turnover rate 
(Spicer, 1985).
Low or no turnover may lead to relationships among 
work-group members that are expressive and personal, and 
this may affect the group's work (Granovetter, 1985). If 
turnover is high, an employee is expected to experience 
little bonding with work-group members and no incentive to 
cooperate regarding effort levels (Spicer, 1985). Emotional 
bonds that develop through repeated interaction and 
transcend a simple cost-benefit analysis may have an impact 
on the effort levels an individual is willing to offer.
H10: Turnover in a work group will be positively 
related to propensity to withhold effort.
Length-of-service heterogeneity
Group and organizational demography have been 
associated with work unit dynamics and outcomes such as 
communication frequency, turnover and social integration. 
Zenger and Lawrence (1989) found a positive association
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between organizational tenure similarity and technical 
communication frequency in an organization but not in its 
work groups. Wagner, Pfeffer and O'Reilly (1984) used 
length-of-service distribution to predict turnover among top 
management teams. O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett (1989) 
found that heterogeneity in group tenure was associated with 
lower levels of group social integration.
Demography explanations often include intervening 
processes, which result from demographic variables and 
predict organizational outcomes (Lawrence, 1991). Although 
these processes are important in explaining organizational 
phenomena, many researchers assume the processes are 
congruent with demographic predictors and do not need to be 
evaluated. Lawrence (1991) argued that this congruence 
assumption is not empirically supported, and the demography- 
outcomes relationship is more complex.
The congruence assumption is required in demography 
research that uses intervening variables in explaining 
organizational outcomes as the indirect result of 
demographic variables through their relationship with other 
variables such as conflict, communication and social norms 
(Lawrence, 1991). For example, Wagner et al. (1984) 
suggested that those who communicate with each other are 
more likely to develop shared beliefs and perceptions than 
those who do not speak to each other. People who join an 
organization at the same time are likely to speak to each
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other more frequently than with others thus an 
organization's tenure distribution should indicate groups in 
which members' beliefs and perceptions are shared.
The impact of demographic length-of-service 
distribution could be predicted in the model of PWE by 
suggesting that it has an indirect influence on effort by 
its effects on group-turnover rates and effort norms. 
However, that requires a congruence assumption. Testing 
conditions in which demography has an impact on outcomes 
would be a more important contribution as Lawrence (1991) 
noted. In this study, direct effects of length-of-service 
distribution are considered.
Demography research suggests that homogeneity of work­
group members' length-of-service distributions leads to 
cooperation, and to a prediction that there would be less 
propensity for individual employees to withhold effort the 
more homogeneous the distribution. Under conditions of 
demographic homogeneity of length-of-service distribution, a 
network of relations is developed, leading to shared 
understandings of appropriate behavior. Conversely, in a 
more heterogeneous group, it is argued that the members 
would be less likely to develop shared understandings, and 
that would affect their propensity to withhold effort.
Hll: Heterogeneity of a work group's length-of-service 
distribution will be positively related to propensity to 
withhold effort.
Pfeffer (1983) suggested that other demographic 
variables, such as age, gender, and race, could affect 
organizational phenomena. Heterogeneity of these 
characteristics in a work group could have similar 
implications for PWE. Whereas heterogeneity of tenure 
distribution indicates less opportunity for repeated plays, 
which have been tied to cooperative behavior and, therefore, 
less PWE, the relationship of other demographic variables to 
PWE is less developed. Thus, no a priori propositions 
concerning other demographic variables are made. These 
variables were collected, and relationships to PWE will be 
explored in a supplementary analysis.
Control variables
In addition to lack of alternative employment 
opportunities, three control variables are examined. Group 
cohesiveness. which is related to the affective bonding 
variables, has long been important in studying group 
dynamics (Zander, 1979). In two laboratory experiments, in 
which group cohesiveness was operationalized by degree of 
previous acquaintance and desire to work together, results 
suggested that cohesiveness moderated social loafing (Karau 
& Williams, 1992b). Despite these findings, the relation of 
cohesiveness to effort is unclear, due in part to problems 
of measurement and definition (see Mudrack, 1989, for 
examples of varying definitions of this construct). Because 
the dependent variable in this proposed study is PWE, which
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may relate ultimately to productivity, and several of the 
independent variables measure affective bonding incentives, 
it is important to consider the role of work-group cohesion.
Each work-group member was asked to provide information 
on group cohesiveness, and their perceptions of a group's 
cohesion are used as a control. Previous research into the 
relation between group cohesiveness and productivity found 
the two connected, but much of this research suffered from a 
lack of focus and cohesiveness (Mudrack, 1989). For this 
reason, no predictions about the relation between 
cohesiveness and effort are offered.
In addition, a social desirability scale was 
administered to respondents. Social desirability is a 
tendency for individuals to present themselves in ways that 
make them appear positive regarding cultural norms and 
standards (Ganster, Hennessey & Luthans, 1983). Research 
that seeks self-report measures from employees should 
include a measure of social desirability and control for its 
effects in data analyses (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Podsakoff 
& Organ, 1986). This controls for the potential of socially 
desirable responses to produce spurious correlations among 
variables, and suppress true correlations among variables 
(Ganster et al., 1983). Self-reports of effort, motivation, 
performance, citizenship behavior and attributions of 
performance may be contaminated by the tendency of
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respondents to provide socially desirable responses 
(Ganster, et al., 1983; Schnake, 1991b).
Finally, internal validity could be threatened in this 
study because in considering multiple organizations, there 
are many ways for work groups to differ other than on the 
independent variables. Testing in a single state and 
testing for differences among employees on other factors 
were among the efforts to confront this limitation.
However, organizations are never quite the same on all 
factors. Every effort can be made to minimize differences, 
but the history of the organization (as well as history of 
the work groups) could affect the results (Stinchcombe,
1965). Therefore, organization membership should be 
controlled in the analyses.
Chapter Summary
This chapter presented a model of individual employee 
PWE drawing on economics, social psychology, sociology and 
management. Hypotheses implied by the model were presented 
under the guiding assumption that employees are motivated to 
contribute effort based on three types of incentives: 
rational cost-benefit analysis that is largely concerned 
with economic exchange, normative conformity to perceived 
peer effort norms and equity perceptions, and affective 
bonding with fellow employees reflected in the opportunity 
for repeated interaction with co-workers and perceptions of 
altruism in the work group.
Heterogeneity of a work group's length-of-service 
distribution was offered as an additional variable that is 
expected to have an impact on an individual's propensity to 
withhold effort. Other demographic variables were discussed 
as were variables that should be controlled in this multi­
organization analysis.
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DESIGN
This chapter describes research methodology and design 
to be used in testing hypotheses advanced in Chapter 2. The 
sample and procedures for data collection are discussed. 
Measures and scales used to tap underlying constructs are 
summarized.
Sample
Data were collected from employees at ten worksites in 
Louisiana, drawn from a sampling frame provided by the 
Louisiana Department of Employment and Training, Division of 
Research and Statistics. The sample was drawn randomly from 
the division's taxmaster file. Procedures used to select 
these companies are described in the data collection section 
of this chapter.
Correlational and regression analyses were used to test 
the hypotheses. In such analyses, a statistical test's 
power is a function of expected strength of the association 
between two (or more) variables and the tolerable threshold 
of Type I and Type II errors. Alpha is generally set at .05 
and power (or beta) at .80 (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). Because 
there are multiple independent variables, a power analysis 
for multiple correlation was conducted using a method 
provided by Gatsonis and Sampson (1989). The analysis 
showed that this study, which will include a maximum of 22 
predictor variables in one of the regression equations, will
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required at least 233 subjects to achieve statistical power 
of .80 at a .05 confidence level with hypothesized effect 
size of .30, considered a moderate population effect size 
(Cohen, 1977). To address potential problems with missing 
data, gain variation in labor market area responses and 
achieve required statistical power to test the hypotheses, 
more than 550 employees were sampled in ten companies.
The unit of analysis in the study was the individual 
employee. To be eligible for the study, an individual had 
to be part of a work group, defined in this study as two or 
more rank-and-file employees under authority of a common 
supervisor to whom members of the group are directly 
responsible (Glisson & Durick, 1988). All employees in each 
work group and their supervisors were asked to complete a 
questionnaire at their work sites. Measures used in the 
questionnaire were pre-tested on a sample similar to that 
used in the actual study. Factor and reliability analyses 
were performed as part of the pre-test.
Data Collection
There were two visits to each worksite. The first 
visit involved an interview with the person on site who was 
most familiar with human-resource practices at that site.
At the conclusion of the interview, those individuals were 
asked if they would participate in a survey of several 
employee groups. If they agreed to participate, a time was 
arranged to return and administer a survey to employees. In
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the case of one company, the researcher met with the 
operations director of the work groups that were asked to 
participate in the study and with two of the supervisors of 
those work groups, returning the next week to administer the 
surveys to employees.
Measures of individual propensity to withhold effort, 
perceptual measures of work-group altruism and peer effort 
norms and demographic measures were among the variables 
collected on the second visit. Appendix B shows a list of 
variables, the measures used in the study, and the sources 
of data collected in the study. Appendix C includes the 
pre-test questionnaire while Appendix D contains the field 
study instruments.
Measures
Independent variables
Wage premium. Supervisors were asked to review their 
records and calculate an average wage of employees in the 
work group they supervised. To determine if a wage premium 
was being paid, the wages reported by the supervisors were 
compared to the estimate of median salary provided by the 
BTA Economic Research Institute for jobs included in the 
sample. This publication provided a prevailing market wage 
for most of the jobs performed by those in each work group 
(n = 474) .
The use of this resource was comparable to that used in 
previous measures of wage premium (i.e., a comparison of the
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hourly wage being paid within the plant to the average 
hourly wage paid in each Standard Metropolitan Statistical 
Area, Cappelli & Chauvin, 1991a). Prevailing wage 
information was unavailable for about 100 individuals 
sampled. Either they performed jobs not listed in the BTA 
report or they worked in the Houma, Louisiana, labor market, 
which had no wage information listed in the report.
Size of work group. Supervisors were asked the number 
of employees they supervise in each work group.
Task interdependence. To measure work-group technology 
perceptions, items that gauge degree of interdependence were 
used in this study. Work-group members were asked to 
respond to five items that collectively reflect reciprocal 
interdependence (Pearce & Gregersen, 1991). The items 
indicated whether respondents rely on others to complete 
their tasks or work on their own. Sample items included "I 
work closely with others in doing my work" and "I frequently 
must coordinate my efforts with others." Items were summed, 
and higher scores indicated that employees perceive a 
greater degree of reciprocal interdependence present in the 
tasks of each work group.
Perceived task visibility. A five-item measure from an 
earlier study (George, 1992) was used to gauge employee 
perceptions of task visibility. Sample items included "My 
supervisor is generally aware of when I am putting forth 
below average effort" and "My supervisor is aware of the
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amount of work I do." Items were summed so that higher 
scores indicated greater perceived visibility.
Perceived effort norms. The first step in tapping this 
variable was a pilot study to produce a measurement. In 
discussing reward systems, Kerr and Slocum (1987) 
differentiated between those that are performance-based and 
those that are hierarchically-based. Their research showed 
that a clan culture emerged in a hierarchical reward system. 
Ouchi (1980) used the term clan to describe a control system 
based on socialization and internalized values and norms.
In this culture, individual employees are similar to a 
fraternal group with strong pressures to conform to group 
standards. The variable of interest in this study, 
perceived peer compliance effort norms, is related to clan 
control in the sense that it is concerned with individual 
members' perceptions of the strength of work-group norms to 
control their activities.
Twenty items that attempt to tap perceptions of this 
work-group characteristic were considered. These items were 
suggested by Kerr and Slocum (1987) and by Van de Ven and 
Ferry (1980). The items, presented on seven-point Likert 
scales, attempted to measure perceived strength of 
tradition, conformity pressures, independence, teamwork and 
internal control present in the work group. Sample items 
included "There is a great deal of pressure from my co­
workers to exert effort" and "Members of my work group
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encourage individuals to excel and strive for increasingly 
higher levels of performance." Higher scores indicated 
greater perceived presence of strong normative pressure to 
conform to standards.
Following guidelines recommended by Sheatsley (1983), a 
measure was developed based on these items and pre-tested in 
groups similar to the sample to be tested in the actual 
study. This enabled a check of internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability of the questionnaire. Results were 
factor analyzed to check construct validity of the items. 
Acceptable items were included in the survey of employees. 
Details of the pretest are included in Chapter 4.
Equity perceptions. Employee perceptions of equitable 
treatment were tapped by use of a distributive justice 
scale. Distributive justice is concerned with a perceived 
lack of fairness based on outcomes received by employees, 
such as pay raises, promotions and status (Lind & Tyler, 
1988). A seven-point measure consisting of three items 
measured employee perceptions of distributive justice 
(Martin, 1987). Sample items include "I am compensated 
fairly for the work I do here, based on the effort I give on 
the job" and "I am compensated fairly here considering the 
responsibilities I have." Items were summed so that higher 
scores indicated greater perceived equity in rewards.
Perceptions of altruism. Perceived altruism was 
measured by five items that make up a portion of the
80
organizational citizenship behavior measure developed by 
Smith, Organ, and Near (1983). This measure is anchored 
with a five-point scale, ranging from "practically never" to 
"almost always." Sample items include "Members of my work 
group help others who have been absent" and "Members of my 
work group volunteer for things that are not required."
Items were summed so that higher scores indicate greater 
perceived altruism on the part of co-workers.
Turnover rates. The group supervisors were asked to 
state the number of employees who quit, were fired or 
otherwise left the work group in the past 12 months. The 
number of employees who had left was divided by total number 
of employees in the work group to provide a turnover rate 
for each work group in the study. Both voluntary and 
involuntary turnover potentially limit opportunities for 
cooperation in the work group (Spicer, 1985).
Work-group heterogeneity. Employees were asked to 
provide demographic information such as age, length of 
service in this work group, race, gender, and education 
level. This information was used to obtain demographic 
heterogeneity measures of each work group.
Two types of indices were computed. For interval 
variables (e.g., tenure: number of months in this work 
group), the coefficient of variation (standard deviation 
divided by the mean) was computed. This measure was used 
because its psychometric properties are preferable to the
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standard deviation in establishing a measure of 
heterogeneity (Allison, 1978).
For categorical variables such as race, gender and 
education level, Blau's (1977) index of heterogeneity was 
computed. This index varies from a low of 0 if all group 
members are the same to a theoretical high of 1. 
Heterogeneity is defined as follows: Heterogeneity = (1 - £ 
pi2), where p is the proportion of group members in a 
category and i is the number of different categories 
represented in a group. These procedures were used to 
calculate heterogeneity of work groups on the following 
dimensions: race, gender and education level (non-high 
school graduate, high school graduate, some college, college 
graduate, graduate school).
Dependent variable
Propensity to withhold effort. The dependent variable 
is the propensity of employees to withhold effort. In a 
pre-test, several measures were considered. First, a 
measure employed by Judge and Chandler (1990) was used.
Using seven-point Likert-type scales, respondents were asked 
how often they give less than 100 percent effort on 
important activities of their jobs, how often they expect to 
give less than 100 percent effort on those activities in the 
future, and how often they fail to perform tasks not 
formally required of their jobs. Supervisors were asked how 
often the respondent gives less than 100 percent effort on
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important job tasks and how often the respondent fails to 
perform tasks not formally required. Failing to perform 
duties not formally required (working to job description) 
may indicate lack of task effort (Judge & Chandler, 1990).
In addition, a seven-item scale (George, 1992) was 
presented to each pre-test respondent. The supervisor of 
each work group was asked to provide data about each 
respondent. These measures were pre-tested, and a 
confirmatory factor analysis was performed on these measures 
and the Judge and Chandler measure to determine if both 
gauge the same construct.
George labeled her measure a "social loafing" scale, 
but its items are descriptive of withholding of effort by 
employees, and may just as validly been named a withholding 
effort scale. Finally, five original items designed to tap 
free-riding behaviors were included in the pre-test.
Variants of PWE measure. Included in the field survey 
questionnaire were several other measures designed to tap 
effort withholding behavior. These included a measure of 
job neglect (Leek & Saunders, 1992) as well as an adaptation 
of the Judge and Chandler (1990), George (1992) and original 
free riding items. The adaptation asked employees to 
evaluate the PWE (shirk, loaf, free ride) of their fellow 
workers as a group. In addition, supervisors were asked to 
evaluate the effort provided by each employee by using the
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George scale. These additional measures were included so as 
to have multiple measures of the dependent variable.
Control variables
Alternative employment opportunities. The efficiency 
wage hypothesis implies that alternative employment 
opportunities should be controlled when predicting a 
negative relation between the interaction of wage premium 
and unemployment rate, and PWE. Lack of alternative 
employment opportunities have been operationalized in 
previous research by unemployment rate, and percentage of 
employees on layoff from a particular plant (Cappelli & 
Chauvin, 1991a, 1991b).
An average unemployment rate for the last year in the 
parish where each worksite is located was provided by the 
Louisiana Department of Labor. To obtain an unemployment 
measure for the labor market area (LMA), the parish 
unemployment rate was weighted by the percentage of LMA 
labor force that lived in each parish, and then summed to 
create an LMA unemployment rate.
Percentage of employees laid off at each of the 10 
worksites in the last year was obtained. An employment 
growth trend measure was calculated by asking each human 
resource manager to provide the current number of employees, 
and the average number of people employed at the worksite in 
each of the last three years. There was little variance in 
layoffs and growth trends across companies so these
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variables were not used in the analysis; however, 
organization membership was controlled in the multivariate 
analyses.
Individual employee perceptions of labor market 
conditions were collected. Three items, measured on a 
seven-point scale and based on O'Reilly and Caldwell (1981) 
and Gerhart (1990), were used. The items were designed to 
gauge an individual's perceived ease of movement to another 
job. Subjects were asked whether they agree or disagree 
with the following: (a) "If I were to leave my current job,
it would be difficult for me to find another job that was 
just as good." (R) (b) It would be easy for me to change
jobs should I decide to do so." (c) "There are numerous 
jobs as good as this one that would be available to me if I 
decided to leave my current job." Higher scores indicated 
respondents believed it easier to move to a comparable job.
Social desirability. When researchers ask employees to 
provide self-evaluation concerning effort, motivation or 
performance, they should include a measure of social 
desirability in the questionnaire and control for the 
effects of social desirability in the data analyses (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1960; Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).
In the field study, the 16-item, two-point "Responding 
Desirably on Attitudes and Opinions" (RD-16; Schuessler, 
Hittle & Cardascia, 1978) was given to respondents. The 
scale is appropriate to use in opinion surveys because items
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were taken from a large pool of general attitude measures, 
selected from ratings completed by a cross section of adults 
and screened so no items differed in desirability across 
racial or educational lines (Paulus, 1991).
Perceived group cohesiveness. This variable was 
measured with an eight-item Group Cohesiveness scale adapted 
from Dobbins and Zaccaro (1986). Items, such as, "The 
members of my work group get along well together", tap 
various facets of cohesiveness including attraction to the 
group and social interaction, and can be adapted to fit most 
samples (Mudrack, 1989). Items were summed so that higher 
scores indicated greater degrees of perceived group 
cohesiveness.
Organization. This is a dummy variable indicating in 
which of the 10 organizations the surveyed employee works. 
This information is used to control for organization in the 
multivariate analyses.
Conclusion
This chapter summarized the general research strategy 
and the measures used in the study. In the next chapter, 
the pre-test and its results are discussed. Then, the 
sample and procedures for the hypothesis tests are 
described, and the results of correlational and regression 
analyses are presented. Chapter 5 discusses the results as 
they pertain to the hypotheses, the study's limitations, and 
directions for future research.
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This chapter reports the results of both the pre-test 
and the hypothesis tests. First, results of a pre-test 
designed to develop two measures used in the study are 
discussed. Then, a description of procedures employed to 
collect the field data is provided. Demographic 
characteristics of the sample and measures used in the study 
are reported. Correlational and regression analyses to test 
the hypotheses developed in Chapter 2 are described, and the 
results of these tests are reported. In addition, results 
of supplemental analyses are provided. All of these results 
are discussed in Chapter 5.
Pre-test
Goals
The pre-test had four specific goals:
1. Assess reliability and validity of a propensity to 
withhold effort measure. The dissertation argues that 
social loafing, free riding and shirking are manifestations 
of the same phenomenon: propensity to withhold effort (PWE). 
To obtain a measure of PWE, items representing social 
loafing and shirking were taken from existing scales. In 
addition, original items that represented free riding were 
considered. The goal was to identify the subset of items 
that best capture variance in the underlying construct of 
PWE.
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2. Assess reliability and validity of a measure of 
perceived group effort norms. Theoretical consideration of 
the proposed measure led me to conclude that all of the 
proposed items for work-group effort norms did not 
necessarily pertain to norms to provide high effort on the 
job. For example, "My co-workers and I care about each 
other's well being" does not represent an effort norm. 
Therefore, a pre-test was needed to identify those items 
specifically reflecting effort norms in work groups.
3. Empirically distinguish between the group effort 
norm measure and an established measure of group 
cohesiveness. The model to be tested considers group effort 
norms as a predictor of PWE. Group cohesiveness, an 
important variable in determining how individual group 
members behave in accomplishing group tasks (Zander, 1979), 
is included as a control variable. Because group effort 
norms and group cohesiveness are conceptually similar, a 
factor analysis was conducted to determine whether the two 
scales could be distinguished empirically. Such a result 
would also provide evidence for the discriminant validity of 
the effort norm measure.
4. Ensure that the final survey could be read and 
comprehended by participants in the field study by using a 
computer program to ascertain the reading level required to 
understand the measurement instrument.
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Sample and Procedure
Surveys were administered over three weeks during Fall, 
1992 to MBA students at LSU-Baton Rouge, University of 
Southwestern Louisiana and Southeastern Louisiana 
University, and to undergraduates at LSU-Alexandria. An 
analysis of variance of survey items by site and cross 
tabulations of items by demographic variables revealed no 
significant differences across sites or demographic groups.
One hundred fifty-two students in 10 classes 
participated; 149 usable responses were returned, a response 
rate of 98 percent. Respondents were asked to keep in mind 
their current or most recent job when answering. All 
respondents had work experience, more than half as 
supervisors, and most were currently employed. Sample 
demographics are shown in Table 4.1.
Sample size is sufficient to undertake planned pre-test 
analyses. A pre-test in which factor analysis is performed 
should sample more than 100 respondents, and obtain about 
five observations per item to be analyzed (Hair, Anderson & 
Tatham, 1987). Attempts were made to sample individuals 
similar to the study's target population (Bolton, 1993), but 
pre-test respondents had higher education levels than field 
study respondents and a fourth of pre-test respondents 
worked in the public sector. Whereas pre-testing a survey 
such as this is recommended, "there are no general 
principles of good pretesting..." (Converse &
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Table 4.1 
Characteristics of pre-test sample
Mean SD n Percent
Age 27 5.76 149 ---
Race 149
White — - 130 87 percent
Black — - 5 3 percent
Asian — - 10 7 percent
Other — - 4 3 percent
(or no answer)
Gender 149
Men — - 103 69 percent
Women —— — 46 31 percent
Education 149
Some college — - 6 4 percent
College degree — - 130 87 percent
Advanced degree —— — 13 9 percent
Emblovment tvoe 149
Full-time — - 92 62 percent
Part-time — - 57 38 percent
Non-supervisors — - 72 48 percent
Supervisors —— — 77 52 percent
Sector 149
Service — - 85 57 percent
Manufacturing — - 27 18 percent
Public — — 37 25 percent
Work-group size 9 9.8 Size range 2 - 6 0
Presser, 1986, p. 52). Because of differences between pre­
test sample and target population, it was important to be 
conservative regarding item deletion based on pre-test data. 
Pre-test Results
Reliability and validity of PWE measure. Because the 
goal was to find one factor that explains the most variance 
underlying PWE, and perfect reliability among items could 
not be assumed, a common factor analysis with varimax
rotation (Nunnally, 1978) was performed on 15 items (shown
in Exhibit 4.1). Common factor analysis is appropriate when
Exhibit 4.1 
Proposed PWE items
Item 1. How often do you give 100 percent effort on 
the job?
Item 2. How often do you expect to give 100 percent 
effort in the future?
Item 3. How often do you perform duties that are not 
normally required by your job description?
*Item 4. I defer responsibilities I should assume to 
my co-workers.
*Item 5. I put forth less effort on the job when 
others are around to do the work.
Item 6. I do not do my share of the work.
*Item 7. I give less effort than other members of the 
work group.
Item 8. I avoid performing housekeeping tasks as much 
as possible.
*Item 9. I leave work for the next shift that I should 
really complete.
*Item 10. I take it easy if others are around to do 
the work.
Item 11. I contribute to lowering production costs in 
this work group.
Item 12. I am absent from work more than others in 
this work group.
Item 13. I make an effort to increase this work 
group's reputation.
Item 14. Improving the equipment used by this work 
group is not my concern.
Item 15. I contribute to a work environment that is 
free of safety and health problems.
* —  Retained in field study
a researcher wants to obtain a minimum number of factors for 
prediction purposes (Hair, et al., 1987), and perfect 
reliability among the proposed items cannot be assumed 
(Gorsuch, 1990). The items included were purported to 
measure shirking (3 items, Judge & Chandler, 1990), social
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loafing (7 items, George, 1992), and free riding (5 original 
items). Table 4.2 shows results of this analysis (n = 149).
Table 4.2
Results of pre-test on proposed effort items
F 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5
Item 1 (SHRK) . 13 .70 .31 . 05 .16
Item 2 (SHRK) . 18 .85 . 04 .23 . 06
Item 3 (SHRK) . 18 . 06 .43 -.02 . 17
Item 4 (SL) . 68 -.05 . 03 . 16 -.42
Item 5 (SL) .70 . 12 . 07 .26 -.15
Item 6 (SL) .22 . 17 -.00 .65 -.09
Item 7 (SL) . 39 . 10 . 07 . 38 . 15
Item 8 (SL) . 27 . 08 . 12 .09 . 06
Item 9 (SL) .43 .27 .31 . 00 -.02
Item 10 (SL) .81 . 11 . 02 . 02 .38
Item 11 (FR) . 01 . 03 . 07 . 01 .25
Item 12 (FR) . 01 .22 .21 . 18 -.14
Item 13 (FR) .04 . 17 .74 . 05 . 05
Item 14 (FR) . 03 .09 .31 .26 . 18
Item 15 (FR) .24 . 04 . 24 .23 -.00
Eigenvalues 3.2 1.3 .73 .57 .38
% Variance Exp. 21.6 8.7 4.9 3.8 2.6
The latent root criterion, eigenvalues greater than 1, 
was used to determine how many factors to extract (Hair et 
al., 1987). After rotating the solution, a factor loading 
of .30 was used as a criterion to discern important items 
(Hair et al., 1987). Five items loaded on the first factor, 
explaining 21.6 percent of the variance. Coincidentally, 
these items were all taken from a social loafing measure. 
These five items —  4, 5, 7, 9 and 10 -- represented PWE in 
the final survey because their wording taps elements of 
shirking, social loafing and free riding (i.e., PWE).
PWE describes the likelihood that an individual will 
give less than full effort in performing a job-related task.
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This is reflected by asking employees if they defer their 
own responsibilities to co-workers, if they put forth less 
effort than co-workers or "take it easy" when others are 
around to do the work, and if they leave work for the next 
shift that they really should complete. These tendencies 
are clearly addressed in the items loading on the first 
factor.
Table 4.2 shows that Items 7, 9 and 10 crossloaded on 
other factors. As noted, the goal of this factor analysis 
was to develop a PWE scale. Because the wording of these 
three items is conceptually similar to the PWE construct and 
the three items loaded on the first factor, they were 
included in the field survey.
A reliability analysis was performed on the five items 
retained from the pre-test. A coefficient alpha of .75 was 
obtained. An alpha level of .70 is considered acceptable 
for exploratory research (Nunnally, 1978), thus these five 
items were judged internally consistent based on that 
criterion.
Internal consistency is a "necessary but not sufficient 
condition for construct validity" (Nunnally, 1978, p. 103). 
Further testing is required to determine how proposed 
measures of a construct fit into a network of 
relationships that would be expected based on theoretical 
considerations. Whereas such tests are limited by 
assumptions about the soundness of a theory, they address
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concerns regarding the position of a proposed measure within 
a nomological net (Nunnally, 1978/ Schwab, 1980).
In this case, PWE should be related negatively to 
perceptions of high-effort norms (Heckathorn, 1990), 
altruism (Williams & Karau, 1991), task visibility (George, 
1992), and distributive justice (Jackson & Harkins, 1985), 
and positively related to task interdependence (Jones,
1984), and group size (Latane, Williams & Harkins, 1979). 
Group cohesiveness has been negatively correlated with 
social loafing (Karau & Williams, 1992b). Social 
desirability responses are expected to be negatively 
correlated with self-reports of a negative behavior such as 
withholding effort (Ganster, Hennessey & Luthans, 1983).
Established scales measuring the aforementioned 
variables were collected in the pre-test. Alphas for these 
scales are shown in Table 4.3. All approached or exceeded 
acceptable levels, ranging from .64 (social desirability) to 
.88 (distributive justice).
Correlations were computed on the five PWE items and 
the established scales (n = 142). As expected, the results 
show significant negative correlations with scales measuring 
effort norms (r = -.18; p < .05), altruism (r = -.25; p < 
.01), group cohesiveness (r = -.20; p < .05, task visibility 
(r = -.20; p < .05) and social desirability (r = -.37; p < 
.01). These findings support the nomological validity of 
the PWE scale based on theoretical expectations.
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Non-significant results were obtained between PWE and 
the task interdependence, distributive justice and group 
size measures. These results may have been due to sample 
specific causes induced by pre-test conditions. A field 
study to test the hypotheses considered intact groups where 
within group consistency existed across tasks, reward
Table 4.3
Results of pre-test reliability analysis
Scale Number of Items Alpha n
Altruism 5 .86 147
Interdependence 5 .86 148
Effort norms 6 . 79 146
Group cohesiveness 8 . 92 148
Distributive
justice
3 . 88 149
Perceived task 
visibility
5 .81 149
Social desirability 16 .64 149
systems and size. For example, size was measured 
objectively in the hypothesis tests rather than by 
recollection of respondents as in the pre-test. In the pre­
test, a failure to find correlations among these three 
variables and PWE may have resulted because there was a vast 
variety of objective interdependence, reward systems and 
group sizes that existed within the sample; 149 work groups 
were represented, one per respondent. Such variety may not
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be present for perceptual measures dealing with altruism, 
effort norms, group cohesiveness, and task visibility.
In sum, items identified in the common factor analysis 
will be used in the field study to represent PWE based on 
the following: (a) A factor analysis of items associated
with withholding effort produced five items addressing PWE 
on the job, (b) A test of the internal consistency of the 
items met the criterion for exploratory research, and (c) A 
test of relationships between the proposed scale and other 
measures showed associations that represent the measure's 
theoretically proposed nomological network.
Reliability and validity of group effort norm measure. 
The second goal of the pre-test was to find one factor that 
explains the most variance in the domain underlying group 
effort norms. To address this goal, a common factor 
analysis with varimax rotation was performed on 20 original 
items written to measure perceived group norms (See Exhibit 
4.2). These items were suggested by the work of Kerr and 
Slocum (1987) and Van de Ven and Ferry (1980).
As in the PWE factor analysis, a latent root criterion 
was used to determine the number of factors to extract (Hair 
et al., 1987). After the solution was rotated, loadings on 
the first factor greater than .30 were viewed as important 
and merited close examination (Hair et al., 1987). The 
results shown in Table 4.4 indicate that six items related
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Exhibit 4.2 
Proposed group effort norm items
*Item 1. My co-workers and I stress teamwork.
Item 2. It is the supervisor's job to see that my
co-workers and I work as hard as we can. (R)
*Item 3. There is a great deal of pressure from my 
co-workers to exert effort.
Item 4. My co-workers and I don't talk much about the 
way we do our jobs.
*Item 5. My co-workers and I are rewarded here based 
on how well our group does its job.
Item 6. My co-workers rarely worry about how hard I 
am working. (R)
Item 7. The supervisor has little impact on how hard 
we work here. (R)
*Item 8. My co-workers and I have little obligation 
to work together to do the best job we can.
Item 9. Maintaining close friendships is important to 
my co-workers and me.
Item 10. My co-workers and I regularly socialize 
together. (R)
Item 11. I have a great deal of independence from my 
co-workers.
Item 12. My co-workers do not urge me to work hard. (R)
Item 13. Each member of this work group is rewarded 
based on how well that person does the job, 
compared to other members.
*Item 14. In this work group, we expect everyone to 
pull together to get the job done.
Item 15. It is routine for my co-workers and I to get 
together during non-work hours.
Item 16. My co-workers compete with each other to 
achieve performance targets.
Item 17. My co-workers gang up on the person whose 
work is far below that of the others.
Item 18. My co-workers gang up on the person whose 
work far exceeds that of the others.
*Item 19. My co-workers encourage individuals to excel 
and strive for increasingly higher levels of 
work performance.
Item 20. My co-workers try to get ahead at the expense 
of other work-group members.
* —  Retained as a measure of group effort 
norms in the field study.
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Table 4.4
Factor loadings on proposed effort norm items
F 1 F 2 F 3 F 4 F 5 F 6 F 7
Item 1 .57* .34 . 13 . 12 . 15 . 02 . 09
Item 2 - .06 -.07 .01 . 06 . 00 -.14 -.77
Item 3 . 37* . 17 -.04 .25 . 14 .38 . 19
Item 4 .06 . 19 . 04 .29 .26 -.04 . 03
Item 5 .56* .11 -.05 . 03 . 32 . 06 . 08
Item 6 . 13 . 08 -.04 . 50 -.15 . 11 -.05
Item 7 - .31 . 02 .02 -.22 . 00 . 22 . 05
Item 8 .72* . 02 .11 . 14 -.03 -.25 . 07
Item 9 .23 .71 . 05 -.01 . 07 . 13 -.00
Item 10 . 12 .86 -.02 . 19 . 05 . 05 .08
Item 11 . 00 .26 -.16 .24 . 17 -.14 .20
Item 12 .21 . 17 -.02 .74 . 13 . 07 -.02
Item 13 - . 16 -.08 . 10 . 11 -.75 -.05 . 06
Item 14 .72* . 18 . 07 . 11 . 05 . 16 -.09
Item 15 . 12 . 83 -.04 . 19 . 09 -.08 .03
Item 16 .22 . 11 -.26 .36 . 53 . 18 .17
Item 17 - . 03 . 00 -.37 . 13 . 07 . 60 . 13
Item 18 . 05 -.03 .95 . 04 -.03 -.05 . 02
Item 19 .42* . 22 . 16 .24 . 24 . 15 . 01
Item 20 - .23 -.06 -.56 . 12 . 19 .30 . 06
Eigen­
values
4.3 2 .1 1.3 . 89 . 78 . 62 .49
Percent
Variance
Explained
21.7 10.6 6.6 4.4 3.9 3 .1 2 . 5
* —  These items reflect perceived norms to provide 
effort and were retained in the field study.
to group effort norms loaded on the first factor, explaining 
21.7 percent of the variance.
Examination of these six items reveals that they would 
generally indicate the presence of perceived effort norms in 
work groups. For example, these items related to pressure 
to produce effort, and to rewards based on high group 
effort and teamwork. Reliability analysis on the six 
retained items yielded a coefficient alpha of .79 (n = 146).
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Table 4.4 indicates that Items 3 and 5 crossloaded on 
other factors. However, the wording of these two items 
reveals conceptual similarity to other group effort norm 
items. Because the goal of the factor analysis was to 
develop a group effort norms scale and these two items 
loaded on the first factor, they were retained in the field 
survey despite the crossloadings.
Item 7 was dropped despite a loading of -.31 on the 
first factor. The item was eliminated because even though 
it had been reverse scored before the factor analysis, its 
loading remained negative and opposite to the other items 
loading on the first factor. This finding appeared to 
indicate a problem with respondents' understanding of the 
item, thus it was not used in the field study.
As discussed earlier in regard to the PWE measure, the 
correlations of the effort norm measure with other scales 
that are theoretically related and were measured in the pre­
test were assessed to consider nomological validity 
(Nunnally, 1978). The effort norm measure should be 
positively related to a group cohesiveness measure, and 
should be negatively related to PWE (Heckathorn, 1990). 
Results showed that effort norm items were positively and 
significantly related to an eight-item group cohesiveness 
scale (r = .62, p < .01, n = 142) and negatively and 
significantly related to the PWE scale (r = -.20, p < .05, n 
= 142). Based on the evidence of internal consistency and
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nomological validity found in the pre-test, these six items
were used on the final survey.
Group effort norms and cohesiveness. A common factor 
analysis with oblique rotation was performed on the six 
group effort norm items and an eight-item group cohesiveness 
scale (Dobbins & Zaccaro, 1986). Oblique rotation was used 
because conceptual similarity of the effort norm and 
cohesiveness constructs indicates the potential that they 
may be highly correlated (Nunnally, 1978).
The analysis —  results shown in Table 4.5 —  produced 
two factors with effort norm items loading on one factor and 
cohesiveness items loading on the other factor. These 
results show that whereas the two scales are indeed highly 
correlated (r = .62, p < .01), one can empirically
Table 4.5
Factor loadings of effort norms and cohesiveness items
Factor 1 Factor 2
Item 2 (GEN) . 29 . 50
Item 4 (GEN) -.08 .43
Item 7 (GEN) -.00 . 61
Item 10 (GEN) . 06 . 55
Item 16 (GEN) -.02 .77
Item 21 (GEN) .20 . 44
1 (GCOH) . 63 . 00
2 (GCOH) .80 . 00
3 (GCOH) .74 .03
4 (GCOH) . 87 . 00
5 (GCOH) . 93 -.02
6 (GCOH) . 48 . 01
7 (GCOH) . 78 -.03
8 (GCOH) .83 . 02
Eigenvalues 6.22 1.05
Percent of Variance
Explained 44 . 5 7.5
1 0 0
distinguish between the effort norms scale and the group 
cohesiveness scale. These factor analysis results provide 
evidence of discriminant validity of the effort norms scale.
Survey comprehension. It was important to determine 
whether respondents in the field study could comprehend the 
survey. To address this question, the proposed survey was 
submitted to the Grammatik III program (Wampler, Williams & 
Walker, 1988). This test showed the following scores 
regarding reading level and reading comprehension:
1. Flesch Reading Ease: 71. This result is based on a 
scale of 0 to 100 with 0 being very difficult to read and 
100 being very easy to read; a score of 71 indicates that 
the questionnaire is easy to read based on this test. 
Criteria consist of average length of sentences, percentage 
of long words and number of syllables per word.
2. Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level: 6. This grade level 
readability score is used by many U.S. government agencies, 
and indicates the average number of school years needed to 
understand the work.
Survey respondents worked in organizations that 
required minimum reading requirements for employment, such 
as job application and other employee forms. Based on this 
information and analysis of the questionnaire by Grammatik 
III, the questionnaire should be understood by the 
respondents. Reading skill necessary to comprehend the 
survey is below the 8th grade -- the level at which average
1 0 1
local newspapers are edited. The Grammatik III results 
indicated that further adjustments to lower reading levels 
of the instrument to ensure comprehension were unnecessary. 
Pre-test summary
The results of the pre-test produced five items for use 
as a PWE scale, and six items for use as a perceived group 
effort norm scale in the field study. Pre-test findings 
showed evidence for the reliability and construct validity 
of these scales. Results indicated that the effort norm 
scale was empirically distinct from the cohesiveness scale. 
Finally, a computerized grammatical analysis of the survey 
instrument indicated that respondents should be able to read 
and comprehend the survey.
Field Study
Sample and procedure
Five hundred seventy employees, representing 110 work 
groups at 10 Louisiana worksites, participated in the field 
study. Eight of the companies employed 31 to 47 0 people, 
whereas two larger companies (N = 2 000; N = 2 814) also 
participated. At each site, the first company visit 
involved an interview with the human resource manager or the 
person most familiar with personnel practices. At the 
conclusion of the interview, those individuals were asked if 
they would permit a survey of several employee groups.
If they agreed to participate, the author returned to 
administer a survey to employees and their supervisors.
1 0 2
Employees —  usually two or three at a time —  were surveyed 
in a conference room away from their work stations. A list 
of names of those who would be surveyed at particular times 
was provided so each employee's survey could be coded by the 
author and later matched with their supervisor's survey. No 
supervisors were present during the surveying of employees. 
Supervisors completed their surveys of employees during 
separate meetings.
Employees were told that the survey involved an 
academic study of factors involved in successful work 
groups. They were ensured that responses would be seen only 
by researchers at LSU and that their responses would be kept 
confidential. They were provided with the researcher's 
phone number so they could call if they had any guestions 
about the survey. They were told that a general summary of 
the results would be returned to the company, but no 
individual responses would be identified. Supervisors were 
given the same assurances and instructions. There were no 
subsequent phone calls.
In the case of one company, the author met with the 
operations director of the work groups that were to 
participate and with two of the supervisors of those work 
groups, returning the next week to administer the employee 
surveys. In these large work groups, it was impossible to 
match employee survey with supervisor survey without the 
help of employees. Two employee facilitators who knew names
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of their fellow employees passed out the coded surveys to
the correct employees at a meeting during working hours.
Demographic characteristics of the employee sample (n = 
570) are shown in Table 4.6. Five of the 10 companies had 
experienced slight employment growth over the last year (n = 
356) while the other five companies (n = 214) had neither 
increased nor decreased their work force. Mean size of the 
work groups represented in the sample was 12.6, size ranged 
from two to 59 people with a median group size of six. The 
median turnover rate over the last 12 months was 10 percent 
within these work groups.
The supervisors of the 110 work groups surveyed had the 
following characteristics: 97 percent were white and 3 
percent were black; 51 percent were men and 49 percent were 
women; 2 percent had less than high school education, 2 3 
percent had graduated from high school, 34 percent had some 
college education, 35 percent had graduated from college, 
and 7 percent had attended graduate school.
Measures
Chapter 3 contained a detailed description of the 
source of measures for this study and the logic behind using 
certain measures to test hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2. 
The following section reports statistical properties of 
items used in hypothesis tests.
Dependent variable. PWE was tapped using the five 
items identified in the pre-test. A common factor analysis,
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Table 4.6
Characteristics of the field study sample
Mean SD n Ranqe
Age 38.6 11. 07 557 17-67
Months employed 113.8 106.6 557 1--447
by company
Months as member 50.17 54.4 549 1--283
of current work
group
Percent
Race Coded 570
White 1 — — 450 78.9 percent
Black 2 — — 82 14 . 4 percent
Hispanic 3 — — 6 1.1 percent
Other (or 4 — — 32 5.6 percent
no answer) 9
Gender 570
Men 1 — — 123 21.6 percent
Women 2 — — 429 75.3 percent
No answer — — — 18 3 . 2 percent
Education 570
< than H.S. 1 — — 18 3 . 2 percent
H.S. degree 2 — — 261 45.8 percent
Some college 3 — — 216 37.9 percent
Coll. degree 4 — — 52 9.1 percent
Grad, school 5 — — 10 1.8 percent
No answer 9 — — 13 2.3 percent
Emolovment tvoe 570
Full-time 1 — — 522 91.6 percent
Part-time 2 — — 38 6.7 percent
No answer 9 — — 10 1.8 percent
Sector 570
Service 1 — — 435 76.3 percent
Manufacture 2 135 23.7 percent
presented in Table 4.7, showed that one item ("I defer 
responsibilities I should assume to my co-workers") did not 
load well with other items. This item was dropped from the 
PWE measure used in the analyses.
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Table 4.7
Results of factor analysis of proposed effort items
Factor 1
Item 4 .23
Item 5 . 60
Item 7 .65
Item 9 . 54
Item 10 .75
Eigenvalue 1.71
Variance explained 3 4.3 percent
To consider convergent and discriminant validity (Schwab, 
1980) of the new PWE measure, the PWE items were compared 
with a job-neglect scale developed by Leek and Saunders 
(1992) and administered in the field study. Job effort and 
job neglect are considered related concepts; the positive 
and significant intercorrelation (r = .25, p < .01, n = 526) 
indicates a degree of relation between the two concepts.
Next, a common factor analysis of PWE and neglect items 
yielded a two-factor solution. This indicates that PWE and 
neglect can be empirically distinguished and provides 
evidence of discriminant validity. The four PWE items had a 
coefficient alpha of .73. In light of these results, these 
four items were used to compute individual PWE.
However, a frequency analysis of the field study 
results identified a problem of non-normality in the PWE 
measure (skewness = 3.008; kurtosis = 10.7; range = 16).
Many respondents reported they did not engage in any 
withholding of effort at work. About 62 percent of the
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individuals surveyed gave the most extreme response of 
disagreement with statements that would indicate they 
withheld effort on the job. Whereas controls for social 
desirability to take into account bias in the self-report 
PWE measure were planned, such high skewness is beyond the 
correction provided by statistical control of response 
desirability. The natural log of each respondent's PWE 
score was used in subseguent analyses and hypothesis testing 
to adjust for non-normality of the dependent variable 
(Johnson & Wichern, 1988).
Additional measures of withholding effort
The non-normality of the PWE scale, which resulted in a 
range restriction problem, and the collection of the PWE 
measure and several of the independent variables from the 
same source, focused the need to use other measures that 
reflect employee PWE. A strong social desirability response 
bias —  beyond what could be statistically controlled —  may 
have affected PWE responses as well. By using alternative 
dependent variable measures, a better judgment regarding the 
efficacy of the proposed model may be forthcoming.
The following variations of the dependent variable were 
measured: employee self-report of job neglect (Leek & 
Saunders, 1992), supervisor perceptions of effort expended 
by each employee using a scale similar to that given to each 
employee (SPWE), and employee perceptions of the work-group 
members' tendency to withhold effort (GPWE).
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The job neglect scale provided a measure similar to 
that sought by the PWE measure. As noted, it was correlated 
with the PWE scale (r = .25, p < .01). The neglect items 
focused on how much an employee is likely to withhold 
required job duties and attempt to withdraw from work 
requirements by avoiding the boss, calling in sick when not 
sick, daydreaming and generally not providing job effort. 
Because of these similarities to withholding of job effort, 
the measure was used to test the hypotheses.
Frequency analysis showed responses on the neglect 
scale to be skewed, though not to the extent of the PWE 
scale (skewness = 2.5; kurtosis = 9.1; range = 30). 
Respondents were less likely to deny ever engaging in job 
neglect (33 percent) than to deny ever withholding effort.
To correct for skew, the natural log of each respondent's 
neglect score was used in the analyses.
The supervisor measure (SPWE) provided an estimate of 
each employee's PWE from a different source than employee 
self-report. The supervisor, while expected to be familiar 
with effort given by each member of the work group, cannot 
observe all employees at all times, in part due to some of 
the factors of interest in this study, i.e., work-group 
size, interdependence and task visibility. Whereas this 
circumstance negates a supervisor's ability to accurately 
measure effort, the supervisors' perceptions are important 
because of their role in performance appraisal, work-place
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discipline and other outcomes that could have a serious 
impact on the employee. Whereas supervisor judgments of 
employee PWE may be flawed due to lack of visibility, their 
views regarding effort expended would be much more 
consequential to the employee than a self-report measure.
In addition, although the supervisor might want to 
provide a favorable response on each employee (so as to 
reflect favorably on his or her own supervisory abilities), 
there is less incentive for the supervisor to provide a less 
than candid response to the researcher. Employees may 
believe that if they report lack of effort or job neglect 
such information will be used against them, despite 
assurances of confidentiality. The SPWE measure was not 
correlated with the PWE self-report measure.
The perceived group PWE (GPWE) was a third measure of 
the dependent variable considered in the analysis. Whereas 
employee perception of PWE by other work-group members may 
not reflect a particular employee's actual PWE, this measure 
was included to aid in evaluating other findings and provide 
grounds for future research at a group level of analysis. 
GPWE was correlated with PWE (r = .09, p < .05).
Common factor analyses were conducted on items 
comprising the job neglect scale, a group propensity to 
withhold effort scale (GPWE) and a supervisor report of 
employee PWE (SPWE). These results are shown in Table 4.8. 
When a reliability analysis was performed, the results
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Table 4.8
Results of factor analyses: Job neglect, GPWE and SPWE
Job neglect factor loadings
Factor 1
Item 1 . 66
Item 2 .70
Item 3 . 56
Item 4 .49
Item 5 .72
Item 6 .71
Eigenvalue 2 . 49
Percent of 
variance explained 41.6%
Group propensity to withhold effort factor loadings
Factor 1 Factor 2
Item 1 . 60 .32
Item 2 . 18 .31
Item 3 . 67 . 00
Item 4 .81 . 07
Item 5 .85 .09
Item 6 .86 . 11
Item 7 . 65 . 08
Item 8 . 57 . 12
Item 9 .84 . 06
Item 10 -.09 . 44
Item 11 . 50 . 04
Item 12 . 12 . 69
Item 13 . 03 . 53
Eigenvalues 4.82 1. 07
Percent of 
variance explained 37% 8 .2%
Supervisor report of employee PWE factor loadings
Factor 1
Item 1 .81
Item 2 . 88
Item 3 . 88
Item 4 . 62
Item 5 .71
Item 6 . 88
Eigenvalue 3 . 89
Percent of 
variance explained 64 .8%
1 1 0
indicate that five items should comprise the job neglect
scale (alpha = .91; n = 556), nine items should make up a
GPWE scale (alpha = .90; n = 556), and six items should
comprise an SPWE scale (alpha = .91; n = 558). The items
are listed in Exhibit 4.3.
Exhibit 4.3 
Alternative measures of dependent variable
Job Neglect: How likely would you be to engage in the 
following behaviors at work?
*1. Avoid working by talking to co-workers, attending to 
personal business, daydreaming, etc.
*2. Put in less effort in your work than you know you can.
*3. Show up late for work even when you could make it on time.
4. Deliberately avoid your boss.
*5. Take more and longer breaks than you should.
*6. Call in sick even when you are not sick.
PWE (Supervisor measure): This employee ...
*1. Defers responsibilities he/she should assume to co-workers. 
*2. Gives less effort on the job when others around to do 
the work.
*3. Gives less effort than other members of the work group.
*4. Avoids performing housekeeping tasks as much as possible.
*5. Leaves work for the next shift that he/she should really 
complete.
*6. Takes it easy if others are around to do the work.
Group Propensity to Withhold Effort
*1. Members of my work group give 100 percent effort on the job
2. I expect members of my work group to give 100 percent effort
in the future.
Some members of my work group:
*3. Defer responsibilities they should assume to other members. 
*4. Put forth less effort on the job when others are around 
to do the work.
*5. Do not do their share of the work.
*6. Give less effort than other members of the work group.
*7. Avoid performing housekeeping tasks as much as possible.
*8. Leave work for the next shift that they should really 
complete.
*9. Take it easy if others are around to do the work.
10. Contribute to lowering production costs in this company.
*11. Are absent from work more than others in this company.
12. Make an effort to increase this work group's reputation.
13. Contribute to a work environment that is free of safety 
and health problems.
* - Used in measure.
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Independent variables. Independent variables measured 
in this study included wage premium, work-group size, task 
interdependence, perceived task visibility, group effort 
norms, distributive justice, altruism, turnover and length 
of service heterogeneity. This section describes 
statistical properties of item measures.
To establish an effort norms measure, common factor 
analysis was performed on the six items identified in the 
pre-test. All six items loaded on one factor as shown in 
Table 4.9. In light of the factor analysis and a subseguent 
reliability analysis of these six items, Items 2, 16 and 21, 
which all loaded above .40 in the factor analysis, should be 
used to compute individual perceptions of work-group effort 
norms. These three items had a coefficient alpha of .74.
Table 4.9
Results of factor analysis: Work-group effort norms
Factor 1
Item 2 . 68
Item 4 . 12
Item 7 . 37
Item 10 .28
Item 16 . 64
Item 21 .78
Eigenvalue 1.71
Variance explained 28.5 percent
Table 4.10 presents means, standard deviations and 
alpha levels and number of items used to measure 
independent variables: altruism, task interdependence, 
effort norms, distributive justice, and perceived task 
visibility. Although the interdependence measure did not
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Table 4.10
Results of reliability analysis: Independent variables
Scale Mean S.D.
# of 
items Aloha n
Altruism 19.10 4 .20 5 .78 556
Interdependence 20.45 3 . 80 5 . 67 556
Effort norms 16.98 3.90 3 . 74 556
Distributive
justice
12.84 5.31 3 .85 558
Perceived task 
visibility
24.85 6.35 5 .70 556
reach the threshold of .70 suggested for exploratory 
research (Nunnally, 1978), all other scales reached or 
exceeded this recommended level.
Control variables. Control variables in this study 
were group cohesiveness, social desirability, organization 
membership, labor market area unemployment rate and 
perceived ease of movement to another job. This section 
reports statistical information regarding item scales used 
in the field study.
Reliability analysis revealed that an eight-item group 
cohesiveness scale, described in Chapter 3, had an alpha 
level of .88 (X = 44.32, SD = 10.08, n = 555). Group 
cohesiveness was strongly correlated with effort norms (r = 
.60, p < .01) and altruism (r = .62, p < .01). A three-item 
perceived ease of movement scale, also described in Chapter 
3, had an alpha of .73 (x = 9.87, SD = 4.98, n = 559).
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A Kuder-Richardson reliability estimation (K-R 20) was 
performed on the social desirability scale, which had a 
dichotomous response format. To run the K-R 20 reliability 
estimation, formula and procedures outlined in Gatewood and 
Feild (1990) were used. ‘'Correct" scores were given to 
respondents who answered the survey questions in a socially 
desirable manner whereas "incorrect" scores were awarded to 
those who did not answer in a socially desirable fashion.
The K-R 20 analysis showed internal consistency of .64 for 
the 16 items that comprised the scale. This score compares 
favorably to previous measures of internal consistency 
reported for this scale and is considered acceptable 
(Paulus, 1991).
Analyses
Hypothesis 1 was tested using multiple hierarchical 
regression with control variables, including unemployment 
rate and perceived ease of movement to another job, entered 
first, followed by the wage premium. The remaining 
hypotheses were first tested using zero-order correlations 
and then partial correlations controlling for social 
desirability.
The synthesized motivation model was then tested using 
a multiple hierarchical regression analysis. Such an 
analysis allows for control of multiple factors that may 
provide incentives for employees to withhold effort in 
performing their jobs. After control variables (social
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desirability, group cohesiveness, unemployment rate, 
perceived ease of movement, and organization membership) 
were entered, the set of rational choice variables was 
entered, followed by sets of normative conformity and 
affective bonding variables.
This order of entry does not reveal the unique 
contribution of each variable set, thus a test for the 
significance of unique contribution in explaining variance 
in PWE by each variable set (Cohen & Cohen, 198 3) was 
performed. Unfortunately, there were more than 100 survey 
respondents for whom wage premiums could not be computed 
because they performed jobs that were not listed in the BTA 
Economic Research Institute report, which provided average 
labor market wage for particular jobs in most of the labor 
markets included in the study. Thus, these individuals were 
not included in the multivariate analyses.
Supplementary analyses were performed on demographic 
variables to determine if heterogeneity of age, gender, race 
or education distributions in the work group were related to 
any of the PWE measures.
Results
Correlational analyses. Appendix F provides a 
correlation matrix of all variables (n = 556). Table 4.11 
shows partial correlations of PWE, job neglect, SPWE and 
GPWE —  with proposed explanatory variables, controlling for 
social desirability. Also, Table 4.11 contains partial
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Table 4.11
Partial correlations controlling for social desirability
PWE Neglect SPWE GPWE
Wage Premium -.03 . 01 . 06 .16
E < .28 .45 . 09 . 001
n = 438 439 439 436
Work Group Size .05 . 01 .10 .23
E < . 12 . 44 . 01 .001
n = 513 515 510 513
Interdependence -.03 -.10 .01 -.07
E < .31 . 02 .40 . 05
n = 513 515 510 513
Perceived -.05 -.08 -.11 -.14
Task Visibility E < . 14 . 04 . 005 .001
n = 513 515 510 513
Effort Norms -.10 -.27 -.04 -.32
E < . 02 . 001 . 16 . 001
n = 513 515 510 513
Distributive -.02 . 02 -.16 -.13
Justice E < .33 .33 . 001 . 001
n = 513 515 510 513
Altruism -.15 -.19 -.07 -.49
E < . 001 . 001 . 05 . 001
n = 513 515 510 513
Turnover Rate -.08 -.08 -.03 .02
E < . 04 . 04 .22 .48
n = 521 522 518 519
L.O.S. Hetero­ -.02 -.08 . 04 .05
geneity E < .33 . 04 . 19 . 15
n = 521 522 518 519
correlations of perceived task visibility with work-group 
size and task interdependence, again controlling for social 
desirability.
Hypothesis 1 stated that PWE would be negatively 
associated with payment of a wage premium, controlling for
1 1 6
labor market area unemployment rate and other alternative 
employment opportunities. The hypothesis was tested using 
hierarchical regression so controls for alternative 
employment opportunities, social desirability, cohesiveness 
and organization could be included. The results of this 
analysis with PWE as the dependent variable, shown in Table 
4.12, indicate support for Hypothesis 1.
When PWE was replaced with SPWE as the dependent 
variable in the regression model shown in Table 4.12, wage 
premium was negatively related to SPWE at a marginal level 
of significance (b = -.135, p = .07) in Step 2. When job 
neglect and GPWE were employed as dependent variables in 
this multiple regression model, no support for Hypothesis 1 
was found. Results of zero-order and partial correlations 
indicate varied levels of support for the other hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2, a positive relationship between work­
group size and PWE, is weakly supported by the zero-order 
correlations when a one-tailed test of significance is used 
(r = .0789, p < .10). When controlling for social 
desirability, PWE's relation to work group size is not 
statistically significant. This leads to the suspicion that 
the relation of PWE and work group size was a chance 
correlation. However, work group size was positively 
correlated with SPWE (r = .103, p < .05) and GPWE (r = .239, 
p < .001). These relationships between work group size and
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PWE
Table 4.12 
regression results: Wage premium
Variable Step 1 Step 2
b SE b SE
Group Cohesiveness -.034" .015 -.033** .015
Social Desirability -.345*" .133 -.327*** .132
Unemployment Rate -.009 .028 -.009 .027
Perceived Ease of Movement .011 .011 .010 .011
Organization 2 -.044 .096 -.002 .096
Organization 3 -.098 .095 -.036 .096
Organization 4 -.154 .097 -.074 .100
Organization 5 -.036 .079 .122 .091
Organization 6 -.038 .106 -.016 .105
Organization 7 -.062 .081 -.037 .080
Organization 8 -.079 .119 -.044 .119
Organization 9 -.021 .011 .224* .332
Organization 10 -.023 .090 .217* .120
W age Premium -.053*** .018
Constant 2.016*“ .270 2.12— .267
R2 .069 .088
A R2 .019
F 2.449***
ri
A F 8.889*'*
N o t e :  n  = 4 4 2
* E < .10 ” E < .0 5 ““ E -01
GPWE and SPWE held when controlling for social desirability.
Therefore, two of the four variants of the dependent 
variable had a strong positive correlation with increasing 
group size. This result supported one of the most often 
observed findings in laboratory studies regarding social
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loafing: that as group size increases, there is greater 
likelihood that individuals will withhold effort.
Hypothesis 3 predicted a negative relationship between 
work group size and perceived task visibility. This 
hypothesis is supported by correlational (r = - .13, p <
.01) and partial correlational (r = -.11, p < .01) tests.
Hypothesis 4, predicting a positive relationship 
between task interdependence and withholding effort, is not 
supported when using the PWE measure (r = -.05, ns), the job 
neglect scale (r = -.12; p < .01) or the SPWE and GPWE 
measures. In all instances, the task interdependence 
variable was negatively related to the PWE variants; in only 
one of these instances was the relationship significant.
Hypothesis 5 predicted a negative relationship between 
task interdependence and perceived task visibility. It is 
also contradicted by the data (r = .16, p < .001). The 
findings relative to hypotheses 4 and 5 call into question 
the efficacy and the meaning of the task interdependence 
measure to survey respondents. A problem of measure 
reliability may have resulted in these findings, or the 
findings may indicate a need to reexamine a theoretical view 
of the relationship between task interdependence and 
withholding effort. The contrarian findings regarding task 
interdependence will be discussed further in Chapter 5.
Consistent with Hypothesis 6, PWE is negatively 
correlated with perceived task visibility (r = -.08, p <
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.05). Job neglect is also negatively correlated to 
perceived task visibility (r = -.10, p < .05) as are SPWE (r 
= -.15, p < .001) and GPWE (r = -.18, p < .001). As seen in 
Table 4.11, three of the four relations hold when 
controlling for social desirability. These findings echo 
much of the literature in the area of shirking and social 
loafing, supporting theoretical models (e.g., Jones, 1984) 
and empirical findings (e.g., George, 1992; Latane, Harkins 
& Williams, 1979).
Hypothesis 7 posited that perceived effort norms would 
be negatively related to PWE. This hypothesis was generally 
supported as effort norms were negatively correlated with 
PWE (r = -.08, p < .05), job neglect (r = -.29, p < .01) and 
GPWE (r = -.35, p < .001.) The correlation of effort norms 
with SPWE was negative but not significant. When 
controlling for social desirability, these findings are 
repeated. Whereas the literature indicated that negative 
relations between effort norms and PWE should be expected 
(Heckathorn, 1990), this finding provides empirical evidence 
regarding the importance of norms on effort levels.
Hypothesis 8, a negative relationship between 
distributive justice and PWE, is not supported when the PWE 
scale is used as the dependent variable (r = - .01, ns). 
However, the other three variants of the dependent variable 
are correlated with distributive justice at varying levels 
of significance: Job neglect (r = - .07; p < .10); SPWE (r
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= -.17; p < .001) and GPWE: (r = -.16; p < .001). SPWE and
GPWE are negatively correlated with distributive justice 
perceptions, even when social desirability is controlled. 
These findings lend support to the importance of equity 
norms (Kerr, 1983) and to equity theory (Adams, 1963): 
employees are less likely to lower effort levels if they 
perceive that rewards are fairly tied to their efforts.
Hypothesis 9 is supported as PWE has a negative 
relationship to perceived altruism (r = -.14, p < .01) in 
the work group. Similar results were found when the other 
three variants of the dependent variable were used: job 
neglect (r = -.22, p < .01), SPWE (r = -.09, p < .05), and 
GPWE (r = -.51, p < .001). These relations held when 
controlling for social desirability. Whereas altruism and 
other social values have been described as important 
determinants of behavior, particularly in social dilemma 
(e.g., Liebrand, 1986) and public goods (e.g., Rapoport, 
1987) research, this study provided evidence that the 
presence of altruistic behavior in work groups is strongly 
related to members' effort levels.
Finally, Hypotheses 10 and 11 were not supported by the 
results. Hypothesis 10 predicted a positive relationship 
between turnover rate and PWE. Three of the four variants 
of the dependent variable had a negative relationship with 
the turnover rate but only one of these correlations 
approached significance, PWE (r = -.07, p < .10). However,
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when controlling for social desirability, both PWE and job 
neglect were negatively related to turnover rate at a .05 
level of significance. Considering the sample size and the 
large number of correlations, these findings could be due to 
chance. Another concern is the percentage of respondents 
who belonged to work groups in which there had been no 
turnover in the last 12 months (greater than 40 percent). 
These two factors may have contributed to this finding, thus 
it is important to continue to examine relationships between 
PWE and turnover rate.
Hypothesis 11 proposed a positive relationship between 
length of service heterogeneity and PWE. This hypothesis 
received no support across all four variants of the 
dependent variable.
Multivariate analyses. Whereas correlational analysis 
describes relationships of the variables in isolation, 
multivariate analysis was required to determine to what 
extent the three sets of variables explain PWE and to 
ascertain if the study's hypotheses are supported when 
controlling for other factors. Multiple hierarchical 
regression analyses were used for these tests. Tables 4.13, 
4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 show results of hierarchical regression 
analyses for the four variants of the dependent variable.
In these analyses, 13 control variables (social 
desirability, cohesiveness, unemployment rate, perceived 
ease of movement and organization dummy variables) were
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entered first, followed by rational choice variables, 
normative conformity variables and affective bonding 
variables. When PWE was used as the dependent variable 
(Table 4.13), results indicate that the control variables 
explained 7 percent of the variance in PWE ( F 13 429 = 2 . 449 , p 
< .01). When the variables sets were entered, rational 
choice variables explained an additional 2 percent of the 
variance in PWE (A F17 425 = 2.227, p = .07) at a marginal
level of significance, but the normative conformity 
variables did not explain additional variance in PWE (A F15 427 
= .25, p = .779). When the three affective bonding 
variables were entered, they explained an additional 1.5 
percent of the variance in PWE at a marginal level of 
significance (A F16426 = 2 . 371 , p = .07).
The squared multiple correlation of PWE with the three 
sets of variables was obtained to determine the amount of 
unique variance explained by each variable set (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983). General F tests on the variable sets revealed 
that the rational choice variables (SR2B = .02, F4419 = 2 . 34 ,' 
p < .1) and the affective bonding variables (SR2B = .015, 
f3,42o = 2.33, p < .1) made a unique contribution to variance 
explained, but only at a marginal level of significance.
When all variables are entered into the hierarchical 
regression with PWE as dependent variable, no support is 
found for relations implied by the synthesized motivation 
model. When all variables had been entered, social
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desirability explained most of the variation in PWE. Wage 
premium was again negatively related to PWE, supporting 
Hypothesis 1 (b = -.055, p < .01). Altruism was negatively 
related to PWE (b = -.044, p < .10), providing weak evidence
Table 4.13
Results of hierarchical regression analysis: 
Propensity to withhold effort
Variable Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Group Cohesivencss -.034** .015 -.032** .016 -.027 .019 -.017 .020
Social Desirability -.346*** .132 -.324** .133 -.333** .134 -.332** .134
Unemployment Rate -.009 .027 -.010 .028 -.011 .028 -.013 .028
Perceived Ease of Movement .011 .011 .010 .011 .011 .011 .013 .011
Organization 2 -.044 .095 -.000 .097 -.002 .097 .080 .106
Organization 3 -.098 .095 -.039 .097 -.M 3 .097 -,M5 .098
Organization 4 -.154 .097 -.074 .101 -.079 .101 -,M 7 .102
Organization 5 -.036 .079 .122 .095 .118 .096 .140 .097
Organization 6 -.038 .106 .002 .108 .000 .108 -.002 .108
Organization 7 -.062 .081 -.038 .081 -.037 .081 -.009 .082
Organization 8 -.079 .119 -,M 0 .120 -.039 .120 -.010 .124
Organization 9 -.021 .105 .226* .133 .220 .134 .222* .133
Organization 10 -.023 .090 .228 .145 .224 .145 .214 .145
Wage Premium -.053*** .018 -.052*** .018 -.055*** .018
Work Group Size -.000 .002 -.000 .002 -.000 .002
Interdependence -.005 .022 -.003 .022 -.003 .022
Perceived Task Visibility -.002 .014 -.002 .014 -.003 .014
Distributive Justice ,0M .010 .006 .010
Effort Norms -.009 .016 -.001 .016
Altruism -.044* .025
Turnover Rate -.157** .078
LOS Heterogeneity .002 .051
Constant 2.161*** .270 2.147*** .286 2.166*** .288 2.255*** .292
R2 .069 .088 ,089 ,1M
A R 2 .019 .001 .015
F 2.449*** 2.418*** 2.182*** 2.226***
A F 2.227* .779 2.371*
Note: n = 442. * E <  . 1 0 * *  £ < .05 * * * £  < 0 1
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supporting Hypothesis 9. Turnover rate was negatively 
related to PWE (b = -.157, p < .05), contrary to Hypothesis 
10. Social desirability was negatively and significantly 
related to self-reported PWE (b = -.332, p = .01).
Table 4.14 shows results of a hierarchical multiple 
regression analysis with job neglect as the dependent 
variable. Results indicate that control variables, such as 
social desirability and group cohesiveness, explained 9.5 
percent of the variance in neglect (F13 429 = 3 . 473 , p < .001). 
Adding rational choice variables did not explain a 
significant amount of variance in neglect (A F17,425 = . 957 , p 
= .43). However, normative conformity variables accounted 
for another 3.9 percent of the variance in neglect (A F15 427 = 
9.532, p < .001), and the three affective bonding variables 
explained another 2 percent of the variance in job neglect 
when they were entered (A F16 428 = 3 . 3 3 3 , p < .05). This 
analysis indicates support for Hypotheses 7 and 9 and 
provides evidence contrary to Hypothesis 10, but did not 
support a synthesized motivation model.
The squared multiple correlation of neglect with the 
three variable sets was obtained to determine the unique 
variance explained by each set (Cohen & Cohen, 1983). 
Significance tests revealed that the normative conformity 
variables made a unique contribution to explained variance 
(SR2B = .028, F2 421 = 6 . 99, p < .05) as did the affective 
bonding variables (SR2B = .020, F3 420 = 3 . 32, p < .05).
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Table 4.14
Results of hierarchical regression, dependent variable: 
_______________________ Job neglect ___
Variable Slep 1 Slcp 2 Slcp 3 Step 4
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Group Cohesiveness -.056*** .018 -.050*** .019 -.002 .022 .013 .023
Social Desirability -.490*** .157 -.479*** .158 -.503*** .157 -.504*** .156
Unemployment Rate .023 .033 .019 .033 .020 .032 .014 .033
Perceived Ease o f Movement .006 .013 .004 .013 .004 .013 .007 .013
Organization 2 -.083 .113 -.018 .115 -.084 .113 .034 .123
Organization 3 -.140 .113 -.025 .116 -.158 .114 -.141 .114
Organization 4 -.217* .116 -.175 .120 -.195* .118 -.163 .119
Organization 5 -.036 .094 .037 .113 .028 .112 .076 .113
Organization 6 -.261** .125 -.240* .128 -.239* .126 -.225* .126
Organization 7 -.137 .096 -.124 .096 -.128 .094 -.084 .095
Organization 8 -.129 .141 -.094 .143 -.094 .141 -.018 .144
Organization 9 .033 .124 .146 .159 .122 .156 .139 .155
Organization 10 -.131 .107 -.061 .173 -.065 .170 -.065 .169
Wage Premium -.024 .021 -.022 .021 -.027 .021
Work Group Size .001 .003 .001 .003 .002 .002
Interdependence -.039 .027 -.027 .026 -.028 .026
Perceived Task Visibility -.000 .017 .002 .016 -.001 .016
Distributive Justice .004 .012 .006 .012
Effort Norms -.080*** .018 -.070*** .019
Altruism -.056* .029
Turnover Rate -.158* .090
LOS Heterogeneity -.075 .059
Constant 2.629*** .320 2.767*** .341 2.901*** .336 3.080*** .340
R2 .095 .103 .142 .162
A R 2 .008 .039 .020
F 3.473*** 2.880*** 3.684*** 3.689***
A F .957 9.533*** 3.333**
Note: n =  442, * E < .10 ** E < .05 it it it E <  • 01
Table 4.15 contains results of a hierarchical 
regression analysis in which SPWE was the dependent 
variable. Results indicate that control variables, such as 
social desirability and perceived ease of movement, 
explained 8.9 percent of the variance in SPWE (F13 427 = 3 . 228 , 
P  < .001). Adding the set of rational choice variables 
increased R2by 2.1 percent (A F17 425 = 2.49, p < .05) whereas 
adding the normative conformity variables increased R2 by 
another 1.2 percent (A F15427 = 2.94, p = .05). However, when 
the three affective bonding variables were entered, they did 
not add to variance explained in SPWE (A F16426 = . 465 , p = 
.71). The analysis does not provide support for a 
synthesized motivation model, but supports Hypotheses 1, 6 
and 8.
The squared multiple correlation of SPWE with the three 
sets of variables was obtained to determine the amount of 
unique variance explained by each variable set (Cohen & 
Cohen, 1983) . Significance tests revealed that the unique 
variance explained by the rational choice set of variables 
was 2 percent at a level of marginal significance (SR2B =
.02, F44I9 =2.39, p < .1). The normative conformity 
variables contributed unique variance explained of 1.3 
percent (SR2B = .013, F2421 = 3 . 11 , p < .05). The affective 
bonding variables did not contribute to variance explained.
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Table 4.15
Results of hierarchical regression, dependent variable: 
 Supervisor evaluation of employee PWE (SPWE)
Variable Step 1 Slcp 2 Step 3 Step 4
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Group Cohesiveness -.054 .063 -.012 .067 -.018 .079 -.012 .085
Social Desirability -1.086* .559 -.978* .559 -.790 .562 -.783 .564
Unemployment Rate -.109 .116 -.102 .117 -.084 .116 -.076 .118
Perceived Ease of Movement .136*** .045 .127*** .045 .112** .045 .112** .046
Organization 2 -.283 .403 -.218 .407 -.256 .407 -.211 .447
Organization 3 -.559 .400 -.389 .409 -.361 .408 -.418 .413
Organization 4 -.296 .411 -.095 .424 -.016 .423 .035 .431
Organization 5 -.324 .334 .089 .400 .174 .400 .146 .408
Organization 6 -1.110** .445 -1.137** .453 -1.100** .452 -1.146** .456
Organization 7 -.233 .340 -.175 .339 -.193 .338 -.186 .345
Organization 8 -.293 .502 -.196 .506 -.221 .504 -.300 .521
Organization 9 .463 .401 1.040* .561 1.138** .560 1.100* .562
Organization 10 -.134 .381 .034 .610 .128 .609 .085 .611
Wage Premium -.149** .075 -.157** .075 -.156** .075
Work Group Size .012 .009 .013 .009 .013 .009
Interdependence .041 .094 .038 .094 .CM0 .094
Perceived Task Visibility -.125** .059 -.113* .059 -.111* .059
Distributive Justice -.098** .042 -.096** .042
Effort Norms .053 .066 .061 .068
Altruism -.047 .106
Turnover Rate -.270 .327
LOS Heterogeneity .208 .213
Constant 4.492*** 1.139 4.493*** 1.206 4.304*** 1.206 4.215*** 1.233
R2 .089 .110 .122 .125
A R 2 .021 .012 .003
F 3.228*** 3.088*** 3.098*** 2.728***
A F 2.487** 2.939** .465
Notes n = 442
* p < .10 * * P < .05 * * * p < .01
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Table 4.16 contains results of the regression analysis 
in which GPWE was used as a variant of propensity to 
withhold effort. Results indicate that control variables, 
such as group cohesiveness, explained 2 6.7 percent of the 
variance in GPWE (F13 427 = 12 . 029 , p < .001). Adding rational 
choice variables did not explain additional variance in GPWE 
(A F17 425 = .056, p = .99), whereas adding normative 
conformity variables increased variance explained by 1.3 
percent (A F15427 = 3 . 78 , p < .02). When the three affective 
bonding variables were entered, they explained an additional 
6.4 percent of the variance in GPWE (A F 16426 = 13 . 56 , p < 
.001). This hierarchical regression analysis does not 
support a synthesized motivation model, but it provides 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 9.
The squared multiple correlation of GPWE with the three 
sets of variables was again obtained to determine the amount 
of unique variance explained by each set (Cohen & Cohen, 
1983). F tests revealed that rational choice and normative 
conformity variables did not significantly contribute to 
variance explained while the affective bonding variables 
contributed 6.5 percent unique variance explained (SR2B =
• 063, F3 42g == 13.26, p < .001).
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Table 4.16
Results of hierarchical regression, dependent variable: 
_________Employee evaluation of group PWE (GPWE)
Variable Step 1 Slcp 2 Step 3 Step 4
b SE b SE b SE b SE
Group Cohesiveness -.350*** .041 -.351*** .044 -.277*** .052 -.159*** .053
Social Desirability -.111 .366 -.111 .370 -.076 .371 -.121 .356
Unemployment Rate -.087 .076 -.086 .077 -.078 .077 -.029 .074
Perceived Ease of Movement -.017 .030 -.018 .030 -.024 .030 -.016 .029
Organization 2 .155 .264 -.139 .269 -.210 .269 -.401 .282
Organization 3 -.196 .262 -.171 .271 -.213 .269 -.305 .261
Organization 4 -.057 .269 -.024 .280 -.026 .279 -.122 .272
Organization 5 -.016 .219 .044 .265 .064 .264 -.034 .258
Organization 6 .246 .291 .249 .300 .265 .298 .144 .288
Organization 7 -.237 .222 -.227 .224 -.240 .223 -.296 .217
Organization 8 .485 .329 .493 .335 .484 .333 .362 .329
Organization 9 -.172 .288 -.084 .371 -.084 .369 -.091 .355
Organization 10 .202 .249 .250 .404 .282 .402 .194 .386
Wage Premium -.020 .049 -.021 .049 -.022 .047
Work Group Size .001 .006 .002 .006 .002 .006
Interdependence .000 .062 .018 .062 .054 .060
Perceived Task Visibility .004 .039 .012 .039 .025 .037
Distributive Justice -.031 .028 -.020 .027
Effort Norms -.107** .043 -.049 .043
Altruism -.415*** .067
Turnover Rate .126 .206
LOS Heterogeneity .073 .135
Constant 5.579*** .745 5.544*** .797 5.683*** .796 5.644*** .778
R2 .267 .268 .280 .344
A R 2 .000 .013 .064
F 12.029*** 9.131*** 8.674*** 10.007***
.056 3.775** 13.561***
Note: n =  442. *  E  <  . 10 * * E < .05 * * *  £  <  . 01
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Summary of hypothesis tests. Results of hypotheses 
tests by variant of the dependent variable are shown in 
Table 4.17. Although the synthesized motivation model of 
PWE was not supported by this data, the tests of hypotheses
Table 4.17 
Summary results of hypothesis tests
Hvoothesis
PWE Necflect SPWE GPWE
1 Supported NS S NS
2 Not Supported NS S S
4 Not Supported NS NS NS
6 Supported S S S
7 Supported S NS S
8 Not Supported NS S S
9 Supported S s S
10 Not Supported NS NS NS
11 Not Supported 
Task Visibilitv
NS NS NS
3 Supported
5 Not Supported
using four variants of PWE found evidence in varying degrees 
supporting Hypotheses 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 9 through zero-order 
correlations, partial correlations controlling for social 
desirability, and hierarchical regression analyses.
Evidence contrary to Hypotheses 4 and 10 was found. No 
support was found for Hypothesis 11. In a multivariate
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analysis with PWE as the dependent variable, none of the 
three sets of independent variables made a unique 
contribution to variance explained. However, multivariate 
analyses using variants of PWE indicates that the normative 
conformity and affective bonding sets of variables did make 
unique contributions to variance explained depending upon 
how the dependent variable was operationalized.
Hypotheses 3 and 5, which did not involve PWE, received 
mixed support. Hypothesis 3, which proposed a negative 
relation between group size and task visibility, was 
supported. Hypothesis 5, which proposed a negative relation 
between interdependence and task visibility, was 
contradicted by the results of the study.
Generally, the results indicate that reconsideration of 
the hypotheses within a synthesized motivation model using 
different formulations of the dependent variable may 
be a productive path for future research. The results also 
indicate that continued efforts should be made to derive 
more effective measures of propensity to withhold effort; 
measures that are not as susceptible to response bias.
Supplemental analysis: Demographic variables. A 
supplemental analysis was performed to examine relationships 
among withholding effort measures and measures of group 
heterogeneity based on age, gender, race and education. 
Appendix F contains correlations among the four measures of 
withholding effort and the four measures of demographic
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heterogeneity. Table 4.18 shows partial correlations of the 
demographic heterogeneity variables (age, race, gender, 
education) and PWE, neglect, SPWE and GPWE, controlling for 
social desirability.
Table 4.18
Partial correlations controlling for social desirability: 
Propensity to withhold effort and demography variables
Race Gender Education Age
PWE . 02 . 05 -.02 -.01
P < 
n = 529
.25 . 13 .38 .30
Neglect -.05 . 08 .01 -.03
P < 
n = 530
. 15 . 03 .40 .23
SPWE .01 . 02 -.07 -.03
P < 
n = 521
.43 .30 . 05 . 28
GPWE .19 -.01 . 05 -.03
P < 
n = 526
. 001 .45 . 13 .25
As seen in Appendix F, racial heterogeneity in work 
groups is positively related to employee self-report of PWE 
(r = .08, p < .10) and positively related to GPWE, the 
individual's evaluation of fellow work group members (r = 
.21, p < .001). Heterogeneity of gender in the work group 
is positively related to job neglect (r = .09, p < .05). 
These relations indicate that when a work group is more 
highly mixed, either by race or by gender, there is a
1 3 3
greater tendency for work group members to withhold effort 
or perceive that fellow group members might withhold effort.
As seen in Table 4.18, when social desirability is 
controlled, the results indicate that heterogeneity of 
education in the work group is negatively related to 
supervisor report of employee PWE. The positive relation 
between heterogeneity of race and GPWE persists even when 
controlling for social desirability. This is an interesting 
finding in that when groups are more racially mixed, 
respondents tended to rate their co-workers lower in 
providing work group effort.
In summary, whereas the data collected in this study 
did not reveal length of service heterogeneity relationships 
with withholding effort as hypothesized, the findings among 
other demographic variables and withholding effort show a 
need for further research into relationships between 
diversity within organizational work groups and withholding 
effort.
Other results of interest. Other results that do not 
relate to the hypotheses and supplemental analyses should be 
mentioned. Three variables included as controls in this 
study were generally related to employee propensity to 
withhold effort across variants in the dependent variable 
measure. These variables were group cohesiveness, social 
desirability and perceived ease of movement.
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The inclusion of these variables as controls indicates 
an a priori belief they would be related to the dependent 
variables. As expected, the social desirability measure was 
negatively related to PWE. The relation of the other two 
measures to PWE was less clear when this study began.
Correlational and multivariate analyses indicate that 
group cohesiveness was negatively related to the four 
variants of the PWE measure. Members of highly cohesive 
groups were more likely to withhold less effort. These 
relations held even when supervisors measured employee PWE 
and when group members were asked to evaluate fellow members 
of their work groups.
Additional multivariate analyses were conducted with 
the group cohesiveness variable removed because of its high 
correlation with the effort norm measure, and the potential 
for multicollinearity. A negative relationship between 
effort norms and PWE was found, as hypothesized, in these 
hierarchical regression analyses. This provides evidence 
that presence of the group cohesiveness variable masked 
relationships between effort norms and PWE in analyses that 
considered both of these variables.
Analyses shown in this chapter generally found positive 
relations between perceived ease of movement and PWE across 
all four variants of the dependent variable. Employees who 
believed they could easily move to another similar job were 
more likely to withhold effort. The findings regarding work
group cohesiveness, perceived ease of movement and social 
desirability can aid in designing future theoretical and 
empirical studies of the PWE phenomenon.
CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This chapter discusses the study results shown in 
Chapter 4, elaborating on support for the research 
hypotheses, and offering possible explanations for lack of 
support for other hypotheses. The contributions and 
limitations of the study are discussed. This discussion is 
followed by potential applications of the findings and by 
suggestions for future research.
Chapter 1 posed two questions: (a) whether Knoke's
model was an appropriate theoretical framework in which to 
study PWE, and (b) how variables based on the three elements 
of the model explain an individual employee's PWE. In 
response to those questions, this study detected a lack of 
support for the complete model but found evidence that 
rational choice, normative conformity and affective bonding 
contextual variables all play some role in explaining 
employee PWE. Whereas the framework of a synthesized model 
appears applicable to PWE, the model's elements did not work 
together to directly explain PWE in this study.
The most significant contributions of this dissertation 
are: (a) a comprehensive synthesis of theory and research
into PWE from the disciplines of economics, psychology, 
sociology and management, (b) the application to and test of 
Knoke's synthesized motivation model in multiple work 
organizations, (c) the finding that variables representing
1 3 6
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the three elements of the proposed model —  rational choice, 
normative conformity and affective bonding incentives —  are 
connected to PWE, and d) the discovery that normative and 
affective bonding variables played a more significant role 
in PWE than rational choice variables. In reaching these 
conclusions, the study addressed an area often overlooked in 
management research: how contextual elements influence
individual behavior and perception in organizations 
(Cappelli & Sherer, 1991) .
Support for Hypotheses
The most consistent finding in this study across the 
varying measures of the dependent variable —  PWE self- 
report, job neglect self-report, group PWE report, PWE 
supervisor report —  was for the negative relations 
hypothesized between PWE and perceived task visibility, 
effort norms and altruism. Each of these variables 
represents a different portion of the synthesized motivation 
model: perceived task visibility (rational choice), effort 
norms (normative conformity), and altruism (affective 
bonding). Thus, although a synthesized motivation model 
(Knoke, 1990) was not indicated, portions of the model were 
supported in separate analyses.
Negative relations between wage premium and PWE, while 
controlling for alternative employment opportunities, were 
found in two of four variants of the dependent variable.
This result is consistent with previous tests of the
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efficiency wage hypothesis (e.g., Cappelli & Chauvin,
1991a). A positive relationship between work-group size (an 
objective indicator) and PWE was supported in different 
degrees across two of the four variations of the dependent 
variable. This finding supports various laboratory studies 
regarding social loafing (e.g., Latane et al., 1979).
Support for Hypothesis 8 —  a negative relation between 
distributive justice and PWE —  was found in two of four 
variations of PWE measured in this study. Norms of equity 
and reciprocity (Schnake, 1991a; Stroebe & Frey, 1982) in 
affecting decisions to contribute effort have been viewed as 
important variables in this line of research by sociologists 
focusing on collective action (e.g., Marwell & Ames, 1981) 
as well as social psychologists concerned with social 
loafing (e.g., Kerr, 1983).
Results consistent with the hypotheses appeared with 
greater frequency when a group measure of PWE (GPWE) and a 
supervisor evaluation of employee PWE (SPWE) were analyzed 
than when self-report measures of PWE and job neglect were 
employed. The frequency analysis indicated that levels of 
skewness and lack of variance in responses may have been 
responsible for the lower number of significant findings 
when PWE and neglect were used as dependent variables. 
Problems with the psychometric properties of PWE scale items 
could have contributed to these results.
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More than 60 percent of respondents reported that they 
never withheld effort at work or neglected their jobs- Even 
those who admitted to PWE or neglect were prone to social 
desirability response bias. The skewness problem was 
attenuated but not eliminated by controlling for social 
desirability.
The low reported PWE could be due to lack of trust of 
the researcher and the employer, questions of 
confidentiality about the research, placement of PWE items 
close to the start of the survey, or to a form of self- 
serving bias in which an employee shifts blame for low 
effort to external factors such as unproductive co-workers.
However, it is possible that the surveyed employees 
never withheld job-related effort. This explanation may be 
less likely than the other alternatives because most of the 
pre-test sample admitted withholding effort to some degree. 
Because they were not part of actual work groups, pre-test 
respondents may have been less prone to fear that 
information they gave would be used against them, and thus 
may have responded with greater veracity.
Another important finding involved a consistently high 
correlation between social desirability and self reports of 
PWE and job neglect. These results indicated that social 
desirability should be a construct of theoretical interest 
when considering employees' responses to the question of 
whether they withhold effort. Further consideration of PWE
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models should devote more attention to the possible 
influence of self-deception by employees who do not want to 
admit that they withhold effort at any time. In cases such 
as this, there are no procedures to identify potential 
contamination (Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992).
In this study, alternative measures of withholding 
effort were obtained from the employee's supervisor, and the 
prevalence of withholding effort in the work group was 
measured. Although these efforts address some of the 
problems that occurred in the self-report measure, they do 
not consider the potential impact of response bias on 
individual PWE measured by questionnaire. The potential 
influence of impression management indicates that a non­
normal distribution of PWE responses may not be an unusual 
occurrence if similar measures are used in future research.
Despite these problems, several relationships were 
found between PWE and the independent variables when 
attempting to control for response bias. Those "common 
method" results were confirmed when measures of employee PWE 
obtained by the supervisor was considered as a dependent 
variable. It is encouraging that several relations 
consistent with the hypotheses were found when employees 
were asked to evaluate fellow group members. These findings 
generally indicated that when low effort norms, low task 
visibility, low equity and low altruism were perceived, an
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employee was more likely to report that his or her co­
workers did not provide full effort.
Unsupported Hypotheses 
Several hypotheses did not receive support. This may 
indicate problems with the data and the measures as well as 
the model. When the model was tested using PWE and neglect 
self-reports by bringing in sets of independent variables, 
variance explained increased in very small amounts. In some 
instances, increased variance explained was insignificant.
Considering the findings when alternative measures such 
as SPWE and GPWE were used, these non-significant results 
could have stemmed from lack of variance in PWE and neglect. 
The low R-squares and correlations found with these 
predictor variables improved when GPWE and SPWE were used as 
dependent variables. Use of GPWE and SPWE increased 
variance in the dependent variable. However, even when GPWE 
and SPWE were used as dependent variables, results did not 
support a synthesized model.
Hypotheses 4 and 5, dealing with relationships between 
interdependence and PWE and interdependence and perceived 
task visibility were not supported. This finding may be a 
fault of the measure; the alpha was .67, below the usual 
reliability threshold for exploratory research (Nunnally, 
1978). However, theoretical explanations for these results 
may be more appropriate. When interdependence rose, 
employees believed task visibility increased. When
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interdependence increased, some employees reported lower 
GPWE and job neglect. This may indicate that the 
interdependence perceived by employees allowed no latitude 
for them to withhold effort or neglect their jobs.
In addition, positive relations between interdependence 
and task visibility may indicate that tasks were so 
interdependent the supervisor may have had to be directly 
involved in the task and thus could better observe 
employees. The findings indicate that this hypothesis 
should be reconsidered in future research.
Whereas there are instances when interdependence may 
allow employees to hide from the supervisor and increase 
PWE, there are other cases in which interdependence would 
not permit PWE because employees are working so closely with 
each other that withholding effort could cause an entire 
operation to fail. Incorporating measures of task variety 
and analyzability (Perrow, 1970) in future research may 
better enable evaluation of the task interdependence-PWE 
relationship.
Regarding Hypothesis 10, turnover, the data indicated a 
relation opposite to what was hypothesized in two of the 
four variants of PWE. Almost half of the groups in this 
study experienced no turnover in the last year. Because 
these correlations are so low, it is possible the findings 
resulted from chance.
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Future research at the group level of analysis would be 
important to determine if respondents' feelings about the 
behaviors of other group members were influenced by the idea 
of repeated plays (Axelrod, 198 6), measured by the turnover 
rate. A measure such as social integration or work place 
interaction may better capture repeated plays in future 
research. The strong relation between cohesiveness and PWE 
may be more indicative of the role of repeated plays than a 
raw turnover rate.
Lastly, there was no support for Hypothesis 11, 
demographic heterogeneity as measured by length-of-service 
distribution. The potential relation between demography and 
withholding effort may be more effectively explored by using 
individual dissimilarity through a distance index (e.g., 
Price & Harrison, 1993). This measure considers how 
dissimilar employee X is from other members of the group. 
This approach may be more effective in linking demography 
and withholding effort, particularly in light of 
relationships found among other measures of demographic 
heterogeneity (race and gender) and PWE measures.
Contributions
This study's most significant theoretical contribution 
was the synthesis of three varied research streams from 
economics, sociology, and psychology into a model of 
propensity to withhold effort in organizational work groups. 
The most significant empirical contribution of the study is
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that contextual elements of rational choice, normative 
conformity and affective bonding incentives were shown to 
have an impact on an employee's on-the-job PWE even though a 
synthesized model was not supported. These results provide 
the groundwork for future research by pointing out how 
contextual variables may act together to influence an 
employee's willingness to produce full effort on the job.
By conducting this study in a field setting, it was 
possible to measure affective bonding (altruism, turnover, 
heterogeneity) in ways not possible in a laboratory setting. 
The negative relation between altruism and PWE in an on­
going work group is a significant finding, backing up the 
idea that non-calculative incentives are an important 
determinant of behavior (Knoke, 1990), even in a situation 
of economic exchange.
The results were also consistent with those of George 
(1992) in regard to the role of perceived task visibility, 
and generally consistent with the tenets of the social 
loafing perspective: increased group size relates to 
declines in individual effort (e.g., Latane, et al., 1979). 
The influence of size has been repeatedly found in the 
laboratory, but has rarely been tested in field settings.
In addition, the findings indicated the importance of 
perceived effort norms in influencing an employee's PWE.
The study results showed the importance of group effort 
norms among work-group members in affecting the behavior of
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employees in work groups. Influence of norms has been seen 
in laboratory studies (e.g., Marwell & Ames, 1981; Kerr, 
1983). This study provided evidence from existing work 
groups of its effect on PWE, possibly as a form of clan 
control (Ouchi, 1981), or as partial gift exchange (Akerlof, 
1982, 1984).
The results demonstrated the importance of group 
cohesiveness in determining employees' PWE. Cohesiveness 
was negatively associated with all four variations of the 
dependent variable; to the greatest degree with employee's 
perception of how much effort fellow group members put into 
their jobs. Whereas there are indications in previous 
research that cohesiveness contributes to reduction of 
social loafing in a lab setting (Karau & Williams, 1992b), 
this study found a similar relation in a field setting. The 
relationship between cohesiveness and PWE was not 
hypothesized a priori because it was unclear as to whether 
closely bonded employees in on-going groups would act 
together to reduce or to increase effort. These results 
indicated the latter, at least from a perceptual standpoint.
The model tested in this study included variables that 
reflect rational cost-benefit analysis stressed in economics 
(e.g., agency theory; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), and 
transactions costs economics (Williamson, 1975), and applied 
to management research (e.g., Jones, 1984; Barney & Ouchi, 
1986). It included variables that reflect normative
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conformity and affective bonding concerns of sociologists 
(e.g., Knoke, 1990; Knoke & Wright-Isak, 1982; Macy, 1990; 
Marwell & Oliver, 1988). Taken alone, neither set of 
variables considered how an individual's predisposition to 
act may be affected by an on-going social system.
On a macro level, Granovetter (1985) criticized 
economists who tried to bring social structure into their 
explanations of organizational phenomena because their 
efforts viewed social influence as an external force that 
sets action in motion and has no further effects. An on­
going debate centers on whether a narrow model of human 
motivation advanced by industrial organization economists is 
appropriate to study behavior in organizations (cf. Barney, 
1990, Donaldson, 1990).
This study's findings that mixed motivations 
contributed to employee contribution of effort indicated 
that rational cost-benefit calculations as well as the 
impact of norms and affective bonding should be considered 
in doing research on behavioral predispositions. A key in 
future research will be in determining how much of which 
type of motivation most greatly affects PWE, and whether 
behavior is more greatly affected by norms imposed 
internally or norms sanctioned by social control —  
externally imposed by the organization or by fellow group 
members. As Macy (1993) noted in his work on collective 
action and free riding, internalized fairness norms may lead
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to too much cooperation toward a collective effort while 
external sanctions may provide too little.
Finally, it is intriguing that in this study of 
economic organizations non-calculative incentives such as 
norms and altruism played a greater role than rational 
choice variables in determining propensity to withhold 
effort. One might expect contrary results when a model 
proposed for the study of voluntaristic organizations —  in 
which use of norms and affective bonding may be prevalent —  
is applied to economic organizations.
Limitations
There are several limitations to this study. First, 
many of the measures were obtained from the same source: a 
survey of employees on the dependent and independent 
variables. Common method variance can jeopardize construct 
validity; however, in this study, when a measure of the 
dependent variable was obtained from a different source, the 
findings produced by surveying employees were often 
duplicated.
In addition, support for hypotheses involving objective 
indicators (i.e., work-group size) was found to some extent. 
Ordering the survey with dependent variables first 
(propensity to withhold effort) and independent variables 
second (task visibility, perceived effort norms) also 
addressed the potential for problems with self-report 
measures (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986).
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However, the ordering of the dependent variable could 
have led to another problem noted about self-report 
measures: item context effects (Harrison & McLaughlin,
1993). The sensitivity of the information sought may have 
led to initial anxiety on the part of the subjects (Roberson 
& Sundstrom, 1990); such anxiety could have affected the PWE 
responses and responses to other questionnaire items.
The skewness problem with the dependent variable was 
addressed by transforming the PWE variable and by using 
variations of the dependent variable measure, such as 
neglect (also transformed), SPWE and GPWE. These remedies 
indicated stronger evidence supporting several of the 
hypotheses and had no effect on others.
Internal validity could have been threatened in this 
study because in considering multiple organizations, there 
are many ways for work groups to differ other than on the 
independent variables. Testing in a single state, testing 
for differences among employees on other factors, and use of 
controls for organization membership were among the efforts 
undertaken to confront this limitation. Yet, work groups 
are never quite the same on all factors, and lack of random 
assignment to treatment conditions and the possibility of 
self-selection through use of questionnaire measures raises 
the potential for alternative explanations of the results. 
Every effort can be made to minimize differences, but work­
group history could have affected these results.
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The use of Louisiana companies has an impact on the 
generalizability of the findings. The advantages of 
conducting this research in Louisiana were practical: it was 
part of a larger study connected to the state's major 
university, and this connection helped obtain access to 
multiple businesses, which were needed to provide the 
sample, and resulted in less costly data collection.
The disadvantages concerned threats to external 
validity in that the results can only be generalized to 
populations that closely correspond to the population of 
businesses in Louisiana. This generalization may be 
difficult because other areas differ from Louisiana, 
particularly in recent economic trends, but the lack of 
generalizability is not a major concern. All research 
involves trade-offs, and the study was designed to maximize 
other types of validity by use of rigorous sampling 
procedures, item and data analysis.
Another limitation was that data were unavailable for 
more than 100 respondents regarding labor market area wages 
for the jobs they performed. This resulted in hierarchical 
regression models —  tests of the synthesized motivation 
model —  including only four out of five survey respondents. 
Although significant negative relations were found between 
PWE and the interaction of wage premium and unemployment 
rate, inclusion of 100 more respondents may have provided 
additional information to evaluate this finding and others.
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Applications 
Group performance has an important influence in 
improving organizational effectiveness (Bettenhausen, 1991). 
The results of this study could be applied to the design of 
work groups in an effort to make them more successful.
First, under the premise that more successful work groups 
are those in which the members provide full effort, the 
results provided information on several factors that 
influence withholding effort.
Second, the results provided information on how to draw 
up baseline measures to aid in selecting successful work 
teams and project teams. Third, propensity to withhold 
effort focused on task effort in this study and such a focus 
may help distinguish between contributions to task with 
contributions to quasi-task effort such as maintenance 
factors, work-group reputation, work-place safety and 
organizational citizenship.
In addition, the results could contribute to an 
organization's strategy in determining which forms their 
work groups should take and how those work groups might be 
supervised. The importance of establishing strong effort 
norms and altruism within the work group indicated that 
management should not solely view financial rewards and 
other personal recognition as the contextual factors that 
influence how much effort is produced.
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Directions for Future Research 
The positive results of this study produce several more 
questions for future research. The shortcomings in some of 
the measures and the lack of significant support for some of 
the hypotheses also reveals a need for additional study.
The significant findings that occurred when employees 
were asked to evaluate the PWE of fellow group members 
points out the need for more research at the group level of 
analysis. Future research should consider the impact of 
variables that are considered to be group-level variables, 
such as group norms, cohesiveness, group interdependence and 
altruism, on PWE perceptions at a group level of analysis. 
The importance of cohesiveness indicated a need to more 
rigorously test the impact of that group level variable on 
an employee's PWE. It would be helpful to replicate the 
finding here that cohesiveness has negative effects on 
employee PWE, through use of other, more objective measures 
of effort, if available, in a field setting.
In future research into the PWE concept, better 
measures should be sought. A major shortcoming of this 
study was skewness of the major dependent variable measure. 
Individuals were unlikely to admit to withholding effort at 
work. If quantifiable measures that actually measure effort 
rather than performance, are available, they should be 
considered in future research. In addition, it may be 
useful to employ measures of self-limiting behavior (Veiga,
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1991) in future consideration of PWE. Self-limiting 
behavior has been used as a surrogate measure for social 
loafing (Price & Harrison, 1993) and includes such 
dimensions as inattention, carelessness and withdrawal. One 
can debate whether these dimensions represent PWE, but the 
concepts are potentially related.
Having noted the problem with social desirability 
response bias, it may be important to design impression 
management and deception scales into future theoretical 
work. It would also be meaningful to consider non­
threatening ways to measure objective effort in the field as 
is done in the laboratory. Laboratory researchers have used 
strain gauges and cheerleading experiments to measure effort 
in PWE studies. Field researchers need to develop similar 
measures, perhaps in the area of job-related computer 
simulation. It is important to remember that these measures 
should consider effort rather than performance.
Spicer (1985) proposed that the type of incentive, or 
reward, system should moderate the way some of the variables 
discussed in this study would be related to PWE. He 
proposed that reward system would moderate the influence of 
group size, interdependence, altruism, and turnover rates on 
PWE. Using Spicer's reasoning, the relation between 
perceived effort norms and PWE may also be moderated by the 
organization's reward system.
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This study did not obtain variance in reward system 
needed to test its moderating influence on relations between 
the independent variables and PWE. It is anticipated that 
future studies may isolate those receiving group rewards and 
those rewarded based on relative individual efforts. Once 
this is accomplished, it will be possible to test whether 
type of reward system moderates the relations of several 
variables of interest in this study, including work-group 
size, group effort norms and altruism, to PWE.
Another potential avenue of inquiry is the relation 
between organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) and 
propensity to withhold effort. Such research would extend 
the work done in this study, which considered altruism, an 
OCB dimension, as an antecedent to effort. PWE has been 
viewed in terms of doing less work than required or expected 
whereas OCBs are generally presented in terms of performing 
acts that are beyond what is required or expected. Of 
further interest are potential relations of courtesy, civic 
virtue, sportsmanship and other behaviors to the common good 
of a work group, that is, its reputation, low production 
costs and safe working conditions.
In addition, future research should consider whether 
the implications of withholding effort may differ in service 
industries when compared to manufacturing industries. 
Withholding effort when in direct contact with a customer 
might have quite different ramifications than withholding
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effort when manufacturing a product. In the latter case, 
organizations may have more capable mechanisms to prevent 
the behavior from having an impact on the company.
Contextual factors such as norms may play different roles 
depending upon whether the activity takes place while 
performing a service or making a product.
Lastly, future research should apply the findings of 
this study to more specific types of groups and teams, such 
as top-management teams, project teams or quality teams. It 
would be interesting to determine if the relationships found 
and not found in this study of generic work groups translate 
to specific types of work groups, or if there are moderating 
influences among different kinds of organizational teams.
Conclusion
Much research has been done in laboratory settings 
concerning the prevalence of free riding, social loafing and 
shirking in small temporary groups. However, previous 
research had not tested a comprehensive model of suggested 
contextual predictors of the propensity of employees to 
withhold effort in a single framework in multiple 
organizations. This study filled that gap in by 
constructing and testing a model that includes formal and 
informal contextual variables mentioned in previous 
conceptual work and in some instances tested.
Whereas elements of context advanced in this model did 
not directly explain large amounts of variance in PWE,
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context should be considered in future research as a 
potential moderator of relationships between individual or 
psychological mechanisms and PWE. Some of these mechanisms 
include felt dispensability (e.g., Weldon & Mustari, 1988), 
intrinsic motivation (e.g., George, 1992), and task 
attractiveness (Zaccaro, 1984). For example, strong effort 
norms and perceived altruism in work groups may enhance the 
effects of intrinsic motivation and task attractiveness and 
negate the effects of felt dispensability on an employee's 
willingness to provide effort.
Psychological mechanisms such as role clarity and role 
ambiguity may also have an impact on PWE, and these effects 
again may be moderated by contextual variables. For 
example, employees may not provide full effort because they 
do not understand how to perform a task. Task 
interdependence, group size, and group norms could influence 
the degree to which an employee obtains needed clarity that 
might lessen the degree of PWE.
This study's focus on context can be the first step in
a research program that examines these issues in different
types of groups as well as in different types of
organizations, i.e., the public sector. The results 
reported here provoke interesting questions that should be 
addressed as contextual causes of withholding effort 
continue to be examined.
ENDNOTES
1. Olson's book The Logic of Collective Action (1965) 
inspired research into free riding at different levels of 
analysis in various areas. Much of this research —  
applications across organizations (e.g., Lenway & Rehbein, 
1991), collective strategy and free riding (e.g., Carney, 
1987) and effects of free riders on right to work laws and 
unionization (e.g., Zax & Ichniowski, 1991) —  is not 
related to the individual level of analysis that will be 
used in this study, so it will not be discussed in detail.
2. Albanese and Van Fleet (1985a) and Stigler (1974) 
suggested that "cheap rider" more accurately describes such 
a group member because gaining benefits usually involves at 
least some cost, and a pure free rider is an exception.
There are two characteristics of free-rider hypotheses. 
Under a strong free-rider hypothesis, none of a group's 
members will contribute because there is too much 
opportunity to free ride. For example, a softball team may 
not practice because all of the players regard practice to 
be too costly when weighed against the public good of 
improved team performance. In a weak free-rider hypothesis, 
provision of a public good will be less than needed, because 
some members free ride whereas others contribute (Stigler, 
1974). For example, most players practice, but a few cheap 
riders only show up for games. Thus, team performance, is 
not as optimal as it could have been if all had practiced.
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APPENDIX A
ARTICLES RELEVANT TO THE TOPIC OF WITHHOLDING EFFORT
TERM
USED
TYPE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS
MANAGEMENT
Jones,
1984
FR/
SH
T Model suggests that free 
riding and shirking mediate 
relations between structure/ 
technology & outcomes
Albanese & 
Van Fleet, 
1985a
FR T Free rider theory and research 
reviewed; importance of 
altruism & fairness norms 
stressed
Weldon & 
Gargano, 
1985
SL E/L Social loafing effects 
occurred when Ss working on 
judgment tasks believed they 
were working alone rather than 
with another person
Spicer,
1985
SH/
PG
T Applied public choice theory 
to study of providing effort 
in work group
Weldon & 
Mustari, 
1988
SL E/L Feeling dispensable can cause 
social loafing effects while 
feeling needed can motivate 
effort
Earley,
1989
SL E/L Collectivistic work beliefs 
moderate social loafing 
effects
Judge &
Chandler,
1990
SH E/F Found individual level 
moderators of shirking 
propensity, e.g. job 
satisfaction, race, age
Schnake, 
1991a
SL/S
E
E/L Sucker effect occurs in co­
acting groups and goal setting 
more effectively reduces it 
than punishment
George, 
1992
SL E/F Relation between task 
visibility and social loafing 
was strongest when worker's 
intrinsic involvement was low
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TERM
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TYPE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS
Cooper, 
Dyck & 
Frolich, 
1992
SD/
FR
E/L Fair distribution rules, 
participatively developed, can 
temper social dilemmas that 
are inherent in gainsharing 
plans
Miles & 
Greenberg, 
1993
SL E/F Social loafing effects 
attenuated and swimmers' group 
performance improved when Ss 
faced punishment
ECONOMICS
Alchian & 
Demsetz, 
1972
SH T The need to reduce shirking 
via monitoring was major 
reason for establishment of 
classical firm
Jensen & 
Meekling, 
1976
M/AC T Combined theories of property 
rights, agency and finance to 
develop a theory of ownership 
structure; focused on 
relations between principal 
(owner) and agent (manager)
Leibowitz
&
Tollison,
1980
SH E/F Optimal law firm size to 
control shirking and free 
riding is about five
Akerlof, 
1982
SH T Partial gift exchange: Worker 
effort depends on norms 
determining fair day's work
Akerlof,
1984
SH T Tied partial gift exchange 
hypothesis to efficiency wage 
theory of unemployment
Yellen,
1984
SH T Explanation of how efficiency 
wage hypothesis explains 
unemp1oyment
Hamermesh, 
1990
SH E/F Further growth in on-the-job 
leisure would reduce 
productivity; eliminating 
breaks would be counter­
productive
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TERM
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TYPE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS
Cappelli &
Chauvin,
1991
SH E/F Greater wage premiums 
associated with lower levels 
of shirking
Krueger, 
1991
SH E/F Monitoring difficulty 
influences timing & generosity 
of compensation
SOCIOLOGY
Marwell & 
Ames, 1979
FR E/L Small groups w/ a person who 
has an interest in public good 
invest more than other groups
Alfano & 
Marwell, 
1980
FR E/L Important normative and 
perceptual factors may 
influence individual decisions 
to contribute toward public 
goods
Marwell & 
Ames, 1980
FR E/L Ss persisted in investing in 
public goods despite 
conditions designed to 
maximize advantages of free 
riding
Marwell & 
Ames, 1981
FR E/L Economics students invested 
less in public goods than 
subjects in previous 
experiment
Oliver, 
Marwell & 
Teixeira, 
1985
CM/
FR
T Advanced logic of critical 
mass to explain how 
contributing to provision of 
public goods occurs
Macy, 1990 CM/
FR
T Extended critical mass theory 
by applying social learning 
theory to decisions about 
contributing to provision of 
public goods
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
Ingham, 
Levinger, 
Graves & 
Peckham, 
1974
SL E/L Replicated Ringelmann effect; 
individual performance 
declined when more people 
participated in a group's task
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TERM
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TYPE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS
Condie, 
Warner & 
Gillmann, 
1976
FR E/F Blood drive donors had less 
free riding tendencies and 
felt more social pressure to 
donate
Latane, 
Williams & 
Harkins, 
1979
SL E/L Average sound pressure 
produced per person decreased 
as group size increased
Harkins, 
Latane & 
Williams, 
1980
SL E/L Social loafing seems to occur 
when Ss perform in groups 
regardless of whether they 
also perform alone
Orbell & 
Dawes, 
1981
SD T Suggested altruism as a 
possible motivation that may 
resolve some social dilemmas
Williams, 
Harkins & 
Latane, 
1981
SL E/L Identifiability of individual 
effort eliminated social 
loafing
Harkins &
Petty,
1982
SL E/L Unique or difficult tasks 
reduced or eliminated social 
loafing effects
Kerr, 1983 SD/
FR
E/L Group members reduce effort if 
they believe a capable partner 
is free riding
Kerr & 
Bruun, 
1983
SL E/L On disjunctive tasks, Ss w/ 
low ability gave less effort 
than high ability Ss. On 
conjunctive tasks Ss w/ high 
ability gave less effort
Zaccaro,
1984
SL E/L Task attractiveness moderated 
social loafing effects in work 
groups of two to four
Jackson &
Harkins,
1985
SL E/L Found that equity-in-effort 
approach (sucker effect) 
helped explain social loafing
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TERM
USED
TYPE MAJOR CONCLUSIONS OR RESULTS
Harkins,
1987
SL E/L Social loafing and social 
facilitation can be viewed as 
complementary paradigms, 
rather than separate research 
streams
Harkins &
Szymanski,
1989
SL E/L Allowing a group to evaluate 
its performance eliminated 
loafing effects
Williams & 
Karau,
1991
SL E/L People worked harder 
collectively when they expect 
co-workers to perform poorly 
on a meaningful task
Shepperd, 
1993
SL/
FR/
SE
T Proposed expectancy theory as 
a framework to organize 
research on social loafing, 
free riding and the sucker 
effect in performance groups
Key to Appendix A
Terms: SH (Shirking); SL (Social Loafing); FR (Free Riding); 
CM (Critical Mass); M (Monitoring); AC (Agency Costs); SE 
(Sucker Effect): PG (Public Goods).
Type of Study; T (Theoretical); E (Empirical); L (Lab); F 
(Field)
APPENDIX B
VARIABLES, MEASURES AND SOURCES
Variables
ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES: Wage Premium
GROUP CHARACTERISTIC VARIABLES: Group Size, Length of 
Service Demography, Turnover Rates
PERCEIVED TASK CHARACTERISTICS: Interdependence
PERCEIVED GROUP CHARACTERISTICS: Perception of Task 
Visibility, Perceived Peer Compliance Effort Norms,
Perceived Degree of Altruism, Distributive Justice
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: Propensity to Withhold Effort
CONTROL VARIABLES: Organization Membership, Group 
Cohesiveness, Social Desirability, Perceived Job 
Alternatives
Measures and Sources
Wage premium: Group average wage minus market wage for 
job. Source: work group supervisor; BTA Economic Institute, 
1992 Geographic Reference Report: Annual Report of Costs, 
Wages, Salaries and Human Resource Statistics.
Group size: Number of people reporting to the 
supervisor in that work group; Source: supervisor.
Task interdependence: Five items that collectively 
reflect reciprocal interdependence, from Pearce & Gregersen, 
1991; Source: employee survey.
Perceived task visibility: Five-item scale used in an 
earlier study (George, 1992); Source: employee survey.
Perceived compliance effort norms: 22 original items, 
variations of these items were suggested by Kerr and Slocum 
(1987) and in Van de Ven and Ferry (1980). Source: employee 
survey.
Distributive justice: Three items drawn from Martin 
(1987); Source: employee survey.
Perceived altruism: Five items that make up a subscale 
of the organizational citizenship behavior measure developed 
by Smith, Organ and Near (1983); Source: employee survey.
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Length of service demographic heterogeneity: 
Dissimilarity in length of service distribution in work 
group; Source: employee provided length of time in the work 
group; coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided 
by the mean) was computed for each group (Allison, 1978).
Turnover rates: Number gone from work group, voluntary 
and involuntary over last 12 months; percentage turnover 
calculated based on this information; Source: supervisor.
Propensity to withhold effort: Ten items drawn from 
Judge and Chandler (1990), George (1992), and five original 
items tapping dimensions of PWE; four of these items used to 
measure PWE in field study. Source: employee survey.
Job neglect: Six-item scale from Leek and Saunders 
(1992); Source: employee survey.
Group PWE: 15 items, drawn from Judge and Chandler 
(1990), George (1992) and original items developed for this 
study. Adaptation asked employees to evaluate PWE (shirk, 
loaf, free ride) of fellow workers; Source: employee survey.
Supervisor evaluation of employee PWE: Six-item scale, 
developed from proposed PWE scale through factor analysis of 
pre-test; Source: supervisor survey.
Group cohesiveness: Eight-item scale from Dobbins and 
Zaccaro (1986); Source: employee survey.
Social desirability: A 16-item, two-point "Responding 
Desirably on Attitudes and Opinions" (RD-16) (Schuessler, 
Hittle & Cardascia, 1978) was used on the field survey; 
Crowne and Marlowe's (1960) 32-item social desirability 
measure was used on the pre-test. Source: employee survey.
Perceived ease of movement: Three-item scale based on 
O'Reilly and Caldwell (1981) and Gerhart (1990); Source: 
employee survey.
Average group wage: Average hourly wage paid to members 
of the work group; Source: supervisor survey.
Market wages: Average wage paid in the labor market for 
the job performed by work group members; Source: BTA
Economic Institute, 1992 Geographic Reference Report: Annual 
Report of Costs, Wages, Salaries and Human Resource 
Statistics.
Unemployment rate: Average unemployment rate over the 
last 12 months in the labor market; Source: Louisiana 
Department of Labor.
APPENDIX C 
PRE-TEST INSTRUMENT
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RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire is designed to measure your attitudes and 
opinions concerning some job-related matters. Please answer 
these questions as though you were describing the job you 
now hold and your current work group. If you are not now 
employed/ please answer about the job you most recently 
held. Your answers will be kept strictly confidential.
1. In this job, how many people, including you, report to 
the same supervisor? ____________________
PART I
PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER
NEVER ALWAYS
1. How often do you give
100 percent effort on the job? 1 2  3 4 5
2. How often do you expect to 
give 100 percent effort in the
future? 1 2  3 4 5
3. How often do you perform
duties that are not formally 1 2  3 4 5
required by your job
description?
How characteristic is each of the following item of you 
in terms of your job?
4. I defer responsibilities 1 1 2  3 4 5
should assume to my coworkers.
5. I put forth less effort on
the job when others are around 1 2  3 4 5
to do the work.
6. I do not do my share of
the work. 1 2  3 4 5
7. I give less effort than 
other members of the work
group. 1 2  3 4 5
8. I avoid performing 
housekeeping tasks as
much as possible. 1 2  3 4 5
9. I leave work for the 
next shift that I should
really complete. 1 2  3 4 5
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NEVER ALWAYS
10. I take it easy if others
are around to do the work. 1
11. I contribute to lowering 
production costs in
this work group. 1
12. I am absent from work 
more than others in
this work group. 1
13. I make an effort to 
increase this work group's 
reputation. 1
14. Improving the equipment 
used by this work group
is not my concern. 1
15. I contribute to a work 
environment that is free of 
safety and health problems. 1
PART II
PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
4 5
STRONGLY
DISAGREE
STRONGLY
AGREE
1. My coworkers and I have
a strong sense of tradition.
2. My coworkers and I stress 
teamwork.
3. It is the supervisor's job 
to see that my coworkers and 
work as hard as we can.
4. There is a great deal of 
pressure from my coworkers 
to exert effort.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5 6 7
5 6 7
5. My coworkers and I don't 
talk much about the way we 
do our jobs.
6. My coworkers and I care 
about each other's well 
being.
5 6 7
5 6 7
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STRONGLY STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
7. My coworkers and I are 
rewarded here based on how 
well our group does its
job. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. My coworkers rarely worry
about how hard I am working. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
9. The supervisor has little 
impact on how hard we work
here. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
10. My coworkers and I have 
little obligation to work 
together to do the best
job we can. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11. Maintaining close 
friendships is important
to my coworkers and me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
and me.
12. My coworkers and I 
regularly socialize
together. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
13. I have a great deal of 
independence from my
coworkers. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
14. My co-workers do not
urge me to work hard. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
15. Each member of this 
work group is rewarded 
based on how well that 
person does the job, 
compared to other
members. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
16. In this work group, 
we expect everyone to pull 
together to get the job
done. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
17. It is routine for my 
coworkers and I to get 
together during non-work
hours. 1 2  3 4 5 6 7
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How much do members of your work group do the following 
things?
18. Compete with each other to 
achieve performance targets.
19. Gang up on the person whose 
work is far below that of the 
others.
20. Gang up on the person whose 
work far exceeds that of the 
others.
21. Encourage individuals to 
excel and strive for 
increasingly higher levels 
of work performance.
22. Try to get ahead at the 
expense of other work group 
members.
NOT AT VERY
ALL MUCH
PART III
PLEASE CIRCLE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER
1. Members of my work group 
help others who have been absent.
2. Members of my work group 
volunteer for things that are 
not required.
3. Members of my work group 
orient new people even though they 
are not required to do so.
4. Members of my work group help 
coworkers who have heavy workloads.
STRONGLY STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
5. Members of my work group make 
innovative suggestions that help 
improve the department. 1 2 3 4 5
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PART IV
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
STRONGLY DISAGREE STRONGLY AGREE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_____  1. Before voting, I thoroughly investigate the
qualifications of all of the candidates.
_____  2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help
someone.
_____  3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work
if I am not encouraged.
_____  4. I have never intensely disliked anyone.
_____  5. On occasion I have had doubts about my ability to
succeed in life.
_____  6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.
_____  7. I am always careful about my manner of dress.
_____  8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat
out at a restaurant.
_____  9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be
sure I was not seen I would do it.
_____  10. On a few occasions, I  have given up doing
something because I thought too little of my ability.
_____  11. I like to gossip at times.
_____  12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling
against people in authority even though I knew they were 
right.
_____  13. No matter who I  am talking to, I am always a good
listener.
_____  14. I can remember "playing sick' to get out of
something.
_____  15.There have been occasions when I took advantage of
someone.
_____  16. I'm always willing to admit it when I make a
mistake.
_____  17. I always try to practice what I preach.
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_____  18. I don't find it particularly difficult to get
along with loud-mouthed obnoxious people.
_____  19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive
and forget.
_____  20. When I don't know something, I don't at all mind
admitting it.
_____  21. I am always courteous even to people who are
disagreeable.
_____  22. At times I have really insisted on having
things my own way.
_____  23. There have been occasions when I felt like
smashing things.
______ 24. I would never think of letting someone else be
punished for my wrongdoings.
_____  25. I never resent being asked to return a favor.
_____  26. I have never been irked when people expressed
ideas very different from my own.
_____  27. I never make a long trip without checking the
safety of my car.
_____  28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of
the good fortune of others.
_____  29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone
off.
_____  30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors
of me.
_____  31. I have never felt that I was punished without
cause.
  32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune
they only got what they deserved.
  33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt
someone's feelings.
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PART V
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED
STRONGLY STRONGLY
DISAGREE AGREE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
______ 1. If given the chance, I would choose to leave my
work group and join another.
  2. Members of my work group get along well together.
______ 3. Members of my work group will readily defend each
other from criticism from outsiders.
______ 4. I feel that I am really part of my work group.
______ 5. I look forward to being with the members of my
work group each day.
______ 6. I find that I generally do not get along with
the other members of my work group.
______ 7. I enjoy belonging to this work group because
I am friends with many group members.
______ 8. The work group I belong to is a close one.
PART VI
  1. If I were to leave this job, it would be difficult
for me to find another job that was just as good.
________  2. It would be easy for me to change jobs should
I decide to do so.
________  3. There are numerous jobs as good as this one that
would be available to me if I decided to leave my current
job.
PART VII
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
STRONGLY DISAGREE STRONGLY AGREE
1 2 3 4 5
_____  1. I work closely with others in doing my work.
_____  2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with
others.
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STRONGLY DISAGREE STRONGLY AGREE
1 2 3 4 5
______ 3. My own performance is dependent on receiving
accurate information from others.
______ 4. The way I perform my job has a significant impact
on others.
______ 5. My work requires me to consult with others fairly
frequently.
______ 6. I work fairly independently of others in my work.
______ 7. I can plan my own work with little need to
coordinate with others.
______ 8. I rarely have to obtain information from others to
complete my work.
PART VIII
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
NEVER ALWAYS
1 2 3 4 5
______ 1. Think of all the activities that make up your job.
To what extent would you say that you are usually able to 
anticipate and predict the nature of these activities?
______ 2. To what extent do you usually encounter the same
kinds of problems in your work day after day?
______ 3. Many jobs require the use of search procedures of
one, kind or another to solve the problems encountered. To 
what extent are the search procedures you use similar from 
one day to the next?
______ 4. To what extent are the work decisions you make
similar from one day to the next?
______ 5. If others in your work group do not do their jobs
well, to what extent does this hinder you doing your job 
well?
______ 6. To what extent must you communicate with others in
your department in order for you to do your job well?
______ 7. To what extent is your planned work interrupted by
unexpected problems?
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NEVER ALWAYS
1 2 3 4 5
_____ 8. To what extent do you need help to solve the
unexpected problems you encounter?
PART IX
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
STRONGLY DISAGREE STRONGLY AGREE
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_____  1. I am compensated fairly for the work I do here,
based on the effort I give on the job.
_____  2. I am compensated fairly for the work I do here,
compared to my coworkers.
  3. I am compensated fairly here, considering the
responsibilities I have.
PART X
_____  1. My supervisor is generally aware of when I am
putting forth 1 below average effort.
_____  2. My supervisor is aware of the amount of work I do.
_____  3. It is generally hard for my supervisor to figure
out how 1 hard I am working.
_____  4. My supervisor usually notices when I am slacking
off.
_____  5. It is difficult for my supervisor to determine how
much effort I exert on the job.
PART XI
PLEASE WRITE THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER IN THE SPACE PROVIDED.
NEVER ALWAYS
1 2 3 4 5
_____  1. How often do members of the work group give 100
percent effort on the job?
_____  2. How often do you expect members of this work group
to give 100 percent effort in the future?
_____  3. How often do members of this work group perform
duties not formally required by their job description?
NEVER ALWAYS
1 2 3 4 5
Some members of my work group:
_____  4. Defer responsibilities they should assume to other
members.
_____  5. Put forth less effort on the job when others are
around to do the work.
_____  6. Do not do their share of the work.
_____  7. Give less effort than other members of the work
group.
_____  8. Avoid performing housekeeping tasks much as
possible.
_____  9. Leave work for the next shift that they should
really complete.
_____  10. Take it easy if others are around to do the work.
_____  11. Contribute to lowering production costs in this
company.
_____  12. Are absent from work more than others in this
company.
_____  13. Make an effort to increase this work group's
reputation.
_____  14. Believe that improving the equipment used by this
work group is an important concern.
_____  15. Contribute to a work environment that is free of
safety and health problem.
PART XII
What is your age? _____
What is your race? _____
Are you male or female? _____
How far have you gone in formal schooling? _____
Are you a full-time or part-time employee? _____
Do you supervise others in your job? _____
Please circle the correct response to the following 
statement.
My job is in the:
SERVICE SECTOR.
MANUFACTURING SECTOR.
PUBLIC SECTOR.
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS.
APPENDIX D 
FIELD STUDY INSTRUMENT
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CO ID  WG ID  EMP ID___
Employee Research Questionnaire 
College of Business 
Louisiana State University
This survey is designed to help us learn more about 
what makes work groups successful. Listed below are some 
statements about your attitudes and opinions about your job, 
your manager and your current work group. Please show the 
degree to which you agree/disagree with each statement 
regarding your job by writing the appropriate number (1 to 
5) in the blank alongside each statement. Your answers will 
be kept strictly confidential and will be seen only by 
researchers at LSU.
Strongly Neither Strongly
disagree agree nor disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5
_____  Members of my work group help others who have been
absent.
Members of my work group volunteer for things that are
not required.
_____  Members of my work group orient new people even though
they are not required to do so.
Members of my work group help coworkers who have heavy
workloads.
Members of my work group make innovative suggestions
that help improve the department,
I defer responsibilities I should assume to my
coworkers.
_____  I put forth less effort on the job when others are
around to do the work.
_____  I give less effort than other members of the work
group.
I avoid performing housekeeping tasks as much as
possible.
_____  I leave work for the next shift that I should really
complete.
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Strongly
disagree
1 2
Neither 
agree nor disagree 
3 4
Strongly
agree
5
_____  I take it easy if others are around to do the work.
_____ I work closely with others in doing my work.
_____ I frequently must coordinate my efforts with others.
_____ My own performance is dependent on receiving accurate
information from others.
_____ The way I perform my job has a significant impact on
others.
_____ My work requires me to consult with others fairly
frequently.
_____ I work fairly independently of others in my work.
 I can plan my own work with little need to coordinate
with others.
_____ I rarely have to obtain information from others to
complete my work.
_____ Members of my work group give 100 percent effort on the
job.
_____ I expect members of my work group to give 100 percent
effort in the future.
_____ Some members of my work group defer responsibilities
they should assume to other members.
_____ Some members of my work group put forth less effort on
the job when others are around to do the work.
_____ Some members of my work group do not do their share of
the work.
_____ Some members of my work group give less effort than
other members of the work group.
_____ Some members of my work group avoid performing
housekeeping tasks as much as possible.
_____ Some members of my work group leave work for the next
shift that they should really complete.
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_____ Some members of my work group take it easy if others
are around to do the work.
_____ Some members of my work group contribute to lowering
production costs in this company.
_____ Some members of my work group are absent from work more
than others in this company.
_____ Some members of my work group make an effort to
increase this work group's reputation.
_____ Some members of my work group contribute to a work
environment that is free of safety and health problems.
Please show the degree to which you agree or disagree 
with each statement regarding your job by writing the 
appropriate number (1 to 7) alongside each statement.
Strongly Neither Strongly
disagree agree nor disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_____ My coworkers and I stress teamwork.
_____ There is a great deal of pressure from my coworkers to
exert effort.
_____ My coworkers and I are rewarded here based on how well
our group does its job.
_____ My coworkers and I have little obligation to work
together to do the best job we can.
_____ In this work group, we expect everyone to pull together
to get the job done.
_____ Members of my work group encourage individuals to excel
and strive for increasingly higher levels of performance.
_____ If given the chance, I would choose to leave my work
group and join another.
_____ The members of my work group get along well together.
_____ The members of my work group will readily defend each
other from criticism from outsiders.
_____ I feel that I am really part of my work group.
_____ I look forward to being with the members of my work
group each day.
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Strongly Neither Strongly
disagree agree nor disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_____ I find that I generally do not get along with the other
members of my work group.
_____ I enjoy belonging to this work group because I am
friends with many group members.
_____ The work group I belong to is a close one.
_____ If I were to leave this job, it would be difficult for
me to find another job that was just as good.
_____ It would be easy for me to change jobs should I decide
to do so.
_____ There are numerous jobs as good as this one that would
be available to me if I decided to leave my current job.
_____ I am compensated fairly for the work I do here, based
on the effort I give on the job.
_____ I am compensated fairly for the work I do here,
compared to my co-workers.
_____ I am compensated fairly here considering the
responsibilities I have.
 My supervisor is generally aware of when I am putting
forth below average effort.
_____ My supervisor is aware of the amount of work I do.
 It is generally hard for my supervisor to figure out
how hard I am working.
 My supervisor usually notices when I am slacking off.
_____ It is difficult for my supervisor to determine how much
effort I exert on the job.
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How likely would you be to do the following behaviors 
at work?
Not at all Extremely
likely likely
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_____ Avoid working by talking to coworkers, attending to
personal business, daydreaming, etc.
_____ Put in less effort in your work than you know you can.
_____ Show up late for work even when you could make it on
time.
_____ Deliberately avoid your boss.
 Take more and longer breaks than you should.
_____ Call in sick even when you are not sick.
Please write the number in the space provided that most 
closely matches the way you feel about the following 
statements.
Never Always
1 2 3 4 5
Think of all the activities that make up your job.
 1. How much would you say you are usually able to
anticipate and predict the nature of these activities?
_____ 2. How much do you usually encounter the same kinds of
problems in your work day after day?
_____ 3. Many jobs require using search procedures of one
kind or another to solve problems encountered. How much are 
the search procedures you use similar from one day to the 
next?
 4. How much are the work decisions you make similar
from one day to the next?
 5. If others in your work group do not do their jobs
well, how much does this hinder you in doing your job well?
_____ 6. How much must you communicate with others in your
department in order for you to do your job well?
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Never Always
1 2 3 4 5
 7. How much is your planned work interrupted by
unexpected problems?
_____ 8. How much do you need help to solve the unexpected
problems you encounter?
Please circle "A" or "D " to show whether you agree or 
disagree with the following statements. Do not omit any 
items.
A D  I find that I can help others in many ways.
A D  I feel that I am better off than my parents were
at my age.
A D  In spite of many changes, there are still
definite rules to live by.
A D One can always find friends if he tries.
A D Anyone can raise his standard of living if he is
willing to work at it.
A D Most people really believe that honesty is the
best policy.
A D In general I am satisfied with my lot in life.
A D People will be honest with you if you are honest
with them.
A D It is difficult to think clearly about right and
wrong these days.
A D Many people are friendly only because they want
something from you.
A D If the odds are against you, it's impossible to
come out on top.
A D At times I feel that I am a stranger to myself.
A D The future looks very bleak.
A D I  often feel that no one needs me.
A D I am so fed up that I can't take it any more.
A D To get along with people, one must put on an act.
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Please show the degree to which you agree or disagree 
with the accuracy of each of the following statements by 
writing the appropriate number on the blank alongside each 
statement.
Strongly Neither Strongly
disagree agree nor disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_____ My supervisor knows a great deal about the technical
side of my job.
_____ My supervisor has a good understanding of the
procedures I use in my work.
_____ My supervisor provides appreciation and encouragement.
_____ My supervisor gives recognition for a job well done.
_____ My supervisor is concerned that I grow and get ahead.
 I am satisfied with my job.
_____ I am satisfied with my pay.
_____ I am satisfied with my benefits.
_____ I am satisfied with my promotion opportunities.
_____ I am satisfied with the recognition I receive.
_____ I am satisfied with the amount of say I have in how my
work is done.
_____ I am satisfied with my job security.
_____ I do not feel a strong sense of belonging to my
organization.
_____ I do not feel "emotionally attached" to this
organization.
_____ This organization has great personal meaning for me.
_____ I do not feel like part of the family at this
organization.
_____ I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career
with this organization.
_____ I enjoy discussing my organization with people outside
it.
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Strongly Neither Strongly
disagree agree nor disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I really feel as if this organization's problems are my 
own.
I could easily become as attached to another 
organization as I am to this one.
In my job, I am evaluated on the basis of (Circle one 
of the following):
A. The performance of my work group.
B. My individual performance.
C. Some combination of A and B.
Please write the number in the blank provided that 
shows your agreement about each of the following two 
statements.
Almost Seldom About half Often Almost
never the time always
1 2 3 4 5
When target performance goals for your work group are 
met or surpassed, how often do the following things happen?
_____ 1. All people in this work group are rewarded or
recognized as a group for their team achievements.
_____ 2. Specific individuals in this work group are rewarded
or recognized for their individual achievements.
When target performance goals for your work group are 
not attained, how often do the following things happen?
_____ 1. The work group is reprimanded or told to "shape up"
to improve work group performance.
_____ 2. Specific individuals in your work group are
reprimanded or told to shape up to improve their individual 
performance.
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GENERAL INFORMATION
How long have you been employed at this company?
 years____ months
How long have you been a member of this particular work 
group?  years__months
Are you (circle one): White Black Hispanic Asian Other
Are you (circle one): Male Female
How far did you go in formal schooling?
_____ 11th grade or less _____ High school diploma or GED
_____ Some College _____ College Degree _____ Graduate
School
What is your age?_____
Are you a full-time or part-time employee?_____
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS. IF 
YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS ABOUT THIS SURVEY, PLEASE 
FEEL FREE TO CONTACT ROLAND KIDWELL AT (504) 388-6150 OR 
6748.
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Supervisor Research Questionnaire 
College of Business 
Louisiana State University
On the following pages are some statements asking for 
your opinions about members of your current work group. 
Please complete a page for each employee. Your answers will 
be kept strictly confidential. The results will be seen 
only by the research staff at LSU, and all responses will be 
identified only by ID codes, not the names of individual 
respondents.
IP YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS ABOUT THIS 
SURVEY, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CONTACT ROLAND KIDWELL AT (504) 
388-6150 OR 6748. THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE.
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Please answer the following questions about your work group.
1. How long have you supervised this work group? ____  years
  months
2. How many employees do you supervise in this work group?
3. How many employees were in this work group 12 months ago?
4. In the last 12 months, how many employees in this work
group have ___ quit   been fired ___ been transferred
  been laid off?
5. How many of these employees have been replaced? _____
6. What is the average hourly pay of the members of this 
work group? _____
7. The employees I supervise are evaluated based on 
(Circle one of the following):
A. The performance of their work group.
B. Their individual performance.
C. Some combination of A and B.
Please write the number in the blank provided that 
shows your agreement about each of the following statements.
Almost Seldom About half Often Almost
never the time always
1 2 3 4 5
When target performance goals for your work group are 
met or surpassed, how often do the following things happen?
_____ 1. All people in this work group are rewarded or
recognized as a group for their team achievements.
_____ 2. Specific individuals in this work group are rewarded
or recognized for their individual achievements.
When target performance goals for your work group are 
not attained, how often do the following things happen?
_____ 1. The work group is reprimanded or told to "shape up"
to improve work group performance.
_____ 2. Specific individuals in your work group are
reprimanded or told to shape up to improve their individual 
performance.
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GENERAL QUESTIONS
How many people in your work group are:
White____
Black____
Hispanic____
Other____
How many people in your work group are:
Male____
Female____
How far did you go in formal schooling?
  11th grade or less   College Degree
  High school diploma or GED   Graduate School
  Some College
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  Employee Initials  Employee Number
What percent of the time does this employee provide 
full effort in doing his or her job? (100% = always)
Please write the number in the space provided that
shows how strongly, you agree or disagree with the following
statements about each of the employees you supervise.
Strongly Neither Strongly
disagree agree nor disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
This employee . . .
_____ Defers responsibilities he/she should assume to
coworkers.
_____ Gives less effort on the job when others are around to
do the work.
_____ Gives less effort than other members of the work group.
_____ Avoids performing housekeeping tasks as much as
possible.
_____ Leaves work for the next shift that he/she should
really complete.
_____ Takes it easy if others are around to do the work.
 Comes to work more often than the average employee.
_____ Does not take extra breaks.
_____ Obeys company rules and regulations even when no one is
watching.
_____ Is one of my most conscientious employees.
_____ Believes in giving an honest day's work for an honest
day's pay.
_____ Consumes a lot of time complaining about trivial
matters.
_____ Always focuses on what's wrong, rather than positive
side.
_____ Tends to make mountains out of molehills.
 Always finds fault with what the organization is doing.
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Strongly Neither Strongly
disagree agree nor disagree agree
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
_____ Is the classic "squeaky wheel" that always needs
greasing.
_____ Attends meetings that are not mandatory, but are
considered important.
_____ Attends functions that are not required, but help the
company image.
 Keeps abreast of changes in the organization.
_____ Reads and keeps up with organization announcements and
memos.
_____ Takes steps to try to prevent problems with other
workers.
_____ Is mindful of how his/her behavior affects other
people's jobs.
_____ Does not abuse the rights of others.
_____ Tries to avoid creating problem for coworkers.
_____ Considers the impact of his/her actions on coworkers.
_____ Helps others who have been absent.
_____ Helps others who have heavy workloads.
_____ Helps orient new people even though it is not required.
_____ Willingly helps others who have work related problems.
_____ Is always ready to lend a helping hand to those around
him/her.
APPENDIX E 
SCALE ITEMS USED IN FIELD STUDY
Altruism (alpha = .78)
1. Members of my work group help others who have been
absent.
2. Members of my work group volunteer for things that 
are not required.
'3. Members of my work group orient new people even 
though they are not required to do so.
4. Members of my work group help co-workers who have 
heavy work loads.
5. Members of my work group make innovative suggestions
that help improve the department.
Task interdependence (alpha = .67)
1. I work closely with others in doing my work.
2. I frequently must coordinate my efforts with others.
3. My own performance is dependent on receiving
accurate information from others.
4. The way I perform my job has a significant impact on
others.
5. My work requires me to consult with others fairly
frequently.
Group effort norms (alpha = .74)
1. My co-workers and I stress teamwork.
2. In this work group, we expect everyone to pull 
together to get the job done.
3. Members of my work group encourage individuals to 
excel and strive for increasingly higher levels of 
performance.
Distributive justice (alpha = .85)
1. I am compensated fairly for the work I do here, 
based on the effort I give on the job.
2. I am compensated fairly for the work I do here, 
compared to my co-workers.
3. I am compensated fairly here considering the 
responsibilities I have.
Perceived task visibility (alpha = .70)
1. My supervisor is generally aware of when I am 
putting forth below average effort.
2. My supervisor is aware of the amount of work I do.
3. It is generally hard for my supervisor to figure out
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how hard I am working.
4. My supervisor usually notices when I am slacking
off.
5. It is difficult for my supervisor to determine how
much effort I exert on the job.
Group cohesiveness (alpha = .88)
1. If given the chance, I would choose to leave my work
group and join another.
2. The members of my work group get along well
together.
3. The members of my work group will readily defend
each other from criticism from outsiders.
4. I feel that I am really part of my work group.
5. I look forward to being with the members of my work
group each day.
6. I find that I generally do not get along with the
other members of my work group.
7. I enjoy belonging to this work group because I am
friends with many group members.
8. The work group I belong to is a close one.
Perceived ease of movement (alpha = .73)
1. If I were to leave this job, it would be difficult
for me to find another job that was just as good.
2. It would be easy for me to change jobs should I
decide to do so.
3. There are numerous jobs as good as this one that
would be available to me if I decided to leave my 
current job.
2 0 7
APPENDIX F 
CORRELATIONS AMONG THE VARIABLES
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VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. PWE
2. Job Neglect . 2453
3. SPWE .003 . 1693
4. GPWE . 0892 . 1512 -.028
5. Wage Premium -.004 .020 .053 . 1583
6. Group Size .079' .001 . 1032 . 2393 . 5403
7. Interdepen. -.045 -. 1163 -.002 -.062 .047 .027
8. Task Visib. -. 0862 -. 0892 -. 1483 -. 1793 -. 1423 -.1293 . 1573
9. Eff. Norms -. 1383 -. 2893 -.056 -. 3453 -.044 -.078 . 2243 • 2783
lO.Dist. Just. -.058 -.074' -. 1713 -. 1583 . 1072 .042 .081' .2093
11.Altruism -. 1813 -. 2203 -. 0942 -. 5083 -.1493 -. 1793 . 2053 .3003
12.Turn. Rate -.073' -.066 -.001 .003 -. 2293 -.1873 -.027 -.056
13.LOS Hetero. -.001 -.062 .059 .056 -.062' -.022 .001 -.042
14.Soc. Desir. -. 1813 -. 2043 -. 1303 -. 1823 .018 -.039 .057 . 1943
15.Cohesive. -. 2033 -.2123 1353 -. 4703 -. 1533 - . 2373 . 2133 .4083
16.Unemp. Rate -. 0882 -.025 -. 1503 -. 2473 -. 5193 -. 5243 -. 0922 .082'
17.E. of Move. . 0932 .067 . 1493 .076' -. 1162 -.049 -.0842 -. 1213
18.Racial Het. .079' -.015 .022 . 2113 . 4363 . 8103 .015 -.076'
19.Gender Het. .052 . 0942 .032 .001 .043 -.010 .071' .025
20.Educ. Het. .001 .017 -.066 .063 .054 . 3073 -.073' .072'
21.Age Hetero. -.022 -.027 -.023 -.025 - . 3353 -. 4003 .032 .0982
Mean 1.593 2.005 15.50 24.91 1. 77 12.66 20.44 24.83
S.D. .342 .412 8.76 9.57 1.89 16.06 3.82 6.34
VARIABLE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
lO.Dist. Just. . 2253
11.Altruism . 5203 . 2283
12.Turn. Rate -.016 -. 1092 -.051
13.LOS Hetero. .005 -.082' -.039 . 3933
14.Soc. Desir. . 1883 . 2423 . 2013 -.053 -.060
15.Cohesive. . 6043 . 2893 . 6163 -.008 .001 . 3313
16.Unemp. Rate . 0952 .033 . 2153 . 1573 -.0872 .083' . 2323
17.E. of Move. -.1763 -. 2423 -.1233 . 1843 .1113 -. 0912 -. 2623
18.Racial Het. -.024 .002 -.1273 -.1743 .027 -.083' -. 2043
19.Gender Het. -.070 -.038 -.077' .no3 .080' .002 .016
20.Educ. Het. -.046 -.030 -.055 .024 .023 -.046 -.0942
21.Age Hetero. .019 -.079' . 0922 . 1703 . 1463 -.062 .072'
Mean 16.98 12.85 19.12 . 191 .851 13.62 44.28
S.D. 3.89 5.31 4.20 .261 . 130 2.08 10.05
VARIABLE 16 17 18 19 20 21
17. Ease of Movement .045
18. Racial Hetero. -. 4863 -.019
19. Gender Hetero. -.040 -.037 -.062
20. Education Het. . 1203 -.073' . 2943 .064
21. Age Hetero. . 3923 . 2343 -. 3543 -.041 .024
Mean 8.009 9.86 -6.13 -2.17 -.952 .223
S.D. .888 4.97 2.46 1.11 .980 . 105
' —  E £ • 1
2 —  £  < .05
3 —  E < -01
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